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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to analyze keynote
speaking in Republican national conventions from 1856 to
1964.

The study sought to determine the purposes and

characteristics of the keynote speech and to analyze the
methods and significance of the Republican keynote speaker.
Specifically, the question posed by this study was: When
viewed as a genre— as a type or kind of speech— what are
the inherently unique features of the Republican keynote
address?

As it appears in this study, the keynote speech

is a long, often vitriolic, usually ill-supported, care
fully prepared, well publicized speech, that historically
has been designed to stimulate, convince, or persuade both
the delegates and the public of the desirability or un
desirability of a course of action, an administration, a
party, a party faction, or an individual.

In recent years,

the speech has been increasingly directed to radio, tele
vision, and the press rather than to the assembled
delegates and guests.

Additionally, the speech usually

reflects the position of the party rather than merely
voicing the opinions of the speaker.
m

«

•

Vlll

This keynote speech

has long been a part of convention activity.
In order to examine the highly complex relationship
that exists among keynoter, party, occasion, and delegate,
this study attempted to ferret.out recurring ideas, themes,
methods of argument, and forms of support, rather than to
discuss techniques or ideas that occurred only occasionally.
The keynote speech is an integral part of the
observable convention, and often is not designed to function
as a kind of deliberative rhetoric w

As this study points

out, a national political convention usually has, in
addition to its deliberative function, a campaign-rally
function, a cohesive function, a compromising function* a
propaganda function, and a ratifying function.

In order

to ascertain the relationship of the keynoter to these
various functions several categories of convention criti
cisms were examined.

The keynote speakers
There was no single rationale for selecting a key
note speaker in Republican national conventions.

Newspaper

writers, scholars, and casual observers, as well as dele
gates and members of the Republican hierarchy agreed that
the speaker should have some degree of oratorical ability.
Another frequently mentioned characteristic of the person
ix

selected as keynoter was his political prowess.

Most of

the keynoters seemed to fall into two rather distinct
categories:

(1) men who already possessed considerable

power and prestige, and (2) men who were being groomed by
the party for possible future leadership.

Additional con

siderations included geography, the speaker's appearance,
or intraparty power struggles.
The theme most characteristic of Republican key
noting was that "our party is worthy of praise for its
glorious history and outstanding leaders."

This theme

was most often supported by appeals to patriotism,
emotive language, assertion, specific instances, rhetorical
questions, authority, lists of beneficial legislation,
and appeals for morality.
A second characteristic theme charged that the
"Democratic party (or a specific Democratic administration)
is inferior in many ways and deserves criticism."

This

idea was most often supported by negative ethos, and by
assertion, rhetorical questions, comparison, sarcasm,
ridicule and humor.

The remaining eight major themes were:

(3) We need unity and harmony?

(4) America is wonderful;

(5) Our fiscal policies are excellent;
zation of power is dangerous;
individual American citizen;
x

(6) The centrali

we are concerned for the
(7) Our policies provide an

impetus tor business and manufacturing;
aid the labor force;

(8) Our policies

(9) Our policies are of benefit to

agriculture; and (10) Our policies on tariff and trade
are sound.
Although drastic changes have occurred in the
evolution of the Republican keynote speech, the speech
has not become a purposeless vestige of the convention.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The use of a national party convention as a method
for nominating candidates for president and vice-president
dates back in an unbroken line to the election of 1832.
Richard C. Bain has remarked that "neither the virility of
the system nor the general public acceptance of convention
decisions as legitimate— for a period of one hundred and
thirty years— can be attributed to chance."'*'
It has long been argued that the bombastic oratory
and emotional demonstrations that accompany nominating con
ventions are undignified and purposeless activities.

Bain

thinks that
. . . there is considerable justification for the
criticism, especially if conventions are thought
of simply as agencies for making nominations and
developing a party platform.
These functions are
indeed the central reason for the existence of the
system as an institution— but they are also func
tions that must depend heavily on the enthusiastic
and devoted participation of a vast number of people. 2
One of the activities that has traditionally evoked enthusi
asm and widespread attention has been the keynote speech.

-*-Richard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting
Records (Washington, D. C.:
The Brookings Institution,
1960), p. 3.
2Ibid., p . 7.
1

This speech, which was classified by Mark Sullivan as "a
combination of oratory, grand opera and hog-calling," is the
subject of this study.
KEYNOTING DEFINED
Traditionally, the speech of the temporary chairman
of the convention has been labeled as the keynote speech.
The only three exceptions to this procedure occurred in the
Republican national conventions of 1952, 1956, and 1960.

In

these years, the Republican national committee created two
separate positions— a temporary chairman to preside while
the permanent organization was being formed and a keynote
speaker whose sole responsibility was to give a speech.

In

their 1964 convention, the Republicans returned to the
earlier practice of having the temporary chairman deliver
the keynote.
Definitions of the keynote speech and the keynote
speaker have ranged from serious analysis to ridicule; many
w riters, however, have merely ignored the existence of the
institution.
Writing in the Dictionary of Civics and Government,
Marjorie Tallman defines the keynote speech as "the address
delivered by the temporary chairman of a National Nominating
Convention which in flamboyant style reviews the political
situation

attempts to heal discords, and urges the

gathering

on to greater efforts for victory.

. . .1,3

Sperber

and Trittschuh attempt to define keynoting in terms of its
historical development:

(a) keynoting in American politics

originally referred to any act or agency which set the domi
nant tone for public acts;

(b) "a definite statement to which

a party attunes its campaign"; and (c) "that a further narrow
ing is found in the 20th century when the keynote address
becomes a regular feature of the party convention:

the

speech which calls upon the party to accept the challenges
for which it is so eminently suited."

(These writers also

include a statement attributed to Will Rogers that "a keynote
speech is press notices of the Republican Party written by
its own members.")^

Another authority, Eugene J. McCarthy,

states that the keynote speech is
. . . an address to the convention designed to arouse
the delegates' enthusiasm and to promote a sense of
loyalty and unity to ones' party.
The keynote address
is usually given early in the proceedings of the con
vention.
Sometimes it has a decisive impact on the
convention and also on the campaign, either in setting
the general tone for the party effort, in arousing
enthusiasm for major candidates, or in actually develop
ing a candidate.5
Writing in the 1964 Guide to Conventions and Elections, S. M.

•^Marjorie Tallman, Dictionary of Civics and Government
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1953), p. 148.
^Hans Sperber and Travis Trittschuh, American Politi
cal Terms: An Historical Dictionary (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1962), p. 225.
Eugene J. McCarthy, The Crescent Dictionary of
American Politics (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1962),
p. 87.

Mirkin defines a keynoter as "a politician who delivers the
keynote address early in a convention's proceedings; this
address is the party's theme song, outlining its ideals and
objectives."0

The keynote speech, as it appears in this

study, is a long, often vitriolic, usually ill-supported,
carefully prepared, well publicized speech, that historically
has been designed to stimulate, convince or persuade both the
delegates and the public of the desirability or undesirability
of a course of action, an administration, a party, a party
faction, or an individual.

In recent years, the speech has

been increasingly directed to radio, television, and the
press rather than to the assembled delegates and guests.
Additionally,

the speech usually reflects the position of

the party rather than merely voicing the opinions of the
speaker.^

This keynote speech has long been a part of con

vention activity.
WHY STUDY KEYNOTING IN REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS?
The writer feels that there are six reasons why a
study of Republican keynoting is necessary.

First, 'the fact

that the keynote address has existed for over a hundred years

®S. M. Mirkin (ed.), 1964 Guide to Conventions and
Elections (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1964),
p. 252.
^For a detailed discussion of the functions and pur
poses of the keynote speech, refer to Chapter IV.

appears to indicate that it has at least minor importance in
the affairs of the convention.

Both David and Bain have sug

gested that an organization with widespread membership needs
a periodic convocation where members of the laity can mingle
with the professional leadership and that all such gatherings
have "characteristically featured some sort of ritual or dis
play . . .

of whatever kind, such manifestations are meant to

instill in an organization's membership a sense of belonging
O
to the group."
Second, the keynote speech is worthy of
study because of the outstanding speakers who have often
served as keynoter.

Included in this group of influential

men are Earl Warren, Elihu Root, Douglas MacArthur, Warren G.
Harding, Charles W. Fairbanks, and Harold Stassen.

In his

preface to The Politics of National Party Conventions, Paul
T. David suggests a third reason for studying keynoting by
observing that,
. . . the more clearly the operations of these institu
tions are seen and understood, the more readily it will
be possible to devise efforts designed to improve their
effectiveness in the general service of government— and
the easier it will be to stave off changes that might be
adverse to the general welfare.
This, fundamentally, is
the most weighty practical reason for pursuing the study
of the details and interrelationships of that central
political operation, the choice of presidential candi
dates .9
A fourth reason for studying keynoting is the widespread

®Bain, op. c i t ., p. 7.
^Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain,
The Politics of National Party Conventions (Washington, D..c.:
The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 7.

attention and publicity that the speech receives.

A study

conducted at the University of Miami showed that "there was
more viewing of the MacArthur speech (59.3 per cent) than of
any other convention or post convention political event in
the 1952 campaign."

This rating compares with 52.1 for

Hoover's speech, 48.8 for Eisenhower's acceptance speech,
and 38.3 for Stevenson's acceptance s p e e c h . i n

addition

to radio and television coverage, newspapers and magazines
. . . begin to speculate on the national committee's
. _ choice for this spot. As the day of the convention
approaches, the keynoter is headline news. Maga
zines print biographies of the speakers; newspapers
follow the progress of the preparation of the speech.
. . . On the day after the speech, most of the major
newspapers across the country carry copies of the
address.
Columnists and editorialists are provoked
into writing long essays on what the keynoter did or
did not s a y . H
Fifth, the study of Republican keynoting offers an oppor
tunity to examine the evolution of this kind of speaking. In
spite, of the bulk of commentary on keynote speaking, only E.
Neal Claussen's study of Democratic keynoting offers a com
plete and thorough treatment of the institution.

Claussen

analyzed the history of keynoting in Democratic national
conventions from 1832 to 1960.

IP

When paralleled with

lOcharles
H * Thompson, Television and Presidential
Politics (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution,
1956), p. 64.
l^E. Neal Claussen, "The Democratic Keynoter:
A
History" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois
University, 1963), p. 26.

Claussen's study of the Democratic keynoter, this study will
provide a complete picture of keynote speaking in American
national political conventions.

Paul T. David has stated

that "the job has to start somewhere, and any contribution
to a better understanding of the nominating process in its
relationship to the party system would seem sufficiently
important to justify substantial efforts.

&

composite

picture of keynoting in America can contribute to this under
standing.

Finally, the writer is in agreement with Gerald

Pomper1s observation that with the exception of the studies
conducted by the Brookings Institution, scant research has
been published on conventions per se.

Pomper points out that

"it is surprising that so little serious attention has been
devoted to the method of selecting the national candidates
. . . many matters . . . still require investigation."^
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This study analyzes the speaking of the keynoter in
Republican national conventions from 1856 to 1964.

Although

the keynote speeches given prior to 1900 seem to be of little
significance, the writer feels that the inclusion of these
early years will aid in understanding the development of the
modern keynoter.

l^David, Goldman, and Bain, ojo. cit. , p. 7.
14Gerald Pomper, Nominating the President (Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 3-4.

The problem posed by this study is to determine the
purposes and characteristics of the keynote speech and to
analyze the methods and significance of the Republican key
note speaker.

When viewed as a genre— as a type or kind of

speech— what are the inherently unique features of the Repub
lican keynote address?
In order to understand fully the social and political
setting in which the twenty-seven keynote speeches were
delivered, Chapter II analyzes the nature of conventions and
convention audiences.
Chapter III discusses the keynote speakers and attempts
to answer the following questions:
Qualifications
Who were the keynoters and what qualities or
qualifications did they possess?
What common characteristics or qualities can
be observed among all twenty-seven keynoters?
What rationale does the national committee
use when they select a keynoter?
Method of selectionWhat is the role of the arrangements committee
and the national chairman in the selection of
the keynoter?
What are the attitudes of the delegates regarding
the selection of the keynoter?
Chapter IV presents general information about the speeches
and attempts to answer the following questions:
Convention organization
What is the place of the speech in the convention
organization?

Function and purpose of the speech
What are the views of newspaper writers, casual
observers, delegates, members of the Republican
leadership and the keynoters themselves about
the purpose of the speech?
Do the specific purposes of the keynote speeches
vary?
Chapter V analyzes the speeches and attempts to provide
answers to the following questions:
Logical appeals
What common themes and arguments occur repeatedly?
How did the speakers support their ideas?
Pathetic appeals
What motive appeals are most often used?
Do the speeches reveal the use of popular symbols
and heroes?
Is the style highly emotive?
Ethical appeals
Do the ethical proofs establish the credibility
of the speaker or of his party?
Organizational techniques
Do the speeches reveal common organizational
techniques in partitioning or development?
The concluding chapter seeks -to answer the following ques
tions :
What are the inherently unique features of the
Republican keynote address?
What is the significance of Republican keynoting?
What major changes have occurred during the
evolution of this speech?

r
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METHOD OP DEVELOPMENT
This study examines the highly complex relationship
that exists among keynoter, party, occasion, and delegate.
Rather than using a traditional rhetorical pattern of analysis based on the five canons of invention, organization,
style, memory, and delivery, the study focuses attention on
keynoting as a type or kind of speaking.

Consequently, the

effort has been to ferret out recurring ideas, themes,
methods of argument, and forms of support, rather than dis
cussing techniques or ideas that occurred only occasionally.
Since this study concerns a class or type of speaking
rather than the effectiveness of a speaker in any single
given situation, a collective approach to the twenty-seven
speakers and speeches seems desirable.

It is only when we

may view all of the arguments used in all of the keynote
speeches that we can determine which arguments can be classi
fied as "typical" or "representative."

The same rationale

applies to the selection of the speakers, their use of proofs,
and their methods of organization. . It would be of compara
tively little value, for example, to know that Julius Burrows
cited many statistics in his 1908 keynote speech or that
George Hoar used numerous analogies in his keynote address
of 1880.

Such information is meaningful only when viewed in
i

relation to the techniques employed by the other twenty-five
keynote speakers.

Isolated information about a specific

speaker, a specific occasion, or a specific speech can shed

11
little light on keynoting as a type of speaking.

A "collec

tive" approach, then, is an attempt to discover repetitive
patterns in the selection of keynoters as well as within the
speeches themselves.
Such a collective approach is designed to eliminate
problems that have confronted other researchers in this
general subject area.

By approaching the study of keynoting

as a type of speaking rather than as twenty-seven separate
speeches, the writer hopes to locate "evidences of recurring
pattern and long-term change wherever they can be found.
*1 C

These are likely to be phenomena of importance.

. .

By

studying Republican keynoting as a rhetorical genre, the
writer has sought to follow Bain's suggestion that the
activities in political conventions "merit more attention
than they could be given . . . especially since suitable
research techniques need to be developed for coping with
their special aspects."

In order to cope with the special

aspects of keynote speaking, this study uses such a technique.
CONTRIBUTORY STUDIES
Only recently has scholarly attention been focused on
conventions per s e .

Numerous studies, however, have been

completed which relate to the subject of Republican keynote
speaking.

Included among these studies., are the following:

l5Paul T. David, _et aJL., o£. c i t ., p. 7.
l^Bain, o£. c it., p. 9.

12
1.

General political histories, including Eugene H.

Roseboora's A History of Presidential Elections;17 Hugh A.
B o n e 1s Party Committees and National Politics; P e n d l e t o n
Herring's The Politics of Democracy; ^ M. Ostrogorskii1s
Democracy and the Party System in the United States?20
Wilfred E. Binkley's American Political Parties;
9

Natural History; a n d

1

Their

.
Laurin L. Henry's Presidential Transi

tions .22
2.

Republican party histories,

M o o s 's The Republicans:

including Malcolm

A History of Their Party;23 C. A.

Stern's Republican Heyday;24 George H. Mayer's The Republican
Party, 1854-1964;2^ Jeter A. Isely's Horace Greeley and the
Republican Party 1853-1861;2^ and Gordon S . P . Kleeberg's
Formation of the Republican Party as a^ National Political
27
Organization .x'

1 7 (New York:
l^(Seattle:

The Macmillan Company, 1959).
University of Washington Press, 1958).

1 9 (New York:

Norton Publishing Company,

2 0 (New York:

The Macmillan Company, 1910).

23-(New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

2 2 (Washington:
2 3 (New York:
2^(Ann Arbor:
2 5 (New York:
2 6 (Princeton:
2 7 (New York:

1940).

The Brookings Institution, 1960).
Random House, 1956).
Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1962).
Oxford University Press, 1964).
Princeton University Press, 1947).
privately printed,

1911).

13

3.

Popularized convention histories, including Edwin

P. Hoyt's Jumbos and J a c k a s s e s Herbert Eaton's Presidential
Timber; ^ and Ralph G. Martin's Ballots and Bandwacrons.3^
4.

Specialized convention studies, such as Richard C.

B a i n 1s Convention Decisions and Voting Records;3-*- Gerald
Pomper's Nominating the President;3^ an<j David, Goldman, and
Bain's The Politics of National Party Conventions.33
Only two scholarly writers have concerned themselves
specifically with keynote speaking:

Edwin A. Miles34 and

E. Neal Claussen.35
The various articles, books and monographs dealing
with certain aspects of conventions and convention speaking
are too numerous to list here, but the more helpful of these
materials are included in the bibliography.
SOURCES OF MATERIAL FOR THIS STUDY
Numerous obstacles confront the researcher of intra
party decision-making.

In addition to the obvious problem

of secrecy, the sheer passage of time tends to obscure

2 8 (Garden City:

Doubleday Publishing Co., 1960).

2 9 (New York:

The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

3®(New York:

Rand McNally and Company, 1964).

33Xoc. c i t .

32l q c . cit.

33Lo c . cit.

3 4 "The Keynote Speech at National Nominating Conven
tions, " Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (February, 1960),
26-31.
35 l

o c

. cit.
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information valuable to researchers probing into the back
grounds of convention activity.

Consequently, this writer

used a variety of research tools in the attempt to discover
why and how certain events took place.
Chapters I and II are based almost wholly on histori
cal and descriptive research.

The material for these two

chapters was gleaned from newspapers, news magazines, text
books, monographs, and scholarly periodicals.
The remainder of the study is based on a variety of
materials, including the sources just mentioned.

The writer

interviewed or corresponded with all of the living Republican
keynoters; interviewed Joseph Martin, Clarence Brown, and
several other Republican leaders; visited Republican National
Headquarters and discussed the project with Josephine Good,
Executive Director of the 1960 and 1964 conventions;
exchanged correspondence with four former Republican national
chairmen; corresponded with twelve members of the Republican
national committee; corresponded with eighty-five former
delegates to Republican national conventions, many of whom
had attended four or more conventions; visited the State
University of Iowa and examined the Lester Jesse Dickinson
Collection; and examined the papers of Theodore Roosevelt,
Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, the Breckinridge Family, James
A. Garfield, Rutherford B. Hayes, L. T. Michener, Benjamin
Harrison, Moreton Frewen, William McKinley, Calvin Coolidge,
William Howard Taft, and Carl Schurz in the Library of
Congress.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study is limited in scope.

Most of these limita

tions are the direct result of the availability of sources.
The selection of the keynoter,
the arrangements committee.

for example, often rests with

This committee always meets in

executive session and such minutes are not available to
researchers.

The only way the writer was able to get pri

mary information on the selection of the keynoter was by
contacting individual members of the arrangements committee.
(Even these members were frequently hesitant to discuss
fully what transpired in the executive session.)
The second limitation is purposive.

The writer has

made no attempt to treat matters that occurred only seldom
during the one hundred and eight years covered by this study.
Only items dealing with keynoting that occurred repeatedly
have been thought worthy of inclusion in the study.
A third limitation concerns textual authenticity.
Keynoters traditionally have been given the opportunity to
edit and revise their speeches.

Although the writer found

several texts for each speech, it was concluded that the
speeches reported in the Official Proceedings of the conven
tion were more accurate than those found in newspaper
accounts.

All texts used in this study, therefore, are taken

from the convention's Official Proceedings and have been
subject to revision by the speaker.

CHAPTER II
THE SETTING:

THE CONVENTION

On April 30/ 1789, a throng of people in New York
watched the inauguration of George Washington as the first
President of the United States.
Around noon there appeared on the Broad Street balcony
of the new Federal Hall a tall soldierly figure in a
homespun suit of deep brown set off with eagle buttons,
white stockings, and a bagwig, a dress sword hanging
at his side. With him was Chancellor Livingston of
the New York judiciary— the Supreme Court of the United
States was not yet functioning— who formally adminis
tered the oath of office.1
Although the trappings and the setting have been changed many
times, the essence remains the same:
Noon on January 20. The red-jacketed Marine Band strikes
up 'Hail to the Chief' as the President and the Presi
dent-elect emerge from the Capitol and proceed to the
front of the inaugural platform.
A few minutes later,
after prayers and patriotic songs, the President-elect
stands beside the Chief Justice and repeats a simple
oath. An instant ago he was a private citizen.
Now,
invested with the authority of the Presidency, he turns
and speaks to the Nation and to the world. . . . Sym
bolically and legally, there has been perfect continuity
in the nation's highest office.2
The inaugural ceremony itself is indeed brief, yet it is one

-*-Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elec
tions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 1.
^Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Transitions
The Brookings Institution, I960), p. 3.
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(Washington:
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of the many phases involved in the selection, nomination,
and election of a United States President.

Many changes have

taken place since the electoral college placed George Washing
ton in office.

These revisions regulating the orderly trans

fer of power were necessitated,

for the most part, by

expediency.
THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES:
THE PRE-CONVENTION YEARS
The slow and often painful periods of transition in
the process of selecting presidential candidates have been
discussed by many writers and need not be repeated in this
study.

Yet, for a full understanding of the significance of

keynoting in the conventions, a brief survey of pre-conven
tion history seems desirable.
During the early years of the United States, three
methods of selection and election were used in the choice of
a President.

The first method allowed the members of the

electoral college to exercise their independent judgment.
The omission of more specific provisions for choosing a Presi
dent was probably a result of the general expectation that
Washington would be the first President, and as long as
Washington served the question of a successor presented no
immediate problems.

This method, of course, proved ineffec

tive with the growth of factionalism and political partisan
ship.
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The second method of selecting candidates resulted.
from the lack of effective means of communication among the
various parts of the country.

As one writer put it, "the

Congress was the only body that represented the public
opinion of the country and that at the same time was able to
deliberate.

..."

3

Consequently, a caucus of party members

determined the choice of candidates.

This system was not

seriously attacked until the election of 1824, when the
presidential electors were chosen in a variety of ways,
including the legislatures in six states, by congressional
districts in seven states, and on a state-wide ticket in
eleven states .4

Since none of the candidates had received a

majority of electoral votes, the matter was put before the
House of Representatives for decision.

Adams's victory and

the subsequent selection of Clay as Secretary of State caused
the Jackson supporters to protest of a "corrupt bargain."
Jackson's 1828 victory was the result of a "highly organized
popular movement" without any substantial congressional
support.^

This era brought the rise of new men who intro

duced new issues and new methods into the American political
scene.

The politics of the Jacksonians was not the politics

of Jefferson and Madison.

But, as Herbert Agar, has observed,

^Cordell Hull, "The Story of Presidential Nominating
Conventions," Current History, XX (June, 1924), 374.

4David, Goldman, and Bain, op. c i t ., p. 16.
5
Ibid., p. 17.
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"politics as understood by the 'Jackson men' in 1828 and
1832 marks the beginning of the modern era."^

One of the

characteristics of this new era was the growth of the national
nominating convention.

This convention system became the

third method of selecting presidential candidates.
THE SELECTION OP CANDIDATES:

THE EMERGENCE OP

THE CONVENTION SYSTEM
Prior to its public appearance on the national scene,
the nominating convention had been used as early as 1808,
when disgruntled leaders of the Federalist party held their
secret meetings in New York.

Although this'convention has

been called the first "national" nominating convention, it
shows little resemblance to our modern conventions, since
over half of the states were not even represented and the
meeting was closed to the general public.^

During the first

two decades of the nineteenth century, conventions began to
appear more frequently.

On the local level, they were used

to select nominees for various offices; on the state level,
they often discussed public improvements and highway con
struction.^

It was also during this period that many people

^Herbert Agar, Pursuit of Happiness (Cambridge:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938), p. 107.
^Samuel E. Morison, "The First National Nominating
Convention, 1807," American Historical Review, XVII (July,
1912), 744-763.
®Pomper, oja. cit., p. 18.

expressed growing dissatisfaction with the caucus system.
When the Hartford Convention of 1814 was called to
protest the conduct of the War of 1812, "its organization
and procedures presaged many practices of later national conventions.

Committees on credentials, rules, and on an

official report, or platform, were prototypes of similar
groups in modern party conclaves." 9

According to the report

of the Secretary of the Hartford Convention, however, there
was no speech by the presiding officer .'*'0

In other words,

there was no speech that served as a prototype for the modern
keynote speech.

Such a model evidently did not appear in

national political conv ntions until the 1832 conventions.
It was primarily because of the efforts of Thurlow
Weed that the Anti-Masonic party is usually credited with
having held the first national nominating convention.

Weed

organized the party in Ontario County, New York, in 1827, and
the movement grew to the point that a national convention was
called in Philadelphia in September, 1830.11

If the presiding

officer of this convention made a speech to the delegates, no
12
record of it appears in the Proceedings.

The model for the

9Ibid.
■^Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention
(Boston:
Russell, Odiorne, and Co., 1833); also see William
Edward Buckley, The Hartford Convention (New Haven:
Yale
University Press, 1934).
■'■-'•Howard P. Nash, Jr. , Third Parties in American Poli
tics (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 3.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s
Q f the United States Anti-Masonic Con
vention Held in Philadelphia, September 11, 1830 (Philadelphia
I. P. Trimble, 1830).
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modern keynote speech did not occur in the National Republi
can convention of 1832, for examination of the convention
proceedings fails to show that the Chairman pro tern addressed
the convention.

13

In the Democratic convention of 1832, how

ever, the temporary chairman "returned thanks in a brief and
pertinent address."

Claussen reports that "no copy or

transcript of this short speech could be found.

This fact

was not so surprising when it was understood that the con
vention did not look favorably upon ora t o r y . " ^

It was not

until 1864 that a temporary chairman in a Democratic conven
tion delivered a long address designed to chide the opposi
tion, urge the election of the Democrats over the opposition,
and incorporate numerous emotional and partisan appeals.

15

The practice of having the temporary chairman of the
convention address the delegates after assuming the chair was
adopted by the Republicans in 1856.

Since this practice was

not copied from the Hartford Convention, the Anti-Masonic
conventions, or the National Republican convention, perhaps
its origin was the Democratic convention of 1832; it is
possible, of course, that both Democrats and Republicans
copied the practice from some third group.

The writer

believes that the practice probably did originate in this

^ Journal of the Proceedings of the National Republi
can Convention Held at Worcester, October 1 1 , 1832 (Boston:
Stimson and Clapp, 832).
•^ciaussen, op. c i t ., p. 40.

-^Ibid., p. 104.
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1832 Democratic convention, for when the man selected to
serve as chairman became ill several days before the con
vention, another man, Robert Lucas, was selected to serve as
"temporary" chairman.**"^

Perhaps Lucas felt obligated to

express his appreciation for the honor by "returning thanks
in a brief and pertinent address."
Both the Democrats and the National Republicans uti
lized the convention system in 1832.

The Whigs did not hold

a convention in 1836, but they later reestablished and con
tinued to use it.

Only eleven Presidents of the United

States have been elected without nomination by a national
nominating convention, and its use in selecting candidates
for the presidency and vice-presidency began with the
election of 1832.

The Republicans, of course, have held a

convention every four years since their origin in 1856.

In

order to understand better the setting in which the keynote
speech was delivered,

it seems important to examine briefly

the purpose of the convention, the audience, and the physi
cal surroundings of the convention hall or auditorium.
THE FUNCTION OF THE CONVENTION
It would be a gross understatement to say that con
ventions are usually misunderstood and poorly analyzed by
scholars, delegates, and casual observers, for the bulk of
convention commentary is a confusing mass of contradictions.

•^Ibid. , pp. 31-40.
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At the outset, it is vital to distinguish between the
"observable" convention that is seen by the delegates, guests,
and television viewers, as contrasted to the "real" conven
tion that controls the decision-making apparatus of the party.
It is this first part of the convention— the observable part
— that has provoked most of the criticism frequently asso
ciated with national political conventions.

Admittedly, the

keynote speech often has little or no effect upon the decision
making apparatus of the "real" convention.

More importantly,

however, the keynote address is an integral part of the
observable convention, and often _is not designed to function
as a kind of deliberative rhetoric.

This distinction between

the dual natures of the convention is essential, for to mis
understand the convention purposes is to misinterpret the
function and significance of the keynote speech.

In a

recent article in the Central States Speech Journal,
Kneprath and Mohrmann vigorously attack the speaking in the
Republican national convention of 1964 for "masquerading as
democratic deliberation."

These writers criticize "a situa

tion in which ceremony undermined the entire rhetorical
process.

. .

As this chapter will later point out,

much convention activity is not primarily deliberative in
nature— these two writers have consequently oversimplified

E * Kneprath and G. P. Mohrmann, "Buncombe ReVisited:
The 1964 Republican Convention," Central States
Speech Journal, XVI (February, 1965), 28-34.

the function of the convention and have therefore evaluated
convention speaking by a frequently irrelevant rationale.
In addition to its deliberative function, a national politi
cal convention usually has a ritualistic function, a campaign-rally function, a cohesive function, a compromising
function, a propaganda function, and a ratifying function.
In order to ascertain the relationship of the keynoter to
these functions, a survey of convention commentary seems
obligatory.
SURVEY OF CONVENTION COMMENTARY
Although the "real" convention is probably the more
important of the national convention's two aspects, it is the
second, or "observable" convention, with which this study is
primarily concerned.

Unless otherwise stated then, the term

"convention" as used in this chapter refers to the so-called
"observable" convention.

Most convention criticism falls

into rather distinct categories:

(1 ) criticism of the

atmosphere with its noise, confusion, and chaos;

(2 ) criti

cism that the convention membership is not representative of
the party or the nation;
not pick the best man;
too large;

(3) criticism that conventions do

(4) criticism that the convention is

(5) criticism of the convention in its entirety;

(6 ) criticism that decisions are made in "a smoke-filled
room" rather than on the floor of the convention;

(7) criti

cism that the proceedings of the convention are drawn out
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over too long a period;

(8 ) criticism of the excessive con

cern for precedent and tradition; and (9) criticism of con
vention speaking.
Criticism of the Convention's Atmosphere
The majority of convention critics have been disturbed
by the so-called "carnival" atmosphere more than any other
single facet of the national political convention.

The chaos

and confusion have provoked sharp criticism from newspaper
writers, casual observers, and scholars, as well as from
delegates and members of the Republican hierarchy.
The Paris newspaper, Ce Matin, explained

a 1948

American political convention to its readers in this fashion:
"A manifestation typically American where politics, patriotism
and the music hall mingle to create an atmosphere which at
the same time becomes a country fair, a religious meeting and
IQ

a public reunion."

A British observer stated in The

Economist that many Europeans were distressed by the "clumsy
chaos of the nominating conventions.

. . ."^

An American

newspaper writer, Irvin S. Cobb, writing in the Chicago
American, reported that "a national convention represents more
wasted energy, more futile, bootless endeavor, more useless
expenditure of noise, money, and talent, than any other
institution on earth."

20

Incited by Mirkin, o£. c i t ., p. 241.
l^August 2, 1952.

^0jUne 2.0 , 1916.
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In addition to newspaper writers, many scholars have
criticized the atmosphere of the convention.

William

Anderson, writing in The-Rational Government of the United
States, said that “it is difficult to imagine an arrangement
less conducive to calm thought and deliberation.
anything else it is a monster

More than

'pep fest,' such as college

boys would like to stage on an equal scale before a football
game."2-*- Ostrogorskiiwas also disturbed by the “incessant
uproar" made by the "raving mob which, under ordinary circum
stances, could only be formed by the inmates of all the
lunatic asylums of the country who had made their escape at
the same time ."22
All such criticism of the convention atmosphere, how
ever does not come from outsiders and laymen, for several
delegates and numerous practicing politicians also have been
critical of this matter.

James Parley stated that there is

"a carnival spirit, a touch of sawdust and the side show,
about a national convention that makes it unique among public
institutional gatherings . . . while party conclaves may not
23

always be successful, they are never dull."^J

Raymond Moley

21william Anderson, The National Government of the
United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1946), p.
148.

22M. ostrogorskii, Democracy and the Party System in
the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910),
p. 159.
23James A. Parley, cited by Pendleton Herring, The
Politics of Democracy (New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc.,
1940), p. 227.
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said that the "uncontrolled passion" of the convention was
partly caused by its "holiday atmosphere."2^

Emmett Houeye,

a Louisiana delegate to the 1964 Republican convention, com
plained of the "fan-fare and bally-hoo" that accompanied the
convention.^

Another delegate, John N. Dalton, stated that

he could not hear portions of the 1964 Republican convention
because "there is so much noise and confusion on the
O^
floor. . . .,|ZD Robert E. Smylie, Governor of Idaho, labeled
the convention setting as simply a "general melee.
The obvious question to be answered at this point in
the discussion is:
atmosphere?

what is the purpose of this carnival

What does the noise, chaos, and confusion seek

to accomplish?

In order to answer these questions we must

examine what Richard C. Bain calls the "campaign rally
function" of the convention.

9Q

expressed by three hypotheses:

This function is best
(1 ) political conventions are

chiefly ritualistic; their purpose is to reinforce party
loyalties in the campaign ahead ;28 (2 ) political conventions

ington:

^ R a y m o n d Moley, Parties, Politics and People (Wash
National League of Women Voters, 1923), p. 45.

25personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Emmett Houeye, February 25, 1965.
26Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
John N. Dalton, April 5, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Robert E. Smylie, March 3, 1965.

28Bain, o p . c i t ., p . 7.
29Gordon L. Gray, "Television and the National Nomina
ting Conventions of 1952" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University, 1952), pp. 12-20.
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are mainly hortatory; they exist to stimulate party workers
and the public to a high pitch of excitement for the campaign
to come; 30 (3 ) conventions exist to provide a middle-ground
between the party professionals and the grass-roots laity
support.
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These three hypotheses are not intended to be

mutually exclusive, but only to suggest the multi-purposive
function of the campaign-rally aspect of national conventions.
Since a political party is often a loosely structured organi
zation, the national convention should, as one Republican
delegate put it, "tie together these loosely connected
units."

In this context, according to Richard C. B a m ,

"it can be said that the function of the convention as a
campaign rally is a necessary one.

. .

33

Each leader, great or minor, who is given the con
vention stage for a few brief moments is at the
same time given a feeling of participation, and his
followers identify themselves in participation with
him.
So, too, the demonstrations give the rank-andfile delegates a sense of belonging to a dynamic
movement— at least for the moment, whatever their
more sober later reflections may be.34
Much of the 11excitement" is admittedly excessive.

Yet the

needed sense of unity and belonging could probably not be
achieved by cold calculated rationality; hence, the atmosphere

30 Ibid.
31Bain, op. c i t ., p. 7; also see Herring, pp. c i t .,
p. 229.
■^Personal correspondence of the writer,
Ray Page, March 19, 1965.
33Bain, op. cit., p. 7.

3^Ibid.

letter from
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of the convention itself is designed to serve specific and
premeditated ends.

The role of the keynote speech within

this atmosphere is discussed later in the study.
Criticism of the Non-Representative
Convention Membership
A second major category of convention criticism con
cerns the allegation that convention membership represents
neither the party nor the nation.

Even though this criticism

is significant and often valid, it has little or no relation
ship to the subject of this study and will not be discussed
in detail.
Criticism that the Conventions Do Not
Pick the Best Men
A third frequently occurring area of criticism is the
opinion that conventions cannot— or do not— pick the best men
to run for office.

This attitude, like the one just mentioned,

is outside of the scope of this study.
Criticism that the Convention Is Too Large
The fourth indictment of conventions to be discussed
is that they are too large— too unwieldy to function effi
ciently.

The conventions of both major parties today are

over ten times larger than the original conventions.*^
Although the Democrats have about twice the number of

35Pomper, op. c i t ., p. 63.
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delegates that the Republicans have, the huge numbers of
alternates, guests, officials, and party leaders have caused
important changes in the nature of the national convention.
Increased size has brought increased noise and con
fusion; this clamor has caused more and more decisions to be
made away from the convention floor.

With the absence of

significant decision-making, spontaneity has virtually dis
appeared.

Consequently, the convention proceedings have

become more rigid, formal, and ritualistic.

"All action,

from inspirational addresses to the format of nominations, is
O/T

carefully programmed."

Pomper noted that "there is some

possibility that the convention may become only a ritualistic
entertainment, rather than an arena for decision-making."
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Ihe Republican keynoter is expected to be an important part
of this "ritualistic entertainment."
Criticism of the Convention in Its Entirety
A fifth group of critics condemn the convention in its
entirety.

It seems significant that this response occurred

rarely from persons closely allied to politics— the "out
siders" and laymen, however,

frequently voiced this complaint.

H. L. Mencken, for example, noted that
. . . it is instructive to observe these great men
at the solemn business of selecting a First Chief
for the greatest free Republic ever seen on earth
. . . one sees them at close range, sweating,

3®Ibid., p. 62.

3 7Ibid., p. 63.
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belching, munching peanuts, chasing fleas. They
parade idiotically, carrying dingy flags and
macerating one another 1s corns. They crowd the
aisles, swapping gossip, most of it untrue. They
devour hot dogs. They rush out to the speak•easies. They rush back to yell, fume and vote.
. . . The average delegate never knows what is going on. 38
Will Rogers summed up the convention behavior in this fashion:
Thousands of people in a hot stuffy hall up till
the early morning hours listening to 'The man I
am about to nominate has the qualities of a Jack
son, the Statesmanship of a Jefferson and the
homely common sense of an Abraham Lincoln.' Then
the next one nominated would have all these and
then a couple more, maby [sic] the looks of
McKinley and the oratory of Bryan.
Hours on hours
of that, then they would all get up and march around
the hall, part would march and part would h i s s . 3 9
Even though party leaders such as Joe Martin would
agree that conventions are probably "on the way out,"40 few
would ignore the strengths of the convention system

The

"extra-constitutional" nature of the convention allows for
considerable flexibility in adapting to changing social and
political conditions.

Also, the convention system (1) allows

new personalities to rise quickly to positions of party
leadership;

(2 ) provides time and opportunity for compro

m i s e ; ^ and (3) is accepted as legitimate by the populace.

38H . l . Mencken, Making a. President (New York:
A. Knopf, 1932), pp. 28-29.

Alfred

^ W i l l Rogers, How We Elect Our Presidents (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p. 127.
^ S t a t e m e n t by Joseph Martin, personal interview,
March 23, 1965.

41Pomper, op. cit., pp. 210-218; also see Herring,
o p . cit., p. 230.
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Criticism that Decisions Are Made in a "Smoke-Filled
Room Rather than on the Floor of the Convention
A sixth frequently occurring criticism concerns the
observation that important convention decisions are made
prior to the convention or in a "smoke-filled room" rather
than being made on the floor of the convention.

Much of such

criticism is valid, for the "real" convention seldom occurs
amid the clamor of the convention hall.
earlier, however,

As was mentioned

it is the "observable" convention with

which this study is primarily concerned.

Consequently, this

sixth criticism is not within the scope of the present study.
Criticism that the Proceedings of the Convention
Are Drawn Out Over Too Long a Period
A seventh indictment against conventions is that they
are drawn out over too long a period.

One delegate to the

Republican convention of 1964 discussed the matter in some
detail:
As you know, various cities which have facilities
for handling large conventions bid against one
another for the purpose of landing political con
ventions.
The winning city then has to pay several
hundred thousand dollars into the coffers of the
particular national committee involved.
One of the
conditions of the bid is that the convention must
last a certain number of days so that the hotels,
restaurants, stores, etc., can get their share of
the profits.
Actually, there's no reason in the world why both
of the 1964 . . . conventions couldn't have been
concluded in a single day. This would have left the
businessmen of San Francisco and Atlantic City
holding the bag, however, so the conventions are
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stretched out by a good deal of padding to last
for four days .42
The campaign-rally function and the compromise function of
the convention, however, could probably not be achieved if
the convention were only to last for a single day.

In any

event, since the keynote speech usually occurs in the early
phases of the convention activity, such criticism is of only
minor concern.
Criticism of the Excessive Concern for
Precedents and Tradition
An eighth area of frequently occurring criticism con
cerns the convention's excessive concern for precedent and
tradition.

Such concern is relatively simple to justify,

however, in light of the campaign-rally function of the con
vention.

In addition to the aura of legitimacy provided by

tradition and precedent, convention procedure is well known
to the general public as well as the participants.

The

effect of these traditions upon the keynoter is discussed
later in the study.
Criticism of Convention Speaking
The ninth and final category of convention criticism
to be discussed concerns convention speaking— not merely
keynoting, but all convention speaking.

Naturally, an

institution which has varied purposes would also tend to

^ P e r s o n a l
correspondence of the writer, letter from
Edward Burling, Jr., March 30, 1965.
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produce varied speaking.

In order to compare keynoting

criticism with criticism of other convention speaking, a
survey of commentary on convention speaking seems desirable.
Often, it is the seemingly unending series of speeches
and "remarks" that causes consternation and dismay among all
types of political observers, including participants as well
as outsiders.

With typical vehemence, H. L. Mencken cate

gorized many of the speakers as "on furlough from some home
for extinct volcanoes ."43

D. W. Brogan, writing in Politics

in America, classified much of the convention speaking as
ritualistic.

Brogan stated that

. . . of course, a great deal of Convention oratory
is delivered simply as ritual. Many speeches are
specimens of 'rich badness' in oratory that should
(and often does) drive the delegates off the floor
in swarms .44
Richard C. Bain, writing in Convention Decisions and Voting
Records, has called the displays of oratory "frenetic,"

45

while William Anderson has used the phrase "flamboyant ."^0
All of this commentary, however, tells us little of
the function of such speaking.

According to Goodman, most

convention speaking is to (1 ) impress the general public;
(2) maintain the enthusiasm of the delegates;

(3) provide a

43cited by Malcolm Moos and Stephen Hess, Hats in the
Ring (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 119.

44Brogan, op. ci t ., p. 205.
45Bain, pp. cit., p. 7.
^Anderson, op. c i t ., p. 153.
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(4 )

means of publicity for the professional politicians;

stimulate party spirit; and (5) serve as "fillers" when there
is no other important convention business .^7
It is evident that the purposes for convention speak
ing closely parallel the various functions of the convention
itself.

Some speeches are designed to serve as part of the

campaign-rally, some are added to give delegates a sense of
"belonging," some of the oratory is intended to provide a
forum for future potential candidates, and some of the
speaking is merely intended to occupy unused time in the pro
gram between more important events.
The foregoing discussion of the nine major areas of
convention criticism demonstrates that conventions and con
vention oratory are multi-purposive.

As a facet of this

activity, the keynote speech cannot be considered apart from
this premise of multi-purposiveness.
THE CONVENTION SETTING:

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt attempted to explain the
temporary chairmanship to Elihu Root by stating that "you
have the advantage of speaking at the very outset.

No one

is tired, everyone desires to listen, and they have your
speech to listen to— what more is there to be said?"

4 7William Goodman, The Two-Party System in the United
States (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, I960), pp. 194-196.
48Theodore Roosevelt Special Correspondence, Library
of Congress, Roosevelt to Root, June 11, 1904.
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Roosevelt's explanation, however, is somewhat naive if not
grotesque.

Delegates to national political conventions, as

a group, can hardly be pictures as an "un-tired," eager,
attentive, calm audience.

Who are these delegates and what

characteristics do they have in common?
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DELEGATES
David, Goldman, and Bain, relying on studies of the
1948, 1952, and 1956 conventions and certain historical and
biographical sources, have attempted to describe delegate
characteristics according to age, sex, race, religion,
educational status, income level, and occupation.

To this

writer's knowledge, this study is the only comprehensive and
systematic study devoted to the characteristics of delegates
to national political conventions
Age
The average age for Republican delegates to the national
convention of 1948 was fifty-two.

Over 20 per cent of the

delegates to this convention were between fifty and fiftyfour years old.

About 18 per cent were between fifty-five

and sixty; 17 per cent were between forty-five and fifty
years old.

The remainder of the delegates were of varied

ages, with about 3 per cent between twenty-five and thirty
(the youngest age represented) and about 1 per cent between

4®David, Goldman, and Bain, op. cit., pp. 325-354.
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eighty and eighty-five years of age (the oldest group repre
sented) .50
Admittedly,

such figures based on a single convention

cannot be claimed as representative.

Bain's data on princi

pal convention participants from 1832 to 1956, shows that
convention leadership has come from men whose ages have
ranged from thirty-three to eighty-four, with the average age
C1
being between fifty and sixty. x Similar conclusions on the
age of members of the national political committees have been
reported by Cotter and Hennessy.

This latter study shows

that "the composite picture of national party committee
members [both major parties]
middle-age

from 1948 to 1963" is of
C^
(forty to sixty years old). ^ Any conclusions

regarding the age of delegates to Republican national con
ventions based on these three sources are highly tentative.
It seems probable, however, that the largest single group of
delegates would fall within the forty to sixty age group.

A

survey of the ages of the 365 principal convention partici
pants over a period of 124 years reveals no particular trend
concerning the ages of delegates.

50Ibid., pp. 326-327.
SlBain, op. c i t ., pp. 306-324.
^Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, Poli
tics Without Power, The National Party Committees (New York:
The Atherton Press, 1964), p. 44.
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Sex
It was not until the 1920 convention (held, two months
prior to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment) that
women "truly participated in the business of the Convention."
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Even though a woman was permitted to address the

1876 convention and two women were seated as alternate dele
gates from Wyoming in the convention of 1892, no real inroads
were made on male dominance of the convention floor until
after the passage of the Suffrage Amendment.

Between 1856

and 1920, a total of only twenty-five women had been seated
as delegates or alternates in Republican national conventions.
In 1920, the total was 156; in 1936, the figure reached 283,
and by 1956, the total number of women delegates to the
national convention was 563.
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In the 1952 Republican con-

vention, over 10 per cent of the delegates were women.

55

In

the 1956 convention, 50 per cent of the Montana and Florida
delegations were women; Minnesota and Wyoming followed with
42 and 41 per cent.

56

By 1964, Senator Margaret Chase Smith,

perhaps with tongue-in-cheek, was an announced candidate for
the Republican presidential nomination.

It has been only

^ w o m e n ' s Division, Republican National Committee,
History of Women in Republican National Conventions (Wash
ington, 1963), p. 11.
^ W o m e n ' s Division, Republican National Committee,
o p . c i t ., p . 34.
S^David, Goldman, and Bain,

ojd.

ci t ., p. 327.

^ W o m e n ' s Division, o£. cit., p. 36.
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since 1920, then, that women have played a significant role
in the activities of Republican national conventions.
Race
Negro delegates have been prominent in Republican
national convention southern delegations from post-Civil War
days up until the 1964 convention.

David, Goldman, and Bain

report that "it is extremely difficult, however, to obtain
comprehensive and accurate information on Negro participaC7
tion."
In the 1952 convention, thirty-two Negro delegates
and fifty alternates were present, representing a total of
about two and a half per cent of the total voting strength of
the convention.

The 1964 convention was often referred to as

"lily-white" by contemporary observers.

The writer believes,

however, that the 1964 convention was exceptional in regard
to Negro participation.

Although Negroes have been under

represented in Republican national conventions, David, Gold
man, and Bain think that the presence of even a single Negro
in a previously white delegation may profoundly change
behavior regarding civil rights .58

Even a low percentage of

Negro delegates, then, can have a disproportionate influence
on the convention in regard to civil rights matters.

S^David, Goldman, and Bain, op. c it., p. 329.

58Ibid., pp. 330-331.
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Religion
Protestants made up the largest single religious group
represented in the 1948 Republican convention.

In this con

vention, 87.1 per cent of the delegates were Protestant, 6.1
per cent were Catholic, 3.5 per cent claimed no formal
religious affiliation, and 0.7 per cent were J e w i s h . ^
(These figures are roughly comparable with the religious
preferences of members of the Republican national committee
from 1948-1963.

In this latter study by Cotter and Hennessy,

85.9 per cent of the committeemen were Protestant and 7.4 per

60
cent were C a t h o l i c . P e r h a p s

the most important aspect of

religion to be noted here is that the Protestant religions
usually linked with high social and economic status
heavily represented at the 1948 convention.

were

Episcopalians

led in percentage of delegates with 17.2, followed closely
by the Presbyterians and Methodists with 17.0 and 16.8.

61

Since the Know-Nothings formed part of the original member
ship of the party, and since the Republicans have frequently
been labeled as a WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant)
party, it seems reasonable to conclude that the majority of
delegates to Republican conventions have been Protestants.

^ Ibid.t p. 331.
60Cotter and Hennessy, op. c i t ., p. 47.
^■*-David, Goldman, and Bain, pp. cit. , p. 331.

Educational Status
Studies conducted on the education of delegates to
national conventions of both major parties show that these
delegates are unusually well-educated.

Fifty-eight per cent

of the delegates to the Republican convention of 1948 were
college graduates; 34 per cent of these delegates had taken
a year or more of post-graduate work. ^

(The figures just

cited correspond rather closely with those of Cotter and
Hennessy in their study of Republican national committee
members from 1948 to 1963.

These two writers found that 67

per cent of Republican national committeemen had at least
one college degree.)

63

According .to a study conducted by

the Brookings Institution, a sharp rise in the amount of
delegates 1 education has occurred as recently as the conven
tions of 1940 and 1944.64

As a group, delegates to Republi

can national conventions, particularly in recent years, are
well educated.

Since lawyers have traditionally played a

major role in convention activity, it can be assumed, that a
significant portion of the delegates to most Republican con
ventions since 1856 have had an above-average amount of formal
education.

62Ibid., p. 332.
63Cotter and Hennessy, op. cit., p. 47.

64David, Goldman, and Bain, op. cit., pp. 332-333.
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Income Levels
The median income for delegates to the 1948 Republican
convention was $10,900.
delegates was:

The reported annual income for these

6.3 per cent made less than $3,500; 10.0 per

cent earned between $3,500 and $4,999; 31.7 per cent made
from $5,000 to $9,999; 31.3 per cent earned between $10,000
and $24,999; 11.3 per cent earned from $25,000 to $49,999; and
9.4 per cent made over $50,000.®^

(Cotter and Hennessy found

that members of the Republican national committee from 1948
to 1963 had "moderate to high" incomes.)

Since many dele

gates to the earlier Republican conventions were probably
state and local political leaders, it seems safe to assume
that they could be classified as having moderate to high
income.

It seems improbable that people with low incomes

could afford the time, money, and effort necessary to become
a political activist.

The effect of the relatively high

delegate income on the keynoters' choices of argument and
supporting material is discussed briefly in Chapter V.
Occupations
The occupations of the delegates to the 1948 Republican
convention are quite varied.

Table I shows the occupational

distribution of delegates to this convention.

This occupa

tional breakdown reveals that lawyers and businessmen

65uavid, Goldman, and Bain, pp. ci t . , p. 333.
66Cotter and Hennessy, pp. cit., p. 44.
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TABLE I
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OP THE
1948 REPUBLICAN C O N V E N T I O N

Occupations
Public Officials
Lawyers and Judges
Publishers and Editors
Other Professional Occupations
Physicians
Engineers
Educators
Others not Classified
Business Occupations
Bankers
Contractors
Manufacturers-Owners
Merchants and Dealers
Real Estate and Insurance
Farmers and Ranchers
Labor Union Representatives
Homemakers
Retired Persons
All Others

Delegates
Per Cent

2.8
36.0
3.6
42.4
1.7
0.6
2.1
7.9
12.3

2.8
0.2
10.2
3.8
8.8
25.8
7.5
0.2
4.1
1.1
6.6

100.0
aDavid, Goldman, and Bain, op. cit., p. 333.
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comprised a large segment of the 1948 Republican convention.
Although labor union officials and public office holders
appear frequently in Democratic national conventions, these
groups are seldom significantly represented in Republican
national conventions.

A cursory examination of Bain's listing

of major convention participatns indicates that these occupa
tional characteristics have probably been true of Republican
delegates since the party's origin.
This discussion of the age, sex, race, religion, educa
tion, income, and occupation of delegates to the Republican
national conventions has been intended to indicate the nature
of the audiences that the keynoter faced.

Numerous changes

have occurred between 1856 and 1964 that influenced the
characteristics of the delegates:

(1 ) immigrant groups have

changed the nature of the big-city machines;

(2 ) civil serv

ice reforms and the passage of the Hatch Act have increased
honesty;

(3) middle- and upper-class people interested in

public service have become more active;

(4) political power

has shifted from party officials to elected officials;

(5)

statewide political bosses have virtually disappeared; and
(6 ) standards of education and social responsibility have
been raised .67

After having discussed these factors, David,

Goldman, and Bain conclude that "changes of this kind are
probably responsible for the fact that while the conventions

^7David, Goldman, and Bain, op. cit., p. 352.
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of recent years have had many superficial resemblances to
those of 1900, the delegates from many states were of a
measurably different type."^®
The facts suggest that the great majority of the
delegates were well qualified to deal with the
problems of their political parties, and that
they were about as reputable a group of individ
uals as could reasonably be expected in any large
political assembly in this imperfect world.
The delegates of recent years were better edu
cated, less boss-ridden, better adjusted to the
requirements of an open political system, and
generally more trustworthy in all respects than
those of a half century earlier. 9
THE CONVENTION SITE
Chicago has been the most frequent site for Republican
national conventions.

Fourteen of the twenty-eight national

conventions have been held in this centrally located city:
I860, 1868, 1880, 1884, 1888, 1904, 1908, 1912, 1916, 1920,
1932, 1944, 1952, and 1960.

Philadelphia ranks second with

five conventions held in 1856, 1872, 1900, 1940, and 1948.
Cleveland and San Francisco follow with two each— Cleveland
in 1924 and 1936; San Francisco in 1956 and 1964.

The

remaining conventions were held in Baltimore (1864); Minne
apolis (1892); St. Louis (1896); Cincinnati (1876); and
Kansas City (1928).

There are many reasons involved in the

choice of a convention city, including accessibility,

69David, Goldman, and Bain, pp. cit., pp. 352-353.
69Ibid.
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accommodations for delegates, amount of bid offered, the
city's patriotic shrines, facilities for television, and the
importance of the state in which the convention city is
located.

All of these reasons, however, lie outside of the

scope of this study and will not be discussed in detail.
With the exception of most of the conventions held
prior to 1880, the Republicans have usually held their
national gatherings in large, "barn-like" structures.

The

1856 convention was held in the Philadelphia Musical Fund
Hall, described by the Daily Tribune as "large and well proportioned."

70

The attendance of two thousand delegates,

reporters and spectators, however, occupied all of the available space.

71

The New York Times added that "the room

engaged was entirely too small to contain the half of those
who were entitled to places as delegates and reporters."

72

The speakers stand was located at the front of the hall "with
seven tables seating twelve each arranged lengthwise in front
of the p l a t f o r m . U n l i k e many later convention halls, the
Musical Fund Hall was said to be "well adapted for sound, so
74
that the speakers can be readily heard.

^Qpaily Tribune [New York], June 18, 1856, p. 5.
71.Ibid.
72ibid., p. 1 .
^ Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 18, 1856, p. 1.
74paily Tribune [New York], June 18, 1956, p. 5.
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Another example of a Republican national convention
not held in a large hall was the convention of 1864.

This

convention was held in Baltimore in an attempt by President
Lincoln to represent the Union party as a national organiza
tion.

As a border-state city, Baltimore was only slightly

less rebellious than the rebel states themselves.

Mayer

reports that Lincoln's arch-foe in the city, Congressman
Henry Winter Davis, manipulated to prevent the Unionists
from renting the only suitable hall.

"So the national com

mittee made arrangements to meet in the Front Street Theatre,
where heat, poor acoustics, and street noise harassed the
delegates."
Regardless of the size of the convention hall, however,
complaints of noise and discomfort have been frequent.
1860,

In

for example, the Republican national convention was

held in the especially constructed Wigwam in Chicago, a
building 180 feet long and 100 feet wide with galleries on
three sides, a.sloping floor and a seating capacity of over
10,000.

7 fi

The easy accessibility of Chicago by the new rail

roads and by steamboat apparently attracted thousands of
visitors to the city, for Roseboom caustically commented that
"a carnival spirit replaced the crusading fervor of 1856, and
whiskey-drinking politicians far outnumbered abolition

75

Mayer, 0£. cit., p. 118.

76 Ibid., p. 67.
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zealots."'

Delegates and spectators were said to be dis

orderly and "twenty thousands of Republicans and their
wives"*

78

milled around outside of the wigwam.

In the 1880

convention held in Chicago's Exposition Hall, many delegates
complained of being wilted by the heat and crowded conditions.
Roscoe Conkling protested for having to sit "idle on un
cushioned seats— fortunately with backs.

The 1884 con

vention met in the huge Industrial Exposition Building in
Minneapolis.

Not only were the delegates forced to suffer

from the heat wave gripping the city, but "resin dripped
sporadically for the unseasoned pine roof of the convention
hall, forcing delegates either to sit on gummy benches or
stand in the aisles and receive direct hits on their bare
h e a d s ."

80

These problems of noise and discomfort were still

evident in the 1900 convention.

The New York Times reported

that,
. . . excepting only Senator Wolcott on the first day,
there have been no speakers who were able to make
themselves heard and understood by the delegates and
the alternates. The vast throng of spectators were
merely spectators. They heard little or nothing.
They kept track of what was going on with their eyes,

^Roseboom, op. c i t . , p. 160.
78Bain, op. cit., p. 68 ; also see Roseboom, op. c i t .,
p. 177.
79Herbert Eaton, Presidential Timber (New York:
Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 74.
8°Mayer, op. cit., pp. 233-234.
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or through the kindness of those who were near by,
and who passed by word of mouth what was going on.®^
The sheer immensity of such convention halls prompted one
critic to complain that no national convention
. . . should ever again assemble in a hall that
seats more than four thousand, or at most, five
thousand persons.
It was cruel and unfair to
subject such consummate orators as Mr. Root . . .
to the throat-racking and heart-breaking task of
trying to fill with their admirable voices a huge
barn lined with a crowd restless because it could
hear nothing and see little.82
In the 1932 convention, the noise even bothered the keynoter.
L. J. Dickinson stated that "there is such a state of con
fusion in the audience at a National Convention that there
is not any opportunity for interference from the audience.
As a matter of fact, on the platform it is difficult to hear
OQ
anyone unless they have a loud-speaker connection."
As
recently as 1964, the problem of noise had not been overcome.
In this convention, Mark 0. Hatfield faced a crowd of well
over 16,000 delegates, guests, and gate-crashers in San
Francisco1s Cow Palace— an enormous structure covering some
sixty-seven a c r e s . O n e

delegate to this convention said

that "there is so much noise and confusion on the floor while
the keynote speech is being made that the delegates and

^ H e w York Times, June 21, 1900, p. 2.
82"The National Democratic Convention at St. Louis,"
Review of Reviews, XII (August, 1904), 187.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
L. J. Dickinson, May 17, 1965.
84Mirkin, oja. cit., p. 136.
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alternates actually get to hear very little of it."
Regardless of the site of the national convention, delegates
have frequently been uncomfortable and unable to hear what
was being said on the platform.

Demonstrations, singing,

slogans, banners, and decorations are discussed as extrinsic
means of persuasion in Chapter V.
THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON THE
CONVENTION SETTING
Television has brought important changes to the
national political convention setting.

In 1940, NBC and

Philco covered the keynote and nominating speeches in both
conventions.

Some forty thousand to one hundred thousand

people were estimated to have watched at least part of the
proceedings, but the advent of television made no real impact
ftfs

on the convention procedure .00

Because of the war, very

little advance was made prior to the 1944 convention of the
Republicans , when an estimated fifty thousand people observed
part of the proceedings.

Earl Warren's keynote speech, how

ever, was filmed in advance by NBC and run simultaneously
with the speech itself .87

By 1952, about eighteen million

85personal correspondence of the writer,
J o h n N. D a l t o n , A p r i l 5, 1965.

letter from

86Charles A. H. Thompson, Television and Presidential
Politics (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1956),
p. 3.
87Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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television sets were in use and available to over 50 per cent
of the American voters.

Estimates reveal that over half of

the American people watched at least part of the 1952 conQO

ventions on television. °

The Republicans made no attempt

to adapt their procedure to television or to coach the dele
gates regarding television dress or manners.

This unwilling

ness to modify procedure resulted in the lack of a "head-on
picture of the rostrum itself" because Republican managers
were unwilling to allow the camera placement to cut into
QQ

delegate space. J

By 1956, however, efforts were made to

streamline the convention program to meet the demands of
television viewers.

"Speeches were shortened and there was

QO
a reduction in the number of speakers."^

The importance of

television has now grown to the extent that "the use of
balloons, the manners of delegates, and the placing of delegation standards are regulated to accommodate the cameras."

Q1

Pomper comments that as television pressure becomes more and
more important, "private deliberations may be impeded, as
the demands of entertainment take

precedence over themore
.

serious business of party negotiation."
ence

Q9

of television on keynoting is discussed

SSlbid.f p .

i.

The specific influ'
in Chapter

89 Ibid.,p.

IV.

33.

98Women's Division, Republican National Committee,
o p . cit., p . 37.
^Thompson, pp. cit. , p. 35.
92pomper, op. cit., p. 63.
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SUMMARY
National political conventions are multipurposive.
Some of the more important of these purposes are listed below:
1. Political conventions are primarily deliberative;
they exist to choose the best candidate available for
public office.
2. Political conventions are chiefly ritualistic;
their purpose is to reinforce party loyalties in the
campaign ahead.
3. Political conventions are mainly hortatory; they
exist to stimulate party workers and the public to a
high pitch of enthusiasm for the campaign to come.
4. Political conventions are principally directive;
they are intended to make converts to the party's cause.
5. Convention decisions are preliminary— the final
decision will take place at the time of the election.

6 . The end product of a convention is action, not
deliberation.
7. The convention provides a middle ground between
the party professionals and the grass-roots laity sup
port.

8 . The convention is designed to attract national
attention to its operations.
9. The convention can and does function as an
implement for compromise.
10. The convention is becoming more of a ratifying
body than a decision-making body.
Most of these observations can be classified into two groups—
one group dealing with the real decision-making apparatus of
the convention; the second group concerned with the noisy and
raucous observable convention.

It is this second, or observ

able convention, with which this study is concerned.
Delegates to national conventions are generally male,
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well educated, middle-aged, primarily Protestant, and often
uncomfortable and noisy.
Hie foregoing discussion has been only a brief indi
cation of some of the many problems that the keynoter faces
when he confronts his immediate audience— noise, drinking,
hilarity, apathy, hostility, and masses of humanity.

It is

little wonder that news commentator David Brinkley had diffi
culty in explaining the situation to Europeans who were
viewing the 1964 conventions via satellite.

Brinkley stated

that the convention
. . . is partly political, partly emotional, partly
propaganda, partly a social mechanism, partly a
carnival, and partly mass hysteria.
It can be de
scribed as nonsense, and often is— but somehow it
works.93
Admittedly, many are not quite sure how it works.

Nor

are the delegates, Republican party leaders, or keynoters
precisely clear on the role that the keynoter should play in
this activity known as a national political convention.

93Qene Shalit and Lawrence K. Grosman (eds.), Somehow
It Works (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1965), foreword, n.p.

CHAPTER III
THE KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
Republican keynoters have included lawyers, governors,
a minister, a farmer, a doctor, and a military officer.

The

youngest of the twenty-seven keynoters was thirty-three; the
oldest was seventy-three.
characteristics?

Do these men have any common

Why were they selected?

This chapter dis

cusses topically the positions of the keynoters, their resi
dences, the qualifications of the speakers, and the rationale
for their selection.
WHO WERE THE KEYNOTERS?
In reply to the writer's request for information about
keynoting, one delegate to the 1964 Republican convention
asked:

"Isn't it true that keynoters drop from sight? Isn't

it an invitation to oblivion?
Hatfield is headed.

. . .

I hope that is where Mark
As the list below indicates,

many of the keynoters were outstanding and influential
figures:

^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
H. J. Clark, February 25, 1965.
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1856
1860
1864
1868
1872
1876
1880
1884
1888
1892
1896
1900
1904
1908

Robert Emmet
David Wilmot
Robert J. Breckinridge
Carl Schurz
Morton McMichael
Theodore M. Pomeroy
George F. Hoar*
John R. Lynch
John M. Thurston
J. Sloat Fassett
Charles W. Fairbanks
Edward O. Wolcott
Elihu Root
Julius C. Burrows

1912
1916
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964

Elihu Root*
Warren G. Harding*
Henry Cabot Lodge*
Theodore E. Burton
Simeon D. Fess
L. J. Dickinson
Frederick Steiwer
Harold E. Stassen
Earl Warren
Dwight H. Green
Douglas MacArthur#
Arthur B. Langlie#
Walter H. Judd#
Mark O. Hatfield

QUALITIES AMD QUALIFICATIONS OF
THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER
Many qualities and characteristics have been ascribed
to keynoters by newspaper writers, scholars, casual observers,
delegates, and members of the Republican hierarchy.

Included

among these qualities and qualifications a r e .oratorical
ability, political prowess, geographical location, and
several additional considerations such as appearance and
political philosophy.
Oratorical Ability
One of the most frequently mentioned characteristics
of the keynote speaker concerned his speaking ability.

This

*A11 four of these men served as both temporary chair
men and permanent chairmen during the same convention.
#During the conventions of 1952-1960, the positions
of temporary chairman and keynote speaker were divided.
These three men served only as keynoters and did not preside
as temporary chairmen.
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attribute was considered important by "outside observers" as
well as delegates and leaders within the Republican party.
Many newspaper writers and scholars agreed that the
keynoter should possess some degree of "oratorical" skill.
Ranney and Kendall commented that the keynote speaker should
have "a reputation as a spellbinder";

E. W. Kenworthy com

mented somewhat caustically that the keynoter should be
"silver-tongued";J both Goodman and Hinderaker also mentioned
that the keynoter should be a competent speaker.^

George E.

Sokolsky, syndicated columnist, observed that the keynoter
"must be an orator with a great voice and forensic powers."^
Several writers specified that the keynoter should have a
particular kind of flamboyant delivery.

V. 0. Key said that

"old fashioned keynoting" might be compared to a "hybrid of
elocution and calisthenics.
t

. .11;

an Associated Press writer

stated that Robert A. Taft, J r . , who was being considered as

^Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and
the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1956), p. 300.
"Roar of the Keynote," New York Times Magazine, May
25, 1952, p. 66 .
^William Goodman, The Two-Party System in the United
States (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1956), p. 215; Ivan Hinderaker, Party Politics (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1956), p. 169.
5"m'Arthur Top Keynoter Since Bryan," Globe Democrat
[St. Louis], June 14, 1952, p. 6 .
York:

^Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (4th ed.; New
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), p. 453.
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1964 Republican keynoter, was not chosen because he was "not
the slam-bang type of speaker usually associated with the
keynote address.

. . ."

7

Many of the delegates to national conventions with
whom the writer corresponded stressed the importance of a
keynoter's speaking skill.

Dorothy H. Presser, a North

Carolina delegate to the last three Republican national con
ventions , stated that the size of convention halls required
g
"dynamic speaking."
F. E. Yerley, a Wisconsin delegate to
the last six Republican conventions, stated that the keynote
q
speech should be an "oratorical display."
Other delegates
expressed similar views by observing that a keynoter should
be "an orator,"-*-® "a good speaker,"

"a man who must breathe

12
13
a certain amount of fire,11
"he must be articulate,"
and
that the keynote speaker should be "dynamic and just about

7Morning Advocate [Baton Rouge, Louisiana], May 14,
1964, p. 2-C.
^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Dorothy H. Presser, March 9, 1965.
^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
F. E. Yerley, March 30, 1965.
Impersonal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Malcolm Lomas, March 8 , 1965.
^P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
J. Reuel Armstrong, March 24, 1965.
12Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Wilbur N. Renk, March 26, 1965.
Impersonal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Louis G. Rogers, March 8, 1965.

58
the best public speaker that the Party can find.

. . ."14

Several delegates added that the speech of the keynoter was
important only if it were "well delivered."

A few dele

gates were more specific about the keynoter’s delivery:
Philip B. Hoffman stated that "he must be a master in the
technique of public speaking."

Hoffman added somewhat vaguely

that "he must know words, anecdotes, and have proper inflections, dramatics and that sort of thing."

Another delegate

specified that the delivery of the keynote address "should
combine dulcet tones with occasional staccato delivery.
There appeared to be little or no difference of opinion
among delegates and members of the Republican hierarchy re
garding the keynoter's speaking ability.

A national committee

man from.Rhode Island, for example, stated that one of the two
basic criteria for selecting a keynoter was that "he must be
an excellent speaker."'1-®

George L. Hinman, national com

mitteeman from New York, observed that the speech should be

•^personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Louis C . Wyman, March 18, 1965.
■^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Lem T. Jones, March 17, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Philip B. Hoffman, March 8 , 1965.
Impersonal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Louis C. Wyman, March 18, 1965.
18personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard E w ing, May 17, 1965.
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"well constructed and eloquently delivered .1,19

One member of

the national committee phrased the matter of speaking ability
negatively when he noted that "political organizations are
more frequently damaged by incompetent jobs than they are
aided by outstanding performances ."20

A Minnesota member of

the national committee said that "people will long remember
the . . . techniques used by Dr. Walter Judd when he keynoted
the 1960 convention.

The result was that he was in demand

nationally as a speaker and even now is booked almost solidly
O1
for a year ahead.
An examination of biographies, histories, and news
papers reveals that many keynoters were noted for their
speaking ability.

Some of the speakers had reputations as

vigorous and aggressive campaigners, others were said to be
impressive and dignified in their delivery, while still
others had been debaters or orators in high school and col
lege .
Although the descriptions varied, many observers,
including scholars, newspaper writers, convention delegates,
and members of the Republican national committee, stated that
speaking ability is an important qualification for the Repub
lican keynote speaker.

^Personal
George L. Hinman,
nn
^Personal
Fred G. Scribner,

correspondence of the writer, letter from
March 30, 1965.
correspondence of the writer, letter from
March 31, 1965.

2^-Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Russell T. Lund, March 16, 1965.

Political Prowess
Another frequently mentioned characteristic of the
person selected to be keynote speaker was his political pres
tige.

Newspaper writers and scholars agree that a keynoter

should have status as a political figure.

Sokolsky stated

that the "keynoter at most national conventions is a distinguished politician";

22

Ranney and Kendall added that "he

must have a public record that entitles him to speak for the
party on issues of the day";

23

Miles noted that "most key24.

noters have been possessors of high political office."■

Similar views were expressed by Hinderaker and Charles W.
Thompson.^5
This so-called "political prowess" tends to fall into
two rather distinct groupings;

(1 ) men who already have

achieved considerable prestige and power, and (2 ) men who are
being groomed by the party for possible future leadership.
Included in the first category are men such as David
Wilmot, who served as temporary chairman in the 1860 conven
tion.

Wilmot had helped to organize the Republican party and

served as its first vice-presidential nominee. Robert
Breckinridge (1864)

J.

was a lawyer, a minister, auniversity

^Sokolsky, op. c i t . , p. 6.
23

Ranney and Kendall, op. c i t ., p. 300.

^Miles, op.

cit. , p. 31.

^ H i n d e r a k e r , op. c i t ., p. 168; Charles W. Thompson,
"A Keynoter1s Speech Soon Fades O u t ," New York Times Maga
zine, June 3, 1928, p. 21.
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president, and a member of one of the most respected and
influential families in Kentucky.

Elihu Root, who keynoted

the conventions of 1904 and 1912, had served as United States
District Attorney, as Secretary of War and as Secretary of
State.

Henry Cabot Lodge (1920) was a well-publicized op

ponent of President Wilson and had served in the United
States Senate for twenty-seven years.

Earl Warren, the 1944

keynoter, had served California as a city attorney, county
attorney, district attorney, attorney general, and governor.
Warren had received considerable publicity when he was con
sidered as a possible vice-presidential nominee in 1940.
Douglas MacArthur, who keynoted the 1952 Republican conven
tion, was already regarded by many people as a kind of
"living legend."

Public feeling was so intense over Mac

Arthur 's loss of command in Korea that talk of impeaching
President Truman was common.

MacArthur gave his keynote

speech shortly after this dismissal.
The second category of keynoters are those who are
chosen partly because they are being groomed by the party for
possible future leadership.
diverse than the first.

This group is somewhat more

In some years, for example, a key

noter is selected as a possible "dark-horse" nominee, such as
Fairbanks in 1896, Wolcott in 1900, or MacArthur in 1952.
Harding (1916), Dickinson (1932), Stassen (1940), and Hat
field (1964) were selected as future party leaders.
Admittedly, these two kinds of political prowess are
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seldom the sole basis for the selection of the keynoter; yet
many delegates and members of the national committee regarded
political power to be as important as oratorical ability.
Most of the delegates with whom the writer discussed
the matter of political prowess tended to agree with the
first category— that the keynoter should have an established
reputation.

Many delegates used phrases such as "well re

spected and highly regarded";

"an established reputation ";^

"an articulate Republican leader";^® "an outstanding member
of the Party";
party""a
descriptions.

"an established position within the political

vigorous man of s t a t u r e , " ^ and other similar
Several delegates, however, tended to support

the second category,

and felt that the keynote speech should

"give a present or future candidate for some office a chance
to be h e a r d . a

delegate from Idaho felt that the keynoter

^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
F. E. Yerly, March 30, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Malcolm Lomas, March 8 , 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Louis C. Rogers, March 8 , 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Robert 0. Blood, March 7, 1965.
-^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Philip B. Hoffman, March 8 , 1965.
■^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Lem T. Jones, March 17, 1965.
•^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
J. Reuel Armstrong, March 24, 1965.
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should be an "outstanding Republican office holder that may
be a potential party leader in the future."

33

Another dele

gate saw the position of the keynoter as an opportunity for
the speaker to become a "national leader rather than a state
leader.

Only one delegate with whom the writer corre

sponded held the opinion that a "nationally known name" was
of no real importance. 3 5
The suggestion that a keynoter should be an important
political figure is not limited to scholars,

journalists, and

delegates, however, for William E. Miller commented that "it
seems obvious that the honor went to persons who were very
powerful in politics."36

other leaders within the Republican

hierarchy also expressed opinions regarding the keynoter's
political power.

In 1924, for example, Republican national

committeeman John W. Hart wrote President Coolidge suggesting
that Senator William E. Borah be chosen as keynoter on the
basis of his "great popularity not only in this intermountain
section, but in the more thickly settled centers of the
E a s t . i n

1940, national chairman John D. M. Hamilton

33personal correspondence of the writer,
Joe McCollum, April 8 , 1965.

letter from

34personal correspondence of the writer,
Richard D. Jones, March 2, 1965.

letter from

3 5 p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f th e w r i t e r ,
L o u i s C. Wyman, M a r c h 18, 1965.

letter f r o m

36personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
William E. Miller, February 20, 1964.
37coolidge Papers, Library of Congress, Hart to Co
olidge, April 21, 1924.
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thought Harold Stassen to be "an astute professional politi
cian" and "personally chose him for the keynoter."^®
According to Bayard Ewing, national committeeman from Rhode
Island, Douglas MacArthur was chosen as 1952 keynoter for his
"senior status and publicity value."

39

Another member of the

national committee agreed with Ewing by stating that "Mac
Arthur was selected as keynoter in 1952 because he was the
greatest American general in the Republican Party and they
wished to recognize him."

40

The selection of Walter Judd as

keynoter in 1960 was partly due to the idea that "Judd typified the support of the Congress."

41

In 1964, the arrangements committee conflicted over
the political prowess of the 1964 keynoter.

Josephine L.

Good, who served as executive director of the 1960 and 1964
Republican national conventions, stated that the arrangements
committee for the 1964 convention was split on the matter of
the keynoter's political status.

One group wanted to select

a relatively unknown figure and another group wanted a man of

38personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
John D. M. Hamilton, May 18, 1965.
• ^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard Ewing, May 17, 1965.

^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Katherine Kennedy Brown, April 17, 1965.
(Mrs. Brown has
been a member of the Republican national committee since
1932.)
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard Ewing, May 17, 1965.
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prestige. ^

(One of the reasons that Minnesota Republican

Chairman Robert Forsythe was not selected as keynoter was
that "he was not well known.")43

Evidently the group re

jected the idea of choosing a new face, for Clarence Brown
indicated that the problem was resolved by the "older people"
on the arrangements committee who "decided that a senator
should be permanent chairman and that a governor should serve
as keynoter."

44

The matter of political prowess can perhaps be best
illustrated by the table below, listing the governmental
positions held by keynoters at the time of their service.
Prior to 1896, most keynoters were judges, lawyers, ministers,
mayors or farmers.

Between 1896 and 1940, United States

senators were the most frequent choice for Republican key
noters.

Four of the six keynoters between 1944 and 1964, how

ever, have been governors.

Although an apparent trend has

occurred in the matter of governmental positions, the selec
tion of MacArthur in 1952 and Judd in 1960 shows that the
qualification of political power is flexible.

“^ S t a t e m e n t

Thus, as

by Josephine L. Good, personal interview,

March 23, 1965.
“^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Katherine Kennedy Brown, April 17, 1965.
(Although Charles
Halleck was also rejected as keynoter for this convention,
his rejection was primarily based on another consideration.
This matter is discussed later in this chapter.)
44Statement by Clarence Brown, personal interview,
March 25, 1965.
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TABLE II
GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS HELD BY REPUBLICAN KEYNOTERS
AT THE TIME OF THEIR SERVICEa
1856-1892

1896-1964

Cabinet Member

-

1

Governor

-

4

U. S. Senator

1

7

Representative in U. S. Congress

-

1

State Legislator

-

-

Other or None

9

3

10

18

Governmental Position

Total

Classifications taken from a table in David, Goldman,
and Bain, o p . cit., p. 66 .

committeeman Bayard Ewing put it, "the reasoning is different
in each case to fit the circumstances at the moment."

AC

Geographical Location
In addition to speaking ability and political prestige,
the keynoter1s geographical location is often an important
factor.

The table below indicates the primary place of resi

dence for the nominees and the keynoters.

It seems

45personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard Ewing, May 17, 1965.

TABLE III
MAJOR PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR REPUBLICAN NOMINEES AND KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
Year
1856
1860
1864
1868
1872
1876
1880
1884
1888
1892
1896
1900
1904
1908
1912
1916
1920
1924
1928

Presidential
Nominees
Fremont (Calif.)
Lincoln (111.)
Lincoln (111.)
Grant (111.)
Grant (111.)
Hayes (Ohio)
Garfield (Ohio)
Blaine (Maine)
Harrison (Ind.)
Harrison (Ind.)
McKinley (Ohio)
McKinley (Ohio)
Roosevelt (N.Y.)
Taft (Ohio)
Taft (Ohio)
Hughes (N.Y.)
Harding (Ohio)
Coolidge (Mass.)
Hoover (Calif.)

Vice-Presidential
Nominees
Dayton (N.J.)
Hamlin (Maine)
Johnson (Tenn.)
Colfax (Ind.)
Wilson (Mass.)
Wheeler (N.Y.)
Arthur (N.Y.)
Logan (111.)
Morton (N.Y.)
Reid (Ohio & N.Y.)
Hobart(N.J.)
Roosevelt (N.Y.)
Fairbanks (Ind.)
Sherman (N.Y.)
Sherman *3 & Butler (N.Y.)
Fairbanks (Ind.)
Coolidge (Mass.)
Lowdenc & Dawes (111.)
Curtis (Kan.)

Keynoters
Emmet (N.Y.)
Wilmot (Penna.)
Breckinridge (Ky.)
Schurz (Mo.)
McMichael (Penna.)
Pomeroy (N.Y.)
Hoar (Mass.)
Lynch (Miss.)
Thurston (Nebr.)
Fasset (N.Y.)
Fairbanks (Ind.)Ra
Wolcott (Colo.)D
Root (N.Y.)R
Burrows (Mich.)R
Root (N.Y.)R
Harding (Mich.)R
Lodge (N.Y.)R
Burton (Ohio)R
Fess (Ohio)C

TABLE III

Year

Presidential
Nominees

1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964

Hoover (Calif.)
Landon (Kan.)
Willkie (Ind. & N.Y.)
Dewey (N.Y.)
Dewey (N.Y.)
Eisenhower (Tex. & Kan.)
Eisenhower (Tex. & Kan.)
Nixon (Calif.)
Goldwater (Ariz.)

(CONTINUED)

Vice-Presidential
Nominees
Curtis (Kan.)
Knox (111.)
McNary (Ore.)
Bricker (Ohio)
Warren (Calif.)
Nixon (Calif.)
Nixon (Calif.)
Lodge (Mass.)
Miller (N.Y.)

Keynoters
Dickinson (lowa)C
Steiwer (Ore.)C
Stassen (Minn.)C
Warren (Calif.)C
Green (Ill.)C
MacArthur (Wise. & N.Y.)
Langlie (Wash.)C
Judd (Minn.)C
Hatfield (Or e .)C

Explanation of symbols: D-Democrat; R-Republican; C-Contested.
*L
Sherman died before the election and Butler was substituted on the ticket.
cLowden refused the nomination and Dawes was subsequently nominated.

(Ti

oo

69
significant that in no convention were both nominees and the
keynoter from the same state.

In the conventions of 1876,

1904, and 1912, the keynoter was from the same state as one
of the nominees.

In all three of these instances, the state

represented twice was electorally rich New York.

At no time

since the 1912 convention has there been any duplication in
residence between the nominees and the keynoter.

In the last

twenty years, the areas most frequently represented by these
three positions have been the east, the mid-west, and the
west.

No southerner has served as keynoter since 1884, when

John Lynch, a Negro farmer from Mississippi, was elected
after a bitter floor fight.

Since 1924, no keynoter has come

from a supposedly "safe" or Republican state.

Thus, the geo

graphical locations of the keynoters are obviously important.
When the 1864 convention met during the Civil War, Robert J.
Breckinridge of Kentucky served as keynoter; the choice of a
southerner for this position was hardly accidental.

The

issue of geography was also important in the selection of
Edward O. Wolcott in 1900.

Wolcott had almost bolted from

the party in 1894 over the issue of bi-metallism and being a
"westerner" from Colorado, he was perhaps selected to heal
Ac

party wounds by singing the praises of the gold standard. °
In more recent years, the necessity for geographical
distribution of convention participants has become pretty

4^Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1948), p. 652.
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much a matter of common knowledge.

After noting that 1964

Democratic keynoter Pastore's speech was "violent and vituper
ative," an Iowa delegate thought that the selection of
Pastore was influenced by the fact that he "came from a
densely populated area."

47

Another delegate suggested that

the selection of Mark Hatfield as 1964 Republican keynoter
"allowed us to give some geographic balance to our convention
program, recognizing the far West."^®
A member of the Republican national committee stated
that among the reasons for Walter Judd's selection in 1960
was his support in the "Middle West."

This same committeeman

added that "the geographical aspect" is definitely considered
/Q
when choosing a keynoter."
Clarence Brown said that the
arrangements committee attempts to select a keynoter who is
from a section of the country different from that of the
nominees.50
Additional Considerations
In certain conventions, keynoters were selected for
reasons other than speaking ability, political power, and

47personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Malcolm Lomas, March 8 , 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Louis G. Rogers, March 2, 1965.
4 9Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard Ewing, May 15, 1965.
^ S t a tement by Clarence Brown, personal interview,
March 25, 1965.
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geographical location.

One such additional quality or quali

fication has been the k eynoter’s appearance.

Examination of

photographs and descriptions of the keynoters shows that
many of them have been relatively handsome (or impressive)
men.

Included in this category are Wolcott, Root, Harding,

Lodge, Dickinson, Warren, MacArthur, and Hatfield.

(An

examination of photographs and descriptions of several of the
keynoters, however, has led to the conclusion that attractive
ness is not obligatory.)

In order to show the increased

importance of appearance or "image" with the growth of mass
communications, especially television, an examination of the
"attractiveness" qualification in the selection of the 1964
keynoter seems desirable.
"A great deal of politics went into the selection of
the keynote speaker at the 1964 Republican C o n v e n t i o n . A
portion of the politics mentioned the appearance of the key
note speaker.

Although "appearance" was certainly not the

only factor involved in the selection of Mark Hatfield, it
did play an important role.

When the Republican governors

convened, they agreed to recommend to the arrangements com
mittee that Hatfield serve as permanent chairman for the 1964
convention.

The Goldwater supporters, however, wanted

Thruston Morton to serve as permanent chairman because they
thought that he would be less prejudiced than Hatfield in

^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mrs. Russell T. Lund, March 16, 1965.

recognizing delegates.

The Goldwater people wanted Republi

can national chairman William E. Miller to keynote the con
vention and were willing to give Hatfield the post of tempo
rary chairman as a concession to the liberal element of the
party.

52

Even the non-Goldwaterites were apparently unwilling

to block Morton1s nomination as permanent chairman because of
his popularity with all factions of the p a r t y .53

With the

post of permanent chairman decided upon, the question of
choices for keynoter and temporary chairman remained.
cisely what happened at this point is not clear.

Pre

What appears

to have occurred is that William E. Miller visited Minnesota
prior to the convention and casually discussed the selection
of a keynote speaker with Robert Forsythe, chairman of the
Minnesota state committee.

Forsythe wanted to be keynoter,

but did not want to serve as temporary 1chairman.

Evidently,

Forsythe misunderstood Mil l e r 's intentions and thought that
he had been invited to serve as keynoter.5^

Minority House

leader Halleck also apparently expected the arrangements com
mittee to follow a precedent set by Joseph Martin when Martin
served as permanent chairman during his years as House
minority leader.

(Halleck was not aware that this position

^ R o w l a n d Evans and Robert Novak, "A Coup for Mod
erates," The Washington Post, May 31, 1965, p. E-7.
33Personal correspondence of the writer, source
requested not to be identified.
^ S t a t e m e n t ky Josephine L. Good, personal interview,
March 23, 1965.

had been filled by Morton.)^5

since Morton was to be the

national committee's choice for permanent chairman, Hatfield
was offered the position of temporary chairman.

At this time,

the Goldwater supporters still thought that Miller would
serve as keynoter.

Hatfield, however, regarded himself as

the "representative of the 16 Republican Governors" and
thought "that the temporary chairmanship was not sufficient
notice of the Governors.

. . ."56

The issue was complicated

at this point by Miller's decision to refuse the post of key
noter because he wanted to "bring in newer and younger
faces."57

The Goldwater people were left without a pre

arranged alternate choice for keynoter and turned to conser
vative Tim Babcock, Governor of Montana.

The move to support

Babcock as keynoter, however, was too late, for national
committeeman John Martin of Michigan had already recommended
a return to the former practice of allowing the temporary
CQ
chairman to deliver the keynote speech.
Among the men con
sidered for the dual role were Forsythe (who thought he would
be selected because of his conversation with Miller), Halleck,
Babcock, and Hatfield.

In addition to the factors of speaking

ability, political power, and geographical location, the

5^Ibid.
5^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mark 0. Hatfield, May 25, 1965.
57Morning Advocate [Baton Rouge, Louisiana], May 14,
1964, p. 2-.C.
S^Evans and Novak, o£. cit., p. E-7.
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issue of appearance loomed large in the discussions.

Although

each of the men under consideration had at least some of the
needed characteristics of the keynoter, Hatfield was con
sidered to be more "attractive" than Forsythe or H a l l e c k . ^
Thus, this additional consideration of appearance can be said
to be a factor influencing the arrangements committee.

(Even

the delegates are aware of the importance of the keynoter
appearance.

One phrase used frequently by several delegates

was the observation that a keynoter should be "attractive and
dynamic .")60
The Republican party has frequently been badly divided
by conflicts between liberal and conservative groups.

Con

sequently, as was illustrated by the discussion of the 1964
convention, intraparty struggles for power exert a pervasive
influence on all parts of the convention.

Frequently, the

selection of the keynoter has been influenced by these intra
party squabbles.

This second "additional consideration"

regarding the qualities and qualifications of the keynoter
can best be illustrated by a discussion of these power strug
gles in the conventions of 1880, 1884, 1888, 1908, and 1912.
In 1880, the selection of the keynoter was based
almost wholly on intraparty manipulations for power.

After

^ S t a t e m e n t b y several members of the Republican
leadership who requested not to be identified.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letters from
Louis C. Wyman, March 18, 1965; Mrs. Louis B. Rogers, March
8 , 1965; Mrs. Katherine K. Neuberger, March 12, 1965.

Grant returned from his European tour in the fall of 1879,
many of his supporters, led by Roscoe Conkling, began plans
to restore the "unit rule" that had created such strife in
1876.

This strategy was based on the selection of a parti

san temporary chairman who would make a favorable ruling on
the unit r u l e . ^

The supporters of the other two major

candidates, James G. Blaine and John Sherman, discovered the
plan and threatened to remove pro-Grant national chairman Don
Cameron from office if he supported the p l o t . ^

According to

Blaine's biographer, James A. Garfield forced Cameron to
abide by the wishes of the majority of the national committee
and select George P. Hoar, an anti-Grant man, to serve as
(

temporary chairman.

CO

t

Consequently, the matter of unit rule

was decided upon by the convention and not by the prejudices
of a pro-Grant chairman.

In this instance the selection of

the keynoter was based on considerations other than Hoar's
speaking ability, or geographical location.
As has been mentioned earlier in the study, the
arrangements committee plays a major role in the selection
of convention participants.

The national committee usually

accepts their recommendations and presents the list of con
vention participants to the convention for a vote.

^ D a v i d Saville Muzzey, James G. Blaine (Port Washing
ton, New York:
Kennikat Press, Inc., 1934), p. 167.
®^Bain, ojo. c i t . , p. 109.

63Muzzey, o£. cit., pp. 167-168.

76
The nomination made by the national committee is
usually accepted by the convention without contest
or division.
If there is opposition, however, any
delegate is entitled to place another name before
the convention and call for a vote. . . .64
Such a circumstance arose for the first time in the 1884 con
vention, when the Blaine-controlled national committee
selected Powell Clayton to serve as temporary chairman, and
the convention rejected the choice.

Henry Cabot Lodge moved

that John R. Lynch, a Negro delegate from Mississippi, be
installed as temporary chairman.
interpreted in several ways.

This action has been

According to one source, Clay

ton was a Blaine supporter and a "coalition of Blaine's
opponents decided that substitution of a colored delegate for
chairman would weaken Blaine's appeal to other colored dele
gates."

ftft

Another source stated that Clayton was originally

selected by the Arthur supporters, but that Clayton moved
into the Blaine camp when Arthur refused to grant him a post
mastership; consequently, the Arthur people decided to punish
Clayton by voting against his nomination.

By an analysis

of key votes, Bain concluded that Lynch was nominated and
seconded by "members of the pro-Edmunds reformist bloc, and
was supported by the Stalwarts, and these two groups, with
assistance from favorite son delegations, selected h i m . " ^

^Kleeburg, op. ci t ., p. 119.

65Bain, op. cit., p. 122; Muzzey, pp. cit., p. 278,
concurs with Bain.
k^Bain, ibid.

^^Ibid.
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The effect of this power struggle was that Lynch1s speech
was evidently unprepared— -the speech was neither well
organized nor well supported.

The qualities of speaking

ability and geographical location were obviously considered
to be of less importance in this instance than power struggles
within the party.
Four years later, in -the 1888 convention, the national
chairman was evidently unwilling to risk a repetition of the
1884 floor fight, and presented the temporary chairman to the
convention without calling for a vote on his election.

A

delegate rose and asked if the temporary chairman had been
elected and the sergeant at arms replied that "the Temporary
Chairman is Mr. John M. Thurston."

The delegate then stated,

. . . [that in] behalf of the Kansas delegation, I
desire to say that they decline to be responsible
for the action in any manner of the National Com
mittee in this matter.
They regard it as a very
great mistake. And they desire me to state that
they wish to record the vote of their state— that
they wish the roll to be called, and if the roll
is called they will vote for the Hon. William
Warner of Missouri.
The motion was apparently ignored,

for Thurston began his

speech immediately.
The circumstances surrounding the selection of Julius
C. Burrows as temporary chairman in 1908 merit attention for
their illumination of the impending Progressive third party

68Proceedinqs, 1888, p. 11.
(The titles and publish
ers of Republican convention proceedings have varied from
year to year and will be cited simply as Proceedings through
out this study.
Complete titles and publishing information
is included in the bibliography.)
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movement.

Apparently, President Roosevelt's choice for key

noter was historian Albert J. Beveridge, but the last vestiges
of the anti-Taft movement were strong enough to block the
selection of Beveridge.

Taft wrote Roosevelt that

. . . [it] appears that all the committee were opposed
to Beveridge; that Dover moved his election in the
committee, and that by way of opposition to that Gen
eral Powell Clayton moved the postponement of action
until the 3rd of June. The committee agreed to this,
though one of them— Mr. Hart of Iowa— expressed the
view that the Chairman ought to make the appointment,
and the rest of the committee intimated that they were
not very much opposed to the Chairman's doing so,
though they seemed to have expressed their opposition
to Beveridge.
The result was that the committee
adjourned and Clayton did not know of the appointment
of Burrows until he heard by telegram after he had
left Chicago. . . . He wished you to know this in a
confidential way because he was exceedingly anxious
to avoid the impression that he had been in any way
concerned in a movement adverse to the Administration.
This only confirms what I have already told you, but
it shows with even greater distinctness that the
appointment was made solely by N e w . 69
As a conservative, Burrows differed with Roosevelt on many
issues.

Roosevelt felt that Beveridge's progressive ideas

would be preferable to those of Burrows.

As chairman of the

national committee, however, Harry S. New ignored Roosevelt's
preference and substituted a man hostile to Roosevelt's pro
gressive policies.

Bain observed that the conservatives on

the committee joined with New to "sidetrack Beveridge on the
grounds that he came from the same state as a potential
candidate, Vice-President Fairbanks, and by adroit maneuvering.

^ T h e o d o r e Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Taft
to Roosevelt, May 19, 1908; also see Blair Bolles, Tyrant
From Illinois (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
1951), p. 133.
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managed to install their own choice."^0
Hie final convention to be discussed regarding intra
party p o w e r :struggles and their influence on the selection
of the keynoter is the convention of 1912.

In this conven

tion, the selection of the temporary chairman erupted into a
floor fight for the second time in Republican convention
history.

The historic and rather tragic Taft-Roosevelt

breach had continued to widen during the months prior to the
convention.

Since the national committee has a major role

in selecting the keynoter, perhaps it would be worthwhile to
look briefly at the position of the national committee in
1912.

The committee had been selected at a convention domi

nated by Roosevelt and under rules approved, by Roosevelt; yet,
at least thirty-seven of the fifty-three members of the
71
national committee were Taft supporters.

Pringle attempted

to explain this by noting that a national committeeman "is a
disciplined party leader.

His loyalty remains with the titu7P

lar head of the party, and Taft was now that head.""1

Both

Taft and the national committee wanted Elihu Root to serve as
temporary chairman in the 1912 convention.

Root had keynoted

the 1904 convention that had nominated Roosevelt, and had

^Bain, pp. cit. , p. 172.
71

.

*

Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William
Howard Taft (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939),
p. 797; also see Bain, pp. c i t ., p. 179.
^Pringle, jLoc. cit.
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served as Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and as a
United States senator.

The position of temporary chairman

was vitally important to both Taft and Roosevelt because of
his rulings on the contested delegations.

Roosevelt, how

ever, was at first hesitant to oppose a former member of his
cabinet until pressure from western progressives forced him
to change his mind and fight.
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Roosevelt decided to support the nomination of
Governor McGovern of Wisconsin as temporary chairman rather
than support the election of Elihu Root.

Unless the Roose

velt forces could enlist the support of the La Follette
backers he lacked the strength to organize or even to dead
lock the convention.

The Roosevelt men reasoned that the La

Follette Wisconsin delegation would hardly refuse to support
their own governor as temporary chairman and then that Mc
Govern could select pro-Roosevelt committees to help overturn
the rulings of the national committee over the contested
seats.
The prolonged floor battle over the selection of the
1912 keynoter lasted for seven hours, and Root won over Mc
Govern by a close vote of 558 to 551.

Taft's margin of

victory was slight, but in the 1912 convention, Root's elec
tion virtually assured Taft's nomination.
The most frequently occurring characteristics and
qualities of Republican keynoters concern their speaking

^Martin, o£. cit. , p. 119.
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ability, political power, and geographical location.

In

certain years, these qualities have been outweighed by
factors such as physical appearance or intraparty power
struggles.

In various conventions, specific events caused

the national committee and Republican leadership to consider
other factors for selecting a keynoter.

In 1864, for example,

Robert J. Breckinridge was perhaps chosen as a contrast to
another member of his family, Democratic nominee John C.
Breckinridge, who ran with Douglas in 1860.

In 1900, Edward

O. Wolcott was chosen partly because of his residence in a
Democratic silver-producing state.

In 1952, Douglas Mac-

Arthur was selected as keynoter partly because of his dispute
with President Truman over the conduct of the Korean War.
Such variables were frequent, but occurred with so little
relationship to each other that they will not be discussed
further in this study.
A COMPOSITE VIEW OF REPUBLICAN KEYNOTERS
The characteristic most common among all Republican
keynoters was that twenty-three of the twenty-seven keynoters
had studied law.

Three of the remaining four keynoters were

college trained, however, for one was a physician, one was an
army general and a West Point graduate, and the third was a
Harvard graduate.

Only John R. Lynch, who was nominated from

the floor of the convention, had received no legal or advanced
schooling.
however,

(Lynch served in the House of Representatives,

from 1873-1877, and from 1882-1883.)
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The most frequently occurring age for a keynoter was
between fifty and fifty-five years old.
ages of the keynoters.

Table IV shows the

Every keynoter since 1936 has been a

veteran of military service.

No keynoter has ever attended

a southern college or university.

TABLE IV
AGE AND NUMBER OF KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
Age

Number

30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70-75

. 1

3
4
0
7
3
3
2
4

SUMMARY
It seems evident that there is no single rationale
for selecting a keynote speaker in Republican national con
ventions.

Newspaper writers, scholars, and casual observers,

as well as delegates and members of the Republican hierarchy
agree that the speaker should have some degree of oratorical
ability.

Another frequently mentioned characteristic of the

person selected as keynoter was his political prowess.

Most

83
of the keynoters seem to fall into two rather distinct
categories:

(1) men who already have achieved considerable

prestige and power, and (2) men who are being groomed by the
party for possible future leadership.

Most of the delegates

with whom the writer discussed the matter of political power
tended to support the first of the two categories— that the
keynoter should have an established reputation.

Although

"outsiders" had little to say about the keynoter's geographi
cal location, many delegates and members of the Republican
leadership indicated that the keynoter's place of residence
was important.

Occasionally, these three characteristics

have been outweighed b y additional considerations such as
appearance or intraparty power struggles.
The largest single age group represented by the twentyseven keynoters was between fifty and fifty-five.

As a group,

the men selected to keynote Republican national conventions
have been exceptionally well educated, most of them having
studied law.

In recent years, all keynoters have been veterans

and the majority of the keynoters since 1940 have been
governors.

CHAPTER IV
THE SPEECHES:

GENERAL INFORMATION

CONVENTION ORGANIZATION
Although the early Republicans had no real continuity
of Whig policy, the new party did have several organizational
precedents to follow.

Prior to their 1856 convention, the

Republicans were quick to make use of committees of cor
respondence, central committees, and a national committee—
all of which had been used with success by both Whigs and
Democrats.

Additionally, there is considerable evidence that

the National Republican convention of December 12, 1831,
served as the most imitated model of procedure in later con
ventions of both parties.
Republican national conventions from 1856 to 1888 were
begun with a "call to order" read by the national chairman.^
Each day's session was opened with a prayer by a clergyman
o
with some degree of at least local prestige.
The order of
the other first day events has varied occasionally, especially

-*-The secretary of the convention began reading this
call in 1888.
^These gentlemen are carefully and regularly assorted
to avoid offending any particular religious group.
84
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since the advent of radio and television and the arrangements
committee's attempts to schedule major events during prime
television time.

During the earlier Republican conventions,

the opening days' activities also included an address by the
national chairman, and addresses by both the temporary chair
man and the permanent chairman.

In later years,

"official"

photographs were taken, pledges of allegiance were repeated,
the delegates were sung to by duets, trios, quartets, octets,
and choirs, the convention was "welcomed" by city councilmen,
mayors, and governors, and the delegates were frequently
prayed over by Catholics/ Jews, Baptists, Methodists, and
Lutherans, to name only a few of the day's exhausting activi
ties. 3
THE KEYNOTE SPEECH:

ITS PURPOSE AND FUNCTION

Since the convention itself is multipurposive and the
keynote speech is an important part of the observable conven
tion, this chapter examines the purpose and function of the
keynote speech from four points of view:

(1) views of news

paper writers, casual observers, and scholarly writers;

(2)

views of the delegates to various Republican national conven
tions;

(3) views of the national committee members and other

leaders in the Republican party; and (4) views of the key
noters themselves.

3The importance of these events is discussed in Chapter
V as "extrinsic means of persuasion," pp. 224-227.
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Views of Newspaper Writers. Casual
Observers and Scholarly Writers
Most of the commentary on keynoting written by "out
siders" is of little value as aids in this attempt to better
understand the purpose and function of the keynote speech.
Responses by newspaper writers, casual observers, and
scholars can be grouped into several separate categories.
Since many outsiders are either unable or unwilling
to accept the rally function of the observable convention,
they have most frequently dealt with the keynote speech by
ridicule.

Consider,

for example, Edward Lowry's statement

that keynoting "implies the ability to make melodic noises
and give the impression of passionately and torrentially
moving onward and upward while warily standing still."

4

Or

consider Sidney Hyman's wry notation that the keynote speaker,
"first . . . whets his axe on the grindstone of several
thousand fire-spouting words.

Then, while his audience

shouts its ecstasy, he chops off the head of the President."^
Robert Bendiner's treatment of the "keynote ritual" is also
rather typical of the responses in this category.

Bendiner

stated that the keynote speaker
. . . is expected to flay the opposition alive and
work up a fine spirit of unity in his own party

^Edward G. Lowry, Washington Close-Ups (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1921), p. 12.
5Sidney Hyman, The American President (New York:
Harper and Bros., 1954), p. 84.
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before it proceeds to tear itself apart over the
nomination.
Only partisans of the deepest dye can
take seriously these grandiloquent outpourings,
which credit only one political sect with genius,
patriotism, courage and defense of the American
home while holding the other responsible for wars,
crime, early frost and the Colorado beetle.
They
are viewed solely as virtuoso performances.
Every
rolling period draws an ovation, and mention of the
party's historical giants is likely to bring an
outburst. . . .6
A final example of such ridicule was Will Rogers's summary
of Simeon D. Fess's 1928 keynote speech:
A Keynote Speech is Press notices of the Republican
Party, written by its own members.
Here are just a few things that I bet you didn't
know the Republicans were responsible for:
Radio,
Telephone, Baths, Automobiles, Savings Accounts,
Law Enforcement, Workmen living in houses, and a
living wage for Senators.
The Democrats had brought in War, pestilence,
debts, Disease, Bo [sic] Weevil, Gold Teeth, need
of Farm relief, suspenders, floods, famine and Tom
Heflin. . . .
Once I thought sure he was referring to 'Our
Saviour' till they told me, 'No, it was Coolidge.'
The way he rated 'em was Coolidge, The Lord, and
then Lincoln.
It was an impromptu address that he had been
working on for only six months. He made no attempt
at Oratory, he just shouted.?
The second most frequently occurring response in this
category came from scholars who agreed that the speech was
multipurposive.

Edwin A. Miles noted that "the keynote

speech-has two primary purposes:

to raise the enthusiams of

^Robert Bendiner, White House Fever
court, Brace and Company, 1960), p. 71.
^Rogers, pp. c i t ., pp. 66-67.

(New York:

Har-

the delegates to a high pitch and to rally the voters of the
O
nation to the p a r t y ’s standard."
Sait saw three functions
for the speech.

He stated that the keynoter "exposes the

weaknesses of the enemy, summons the party hosts to battle,
Q
and does his best to silence discords."
V. 0. Key agreed
that the "keynoter inveighs against the opposition," but
added that he also "recites the great achievements of his
party, invokes the memory of the great party leaders of the
past, and generally attempts to set a stirring theme for the
convention."
A third response voiced by these outsiders was that
the speech should deal primarily with campaign issues.

David,

Goldman, and Bain noted that the keynote address should pro
claim "the chief points on which the party will base its
appeal to the v o t e r s . " ^

In a similar vein, Harold Bruce

observed that the keynote speech should set forth "the salient
aspects and outstanding issues" of the forthcoming election
campaign.12
The fourth group of responses from journalists and

8Miles, pp. c i t . , p. 26.
^Edward McChesney Sait, American Parties and Elections
(4th ed.; New York:
Appleton-Century Company, 1942), p. 558.
l^Key, pp. cit., p. 453.
■*--*-David, Goldman, and Bain, op. c i t . , p. 65.
York:

^ H a r o l d R. Bruce, American National Government (New
Henry Holt and Co., 1957), p. 303.
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scholars viewed the speech primarily as epideictic— "to point
with pride and view with alarm."

13

Theodore Cousens elabo

rated on the matter of praise or blame by saying that whether
the keynoter will "deal mostly in praise or blame will depend
mainly on whether the party is in or out of office."
In the former situation there is little to do but
praise the current administration, showing how it
has helped the farmer, the laborer, the business
man, the Negro, national prosperity, the cause of
peace, the national security, and so on ad
infinitum.
. . . [If the keynoter's party is out of office,'
he] devotes himself largely to vitriolic assaults
on the record of the administration, revealing them
as crooks and wastrels, the friends of privilege or
the foes of honest business. . .
Thus, there are some areas of agreement among news
paper w riters, casual observers, and scholars on the function
and purpose of the keynote speech.

These writers feel that

the speech should set forth important issues for the campaign
ahead, stimulate the delegates, point with pride to party
accomplishments

(if in office), and to attack the opposition

for any unpopular occurrence.
Views of Delegates to the National Convention
The most frequently mentioned purpose for the keynote
speech from the point of view of the delegates to national

•^See, for example. Pie Dufour,
Picayune [New Orleans], July 12, 1964.
■^Theodore

tions in America
p. 388.

"Pie a la Mode," Times

Cousens, Politics and Political Organiza
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942),
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conventions was that the speech should set the "tone,"
"mood," "tenor," or "stage" for the convention itself.

Most

of the delegates who felt that the speech should set a domi
nant tone or mood felt that the speech should stimulate the
delegates.

This opinion took various forms of expression,

such as "stir up emotions," "key the delegates up," "be a
real inspiration," and "pep the listeners up."15
A second major group of responses dealt with the
importance of radio and television coverage of the keynote
speech.

This point of view was well expressed by a West

Virginia delegate who thought that
. . . the keynoter should realize that millions of
people will be watching, which will include party
workers, hard core Republicans, Republicans, Inde
pendants [sic], and Democrats. His speech should
be directed more at them than to his local audience.
I feel a different technique should be used in
speaking to television and radio audiences than when
speaking only to the assembled delegates.15
A large number of delegates used phrases such as "I think it
is now primarily designed for the radio and T.V. audience,"1^

impersonal correspondence of the writer, letters from
Mrs. James P. Hooper, March 8, 1965; Louis C. Wyman, March 18,
1965; Arthur J. Weaver, March 8, 1965; Cleo S. Jones, March
19, 1965; Mrs. Zora McCreary, March 9, 1965; John Rouzie,
March 26, 1965; Arley R. Bjella, March 17, 1965; George P.
Etzell, March 8, 1965; Arthur N. Renk, March 26, 1965; Robert
O. Blood, March 7, 1965; Lem T. Jones, March 17, 1965; Mrs.
Florence G. Mossis, March 10, 1965; Jack L. Middleton, March
17, 1965; James C. Parsons, April 1, 1965; I. Lee Potter,
March 11, 1965.
15Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Cleo S. Jones, March 18, 1965.
impersonal correspondence of the writer, letter from
John N. Dalton, April 5, 1965.
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or "TV has turned the whole thing into a show/'-*-® or, "tele
vision is important— the keynoter gives the nation the first
look at the issues, hopes, plans and ambitions of that con
vention— the keynoter is talking to the public— not the deleIQ

gates."

One delegate went so far as to suggest that the

keynoter,
. . . should use illustrations, possibly pictures and
certainly an occasional item of interest to the tele
vision audience.
The necessary slide reproductions
and other useful photographic material should be pro
fessionally prepared well in advance of the convention
by the best skilled public relations people. . . . The
keynote address should be prepared in draft form at
least thirty days before the Convention and each pros
pective correction and illustration should be proof
tested on television, with at least one or two dry
runs before it is actually d e l i v e r e d . 2 0
A third major purpose for the speech as seen by the
delegates was to isolate issues for the forthcoming election
campaign.

This response, occurring less frequently than the

suggestion that the speech should be stimulating, was expressed
in a variety of ways, including the following:

"to provide

the theme for the forthcoming campaign"; an aggressive out
line of the party's objectives and opportunities"; to outline
the single most important issue in the forthcoming election";
and,

"to reflect the principle issues on which the campaign

Impersonal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Thomas Sweeney, March 15, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Arthur J. Weaver, March 25, 1965.
20personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Louis C. Wyman, March 18, 1965.
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will be based."

21

This group of delegates, then, evidently

viewed the speech as primarily informative or argumentative
rather than stimulating.
A fourth purpose expressed by the delegates indicated
that the keynote speech should stimulate the nation (but not
necessarily inform them about issues).

None of the delegates

with whom the writer discussed the manner in which this stimu
lation should occur were very specific about how it was to be
accomplished.

Several did indicate, however,

that the

speech was primarily designed for radio and television audi
ences rather than for the convention participants.
The fifth largest category of responses came from
those delegates who felt that the speech was multipurposive,
often including one or more of the reasons discussed pre
viously, i.e., to stimulate the delegates, to inform or
persuade the nation, and to stimulate the nation.
Virginia delegate,

A West

for example, stated that the speech

. . . should have three main purposes.
First, it
should set the 'note' upon which the campaign is
waged.
Secondly, it should create enthusiasm among
the party workers and leaders.
Thirdly, since it
is given early in the convention it should create
such interest that the viewing audience would want
to watch more of the convention.22

21personal correspondence of the writer, letters from
John H. Downs, March 19, 1965; Philip B. Hoffman, March 8,
1965; Joseph J. Tribble, March 11, 1965; Robert Taft, Jr.,
March 16, 1965; Jack L. Middleton, March 17, 1965; Arthur J.
Weaver, March 8, 1965; Louis C. Wyman, March 18, 1965.
22personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Cleo S. Jones, March 18, 1965.
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Odin Langen, Congressman from Minnesota, also felt that the
speech should have three purposes:
vention;

(1) to inspire the con

(2) to carry the message to party leaders; and (3)

to inspire the nation as a whole.23

^ Wyoming delegate found

five purposes for the keynote speech:
The speech is probably designed to (a) kill time
while the committees are working; (b) pep the
listeners up; (c) give the delegates a background
of party positions preparatory to adopting plat
forms; (d) attempt to unify splinters; (e) give a
present or future candidate for some office a
chance to be h e a r d . 24
Other delegates expressed an awareness of the speech's multi
ple purpose, but the three examples given illustrate the
typical answers in this category.
A sixth major category of responses dealt with attacks
on the opposition.

This idea was expressed in many ways,

including statements such as "a frontal attack upon the Demo
cratic Party," "pinpoint Democratic failures to keep
promises as well as duplicity of administration," "indict
the opposition," "concentrate on blatant Democratic fail
ures," and "to give the opposition hell— no matter

2 3 s t a t e m e n t by Odin L a n g e n ,

personal

w h a t . "

interview,

25

March

23, 1965.
24personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
J. Reuel Armstrong, March 24, 1965.
25personal correspondence of the writer, letters from
Joe McCollum, April 8, 1965; Louis C. Wyman, March 18, 1965;
Jack L. Middleton, March 17, 1965; H. J. Clark, February 25,
1965; T. G. Chilton, March 2, 1965; Mrs. Louis G. Rogers,
March 8, 1965; Richard G. Kleindienst, February 25, 1965;
F. E. Yerly, March 30, 1965.
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A seventh category of responses suggested that the
speeches were relatively unimportant.

Respondents feeling

this way said, "I think they all stink and are misleading and
without merit" or "I would say that keynote speeches are
nothing but a lot of hot air."

Also included in this cate

gory would be the comments of several delegates who suggested
that the keynote speech was merely a tradition— a speech that
once served a useful purpose, but no longer is needed.

26

Still other delegates used phrases such as the follow
ing to explain the purpose of the speech:

"merely frosting

on the cake," "the speech should differentiate between the
philosophies and methods of the two parties," "the speech
should deal with philosophy, not issues," and that, the speech
should serve as the convention's "State of the Party and of
the Union (as we see it)

m e s s a g e . " ^

Many delegates to the national conventions feel that
the primary purpose of the keynote speech is to stimulate the
delegates by setting the mood or tone of the convention.
Other delegates felt that the speech was primarily designed
for radio and television listeners.

Still other delegates

suggested that the speech should isolate issues for the

26personal correspondence of the writer, letters from
H. J. Clark, February 25, 1965; Edward Burling, Jr., March
30, 1965; G. Paul Jones, Jr., March 8, 1965; T. G. Chilton,
March 2, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letters from
Webster B. Todd, March 29, 1965; Willard E. Strain, March 8,
1965; Paul E. Morris, February 25, 1965; J. Herman Saxon,
April 27, 1965.
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forthcoming campaign, stimulate the nation, attack the oppo
sition, or fill a combination of all these requirements.
Some of the delegates also felt the speech was unimportant.
Views of Members of the Republican Hierarchy
Views of members of the Republican hierarchy regarding
the purpose and function of the keynote speech are similar to
the opinions of outsiders and delegates.

This category in

cludes opinions by former national chairmen, members of the
national committee, Republican governors, officials and
employees of the Republican party, and congressional leaders.
Although the responses from this group of political activists
were quite varied, they can be separated into categories
similar to those used earlier in this chapter.

The large

majority of respondents in this category regarded the purpose
of the keynote speech as primarily stimulating or inspira
tional .

Clarence B r own, a long-time member of the arrange

ments committee, said that the speech should be "unifying and
inspirational rather than controversial."

28

Wirt A. Yerger,

Jr., Chairman of the Southern Association of Republican State
Chairmen, felt that the "keynote speech is certainly an
excellent opportunity to set the tone of the convention, and
it can inspire the delegates in a significant way."

no

2Q

Other

,

Statement by Clarence Brown, personal interview,
March 24, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Wirt A. Yerger, Jr., March 13, 1965.
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Republican leaders used phrases such as "light a spark of
enthusiasm,"

"contribute materially to the tone and morale

of the convention," and "set the tone for the convention."^®
(About half of the persons in this third category with whom
the writer discussed the purpose of keynoting used the
phrase "tone of the convention.")
The second largest group of responses dealt with the
importance of radio and television as they were related to
the purpose of the keynote speech.

The long quotation that

follows expresses this particular point of view quite well:
The National Convention of a political party today
is perhaps the greatest single opportunity of that
party to put its candidate and its program before the
people of the Country.
I was told in San Francisco
by the networks that there were two high points in the
convention:
one the keynote speech, and the second
the acceptance speech.
The audience on these two
occasions might well run as high as 50-million people
and was e j e c t e d by each party to exceed 40-million.
Never again during the entire campaign can either
party expect their audience to be as large as this
except in the unlikely event of a Nixon-Kennedy debate.
Once the campaign positions of the public begin to
harden they tend to screen out material offered by the
side which they do not favor.
Yet the figures seem to
indicate that they will listen to the keynote and
acceptance speeches.
For this reason the entire time
table of the convention is geared to these two events.
Another factor is that the keynote historically is
expected to be a long speech, far longer and more

30personal correspondence of the writer, letters from
Mrs. Russell T. Lund, March 16, 1965; Wirt A. Yerger, Jr.,
March 13,
1965; Mrs. Katherine K. Neuberger, March 12, 1965;
George L.Hinman, March 30, 1965; Ted H.
Hardwick, May 4,
1965; Warren P. Knowles, April 21, 1965; Melvin E. Lundberg,
March 15,
1965; John G. Tower, April 29, 1965.
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comprehensive than any single campaign appearance.
Consequently, the keynote speech is one of the two
or three most important efforts of the entire cam
paign and must of necessity serve as a showcase for
the philosophy and achievements of the party . . .
and most likely will rehearse the program of the
party in the Congress just concluded. . . . In
addition, if the speech is organized about ideas
which are common to a majority of the Congressional
caucus it probably will be 'safe’ as a matter of
party doctrine.
Naturally there is a negative side to all of this
and the speech will also attack the opposition. How
ever, in my view, if the attack is limited to horrible
examples from which a positive policy or conclusion
can be drawn, rather than to make the attack merely
for the sake of attack, the technique is more effec
tive .31
Robert E. Smylie, Governor of Idaho, echoed similar senti
ments when he stated that "TV, radio and the superheated news"
require that the convention "create a show-case of the party's
leadership and to gain national recognition for those who
will be obliged later to carry the main brunt of the party's
case-in-chief.

George L. Hinman, National Committeeman

from New York states that,
. . . because of the size of the TV and radio audience
that is tuned in on the convention, I think it is an
unexcelled opportunity for the party to get its mes
sage across to the country, and it can be, of course,
an opening tocsin for the party's c a m p a i g n . 33
Joe Martin, admittedly an authority of convention behavior,

31personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Bayard Ewing, March 16, 1965.
32personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Robert E. Smylie, March 3, 1965.
■^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
George L. Hinman, March 30, 1965.
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stated that the keynote speech "was directed to the public—
not the delegates, they won't change.
The third major category of responses consisted of
those persons who felt that the purpose of the keynote speech
depended on whether or not the p arty1s nominations would be
hotly contested.
H. Percy.

This position was best expressed by Charles

Percy thought that the

. . . keynote speech is usually designed to remind
the delegates that they are all of one party by
emphasizing those themes which the delegates agree
on. A convention is often a scene of fierce con
tention, out of which the delegates hope to
achieve a strong measure of unity.
The keynoter
speaks before the battle for the nomination. When
the outcome is in doubt, he tries to avoid favoring
one candidate and his views. He therefore empha
sizes those issues on which the party as a whole
agrees, in opposition to the other party. And in
doing so, he of course strives to create enthusiasm
the party as a whole and its cause, in hopes
that this shared enthusiasm will persist throughout
the intense intraparty combat about to take place,
and perhaps even temper and limit it.
When there is to be no competition for the nomi
nation, the task of the keynoter is much simpler and
we see only the effort to state the position of the
unified party, to attack the opposition, and to
arouse the party faithful to great effort in the
general election.^5
Ted H. Hardwick, Chairman of the Republican State Central
Committee of Kentucky, expressed this same idea somewhat more
concisely when he stated that,

34Statement by Joseph Martin, personal interview,
March 22, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Charles H. Percy, March 25, 1965.
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. . . if there is a contest on, the keynoter
properly plays down controversial issues between
the prospective candidates of the particular
party. When the candidate of the party is a
foregone conclusion it takes on the tone of a
campaign speech and hammers out arguments in
favor of the platform.36
The fourth major category deals with those respondents
who felt that the keynote speech was multipurposive.

Melvin

E. Lundberg, National Committeeman from Nevada, stated that
. . . my ideas concerning a keynote speech or the
purpose of such a speech are not particularly fixed,
nor do I feel that the purpose has been, as far as
my experience is concerned, a fixed purpose but
changes with the needs at the time of convention.
A keynote speech, I suppose, serves to creatg
an atmosphere and engender excitement or a proper
mood for a convention.
It serves to set the goal
or to explain to the delegates the plans that have
been carefully prepared by the party officials,
sugar-coated for easy acceptability. A keynote
speech, also, generally provides a highly critical
analysis of the conduct of the opposition, es
pecially when the opposition is in power, and it
serves to express the virtues of the Republican
Party.37
Mrs. R. T. Lund, National Comraitteewoman from Minnesota, also
saw the keynote as multipurposive:
The importance of the keynote speech is to set
the tone for the convention and the campaign that
follows.
The keynoter takes the opportunity to
criticize the opposition party and the Administra
tion performance, if the Party of the keynoter is
not in office. He then sets forth his Party's
position on the issues and the fundamental beliefs

3 6 p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f the w r i t e r ,
T e d H. H a r d w i c k , May 4, 1965.

letter from

37personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Melvin E. Lundberg, March 15, 1965.
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and principles which the presidential nominee of
his Party would likely support.38
A sixth category of Republican activists regarded the
keynote speech "to be of only minor importance," and "to be
vastly overrated."

Only one member of the National Committee

dismissed the speech completely by stating that he "could see
no purpose whatsoever for a keynote speaker or a keynote
. .
.
39
speech in a political convention."
The final group of responses to be considered can only
be labeled as miscellaneous commentary, yet several of the
responses seem worthy of at least brief attention.

Joe

Martin, who "has been attending conventions since the time
of Root," stated that in his opinion the keynote speaker
should "brighten up the convention— simply make it more attractive."

40

W. W. Wannamaker, Republican National Committeeman

from South Carolina, said,
I do not believe a keynote speech achieves any
important result but on the other hand I do not
believe that it is an anachronism which should
be discarded.
It is a formality which adds to
the dignity of the gathering even though it does
not affect the result.

Mrs.

3 8 p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f th e w r i t e r ,
R u s s e l l T. Lund, M a r c h 16, 1965.

letter

from

3^Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
John W. Tyler, March 15, 1965.

^statement by Joseph Martin, personal interview,
March 22, 1965.
41personal correspondence of the writer,
W. W. Wannamaker, March 16, 1965.
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Warren P. Knowles, Governor of Wisconsin, observed that the
keynoter
. . . takes a high and lofty position as to the pos
ture of the party and attempts to assess the his
torical background of the party and emphasizes its
principles, ideals and aspirations.42
It seems evident that although the majority of the respondents
in these categories stressed the importance of stimulating
and exciting the delegates, that numerous commentators in all
three major categories saw additional purposes for the key
note speech— to inform the delegates, to inform the nation,
to attack the opposition, to add dignity to the occasion, to
stress common Republican principles, to help achieve unity,
to "kill time," and to focus attention on the proceedings of
the convention.

In the light of this multiplicity of opinion

from newspaper writers, scholars, casual observers, dele
gates, and leaders in the inner circle of the party, it is
interesting to observe how the keynoters themselves view
their own role.

How do these men who have been chosen to

give the keynote address attempt to meet the somewhat
amorphous demands that have just been discussed?
Views of the Keynoters Regarding
the Purpose of the Keynote Speech
Many of the keynoters evidenced an awareness of the
complexity of the keynote situation.

In 1904, Elihu Root

^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Warren P. Knowles, April 21, 1965.
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explained to President Roosevelt that he "would deliberately
refrain from discussing issues . . . [for] it does not seem
to me quite the correct thing for the temporary chairman to
discuss issues in advance of the platform."43

Root went on

to explain the speech's purpose as he saw it:
. . . I have treated what has been done from an
administration rather than from a personal stand
point.
I have tried to make everybody feel as if
he was getting a share of the honor, and have made
the issue of the party prominent.44
Root ended his letter with the observation that the keynote
speech "should set forth the important acts of public admin
istration."4 ^

As an in-power keynoter, Root felt that the

purpose of the speech was primarily threefold:
issues;

(1) avoid

(2) share the glory with all the party rather than

merely lauding the incumbent President; and (3) review the
accomplishments of the administration.

In 1932, although he

was also an in-power keynoter, L. J. Dickinson faced a prob
lem of a different nature.

As he put it,

. . . in my keynote speech at the Chicago National
Convention I was confronted by a very difficult
political situation, times were hard, prices were
low, many laborers unemployed, and there was not
much that President Hoover could brag about so far
as the condition of the country was concerned. . . .
My purpose was to show that regardless of the
economic and financial condition of the country
that Hoover was the best man to lead it out of
the chaos.
I still think I was right in that

4 ^Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress,
Root to Roosevelt, June 13, 1904.
44 Ibid.

45Ibid.
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contention and my speech was pointed in that
direction. °
Thus, in these two situations, the political and social
conditions which prevailed at the time partially determined
the keynoter’s purpose.

In 1940, Harold E. Stassen felt that

his keynote speech should "set the tone so far as issues are
concerned for the Convention until such time as the Party
nominee is named.

Then his address sets the Party tone."4 ^

It seems important to note that all three of the keynoters
just mentioned have stressed party positions and party issues
rather than merely personal opinions and positions.

Walter

Judd, the 1960 keynoter, elaborated on this matter by explain
ing that the keynoter has "to sell the party, not himself.
He must put the views of the party ahead of his own views."

AO

Judd went on to explain the purpose of the speech .as he saw
it.

According to Judd,
[The] keynote speech should re-state and sum up the
party position and show what we will work toward.
Traditionally, the speech is designed to unite and
arouse the delegates to greater enthusiasm, to "re
charge their batteries" by saying the things that they
believe.
This speech, as I see it, should show the
raison d 1itre for the party.
It simply answers the
question, "how do we b e l i e v e ? " 4 9

46personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
L. J. Dickinson, April 13, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Harold E. Stassen, April 21, 1965.
4®Statement by Walter Judd, personal interview, March
23, 1965.
49Ibid.
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In 1964, keynoter Mark O, Hatfield faced a difficult
speaking situation.

The convention was deeply split philo

sophically, and, as one delegate put it,
. . . the GOP keynoter obviously cannot represent
either of the present two wings of the Republican
party so in the nature of things is forced to re
sort to nothing but cliches and generalities.
Hatfield was intensely aware of his divided audience and
rated the delegates present as "neutral for about one-third;
friendly for one-third and hostile for about one-tenth."
Hatfield,

like Judd, saw the purpose of his speech as stimu

lation of the delegates and the nation.

Hatfield stated

that his purpose was "to inspire; to give a mood for later
convention action; a call to arms."

Although Hatfield

stressed the importance of party issues and party position,
he was also personally concerned about the issue of extrem
ism.

The question was, of course, how the matter would be

handled.

Historically, as will be explained in Chapter V,

keynoters often have tended to minimize controversial matters
of philosophy.

Yet in the 1964 Republican convention, Hat

field spoke out strongly on extremism.

Governor Hatfield

stated:
Our faith challenges any who would destroy freedom

5 0 p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f th e w r i t e r ,
E d w a r d B u r l i n g , Jr., M a r c h 30, 1965.

letter

from

51Personal correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mark 0. Hatfield, April 2 , 1965.
52Ibid.
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whether they wrap themselves in a false cloak of
patriotism or an equally false cloak of religion.
There are bigots in this nation who spew forth
their venom of hate. They parade under hundreds
of labels including the Communist Party, the Ku
Klux Clan and the John Birch Society. They must
be overcome. . . .^3
Although the Official Proceedings of the convention will
record "cheers and extended applause" following this state
ment, the speaker was booed and hissed by part of his audi
ence .

Walter Judd commented that Hatfield1s timing was bad

and that Hatfield was speaking for himself.

Judd felt that

this reference to the Birch Society "caused division because
these were not ideas that the party had accepted.

Hatfield

put his own views ahead of party v i e w s . H a t f i e l d ,

however,

stated that he "anticipated the booing at the reference of
the J B S . " ^

Hatfield later explained his position by stating

that "I said what was on my heart and felt it had to be said
and I doubted that anyone else would say i t .

Were I to d o .

it all over again, I would repeat that part of my message."^®
This is the only instance with which the writer is familiar
where a keynoter used controversial material knowing that it
would provoke a fairly large portion of his immediate audience.

5^verbatim transcript supplied by Republican National
Headquarters.
^S t atement by Walter Judd, personal interview,
March 23, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mark 0. Hatfield, April 2, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mark 0. Hatfield, May 25, 1965.

106
In this instance personal considerations evidently outweighed
any other factor.
So far as specific purposes are concerned, there
appears to be no fixed and rigid purpose to which the key
noter must adhere, but rather that the speakers felt free to
adapt to the specific social and political climates of the
times.
in recent years, the keynoters have been faced with
the problems of a multiple audience— the delegates, the radio
and television audience, and the reading audience.

As was

discussed earlier, the delegates and members of the Republi
can leadership are quite cognizant of the importance of
these factors involving radio and television.

How did the

keynoters feel about their multiple audience?

L. J. Dickin

son, the 1932 keynoter, stated:
It is true that we have many different problems in
the U.S. because what Maine may want Louisiana may
oppose and vice vers^.
In other words, different
sections of the country have their location problems.
Not all of them can become national problems. . . .57
As keynoter in 1940, Harold E. Stassen was aware that "the
audience present, the audience then on radio . . . and the
CO

readers of the newspapers must all be taken into account."3
Stassen further explained that "it was recognized that the
national radio audience was the most important in its ultimate

5 7 p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f the w r i t e r ,

letter

from

L. J. D i c k i n s o n , A p r i l 13, 1965.
^Pers o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Harold E. Stassen, April 21, 1965.
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effect, but that the message must also react strongly with
the Convention a u d i e n c e . W a l t e r Judd, 1960 keynoter,
also realized the importance of the radio-television audience.
Judd stated that although the speech has been traditionally
geared toward the delegates that "the addition of television
adds appeal to the general public.

Each year the keynote

speech is directed more and more toward the public and away
CA

from the delegates who are present." w

As 1964 keynoter,

Mark Hatfield remarked that the "speech is seen and heard by
millions . . . the convention audience and the television
audience have to be equally prominent in the keynoter1s
mind.
Even prior to the days of television, the keynoters
were aware of their multiple audience, for Elihu Root
explained to Theodore Roosevelt that his 1904 keynote address
would "take about an hour and twenty minutes to deliver in
full.

My idea is to cut it in delivery to less than hour;

but there is not a sentence left in the paper which I do not
want to have in the speech as_ it

jls

printed unless you see

some objection to it."

59Ibid.
^°Statement by Walter Judd, personal interview, March
23, 1965.
^ P e r s o n a l correspondence of the writer, letter from
Mark 0. Hatfield, April 2, 1965.
62Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress,
Root to Roosevelt, June 13, 1904.
(Underlining is my own.)
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SUMMARY
Newspaper writers, scholars, casual observers, dele
gates, and members of the Republican hierarchy felt that a
keynote speech should:
1 . stimulate the delegates
2 . stimulate the nation
3.

inform the delegates

4.

inform the nation regarding party positions
on issues (or convince them to accept the
positions)

5.

promote unity

6.

provide a forum for a present or potential
leader

7.

deal with philosophy rather than issues

8.

present party views rather than the personal
views of the keynoter

9.

point with pride (if in office) and view with
alarm (if opposition is in office)

10.

attract attention of radio and television
auditors

The keynoters themselves were often in substantial
agreement with these purposes, yet in all instances allowed
for some flexibility of purpose to meet the immediate demands
of the audience and occasion.
The purpose of the keynote speech extends far beyond
the demands of the immediate audience.

Even in those cases

where a keynoter felt the need for argument, he also was
aware of the need to stimulate and excite; in the cases where
a keynoter desired to ridicule his opposition to the delight
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of his immediate audience, he was aware of the possible re
actions of the reading or listening audience.
On the basis of the preceeding discussion, it appears
that the keynote speech cannot be consistently classified
under one of the five "general ends" of speech.

As a politi

cal document, the speech of the keynoter must be flexible
enough to meet the changing political climate.

CHAPTER V
THE SPEECHES:

A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

In his 1960 address to the Republican national con
vention in Chicago, keynoter Walter H. Judd stated:
. . . I do not believe you want me to indulge in the
traditional keynote speech, blaming the other party
for everything that is bad, taking credit to ourselves
for everything that is good, and promising that if you
voters will just elect us to office this fall, we will
solve every problem, increase every benefit, expand
every existing program, start a whole flock of new
ones, give everyone everything he wants— and reduce
the national debt at the same timejl
Although Judd intended his remark to be humorous, this state
ment contains elements of truth.

Many of the twenty-eight

keynote speeches delivered in Republican national conventions
have classified the Republican administrations as honest,
efficient, dedicated, forward-thinking, and successful. These
same keynoters frequently characterized the Democrats as idle,
corrupt, ineffective, insincere, and incompetent.

By ana

lyzing repetitive rhetorical patterns of (1) themes and
arguments;

(2) supporting materials; and (3) organizational

techniques, this chapter seeks to determine whether the
characteristics suggested by Judd are inherent in the rhetori
cal crenre of keynoting.

If these characteristics are not

1-Text supplied by Republican National Headquarters,
p. 1.

Ill
inherent, the study will describe those qualities that are
inherently characteristic.

Although demonstrations,

slogans,

prayers, singing, and flag-waving are often linked with the
keynote speech in the convention program, these extrinsic
means of persuasion are discussed separately at the end of
this chapter.
In order to analyze the appeals contained in the
twenty-eight keynote speeches, this portion of the discussion
views the speeches from several vantage points.

First, the

dominant themes and arguments are isolated and, second, the
forms of support used with these various themes and argu
ments are analyzed according to type and function.
MAJOR THEMES
As might be expected from a kind of speech that has
been delivered every four years for one hundred and eight
y e ars, several dominant themes and numerous minor themes
occur with some degree of regularity and repetition.

These

major themes are listed according to their importance:
1.

Our party is worthy of praise for its glorious

history and outstanding leaders.
2.

The Democratic party (or a specific Democratic

administration) is inferior in many ways and deserves criti
cism.
3.

We need unity and harmony.

4.

America is wonderful.
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5.

Our fiscal policies are excellent.

6.

The centralization of power is dangerous; we are

concerned about the individual American citizen.
7.

Our policies provide an impetus for business and

manufacturing.
8.

Our policies are of benefit to agriculture.

9.

Our policies aid the labor force.

10.

Our policies on tariff and trade are sound.

The first significant theme to be discussed includes
the arguments and ideas centered around historic events,
popular national figures, past Republican leaders, and gen
eral party history.

This discussion attempts to determine

which heroes or what history were used to channel the dele
gates ' emotions toward a predetermined goal.
Howell and Hudson, in their monograph on Daniel
Webster, comment on the importance of Webster's epedeictic
oratory
. . . [for giving] to his youthful country what it
needed— heroes, shibboleths, and myths.
Such in
tangibles as our common government and national
heritage are possessed only so far as they are real
ized imaginatively.
To this end symbols are necessary,
even such symbols as the flag, . . . the capitol . . .
battlefields. . . . But behind and above these physical
symbols— myths, if you will— and symbolic concepts,
w h i c h , as embodied in phrases, are but catchwords to
those who live by catchwords but which are capable of
a rich and more or less definite content.2

W. S. Howell and H. H. Hudson, "Daniel Webster,"
History and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. by
William Norwood Brigance (New York:
Russell and Russell,
1960), II, 677.
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Just as nationalistic symbols played a major role in
the growth of patriotic sentiment, so did "Republican sym
bols" contribute to the mythology and tradition of the
neophyte party.
come?

From what sources were these "symbols" to

(1) They could be borrowed from American history and

forcibly related to the Republican party;
borrowed from the Democrats;

(2) they could be

(3) or they could be created.

The Republicans chose to utilize all these methods.
Our Party is Worthy of Praise for Its Glorious
History and Outstanding Leaders
Over the years, a common appeal revolved around the
party's history and heroes.

Almost without exception, Repub

lican keynoters praised their party's accomplishments and/or
leaders.
Abraham Lincoln
The man most commonly praised was Abraham Lincoln.

In

seventeen of the keynote speeches, the keynoters referred
directly or indirectly to Lincoln's greatness.

For example,

in 1888 , John M. Thurston referred to Lincoln as "another
Moses .

. . that great man of the people .. . who led us

through the parted waters of the sea, past
battle,

the wilderness of

over the Jordan of Safety into the Promised Land."J

In 1908, Julius C. Burrows

praised Lincoln for his "patriotism

•^Proceedings, 1888, p. 14.
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and s a g a c i t y . I n 1868 and 1916, the keynoters referred to
Lincoln's "glory and immortality."'5

In addition, Lincoln

was cited by keynoters for "his noble instincts"?^ "princi-

*7

pies and leadership";' and "having preserved the Union."

ft

Other keynoters were more oblique in their use of the Lincoln
symbol.

In 1892, for example, the keynoter stated:

The Campaign that is
to follow the work of this
Convention is not to
be a campaign of the candi
dates, by the candidates and for the candidates,
but a campaign of the party, by the party and for
the party, in the interests of the whole people.
. . . With malice towards none, but with affec
tion and respect towards all, each of us, accord
ing to his light, as
God gives him to see the
light, should subordinate all merely local and
personal considerations. . . .^
A similar stylistic technique was used by L. J. Dickinson in
1932, when he paraphrased Lincoln's speech at Gettysburg:
Three score and twelve years ago our Nation was at
grips with its most perilous political crisis.
It
faced the proposition of whether this Republic—
dedicated by the blood of patriots on a score of
battlefields— should endure.
In that dark hour, the Republican Party gave to
the country its first Republican President, Abraham
Lincoln.
[Applause.] He preserved the Union and
made it certain 'that government of the people, by

^Proceedings, 1908, p. 45.
^Proceedings, 1868, p. 9; Proceedings, 1916, p. 16.
^Proceedings, 1924, p. 30.
^Proceedings, 1952, p. 67; Proceedings, 1964, text
supplied by Rejpviblicdn National Headquarters, p. 6.
^Proceedings, 1900, p. 47.
^Proceedings, 1892, p. 14.
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the people, for the people shall not perish from
the earth.'
[Applause.]10
Still other keynoters merely mentioned Lincoln's name or
quoted excerpts from his speeches and writings.
Secondary Heroes
The keynoters praised many other Republican heroes,
including U. S. Grant, James G. Blaine, William McKinley,
Theodore Roosevelt, Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge,
Herbert Hoover, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John Foster Dulles.
The majority of the references to these men occurred in one
of three kinds of contexts.

The first of these contexts

occurred when a man was serving as incumbent President (or
titular head of the party if out of power) and was to be re
nominated for a second term.

The following excerpts are

typical of such eulogies:
In this grave hour the Republican Party meets again
in National Convention to nominate another stalwart
American, Herbert Hoover.
(Applause, loud and pro
longed, continued for five minutes.)
Now listen!
I am going to give you something to
talk to your esteemed brethren about.
So get this.
[Applause, and cries of 'Hurrah for the Temporary
Chairman!' 'Tell 'em about i t ! ' 'We are with y o u ! ']
~Tt offers this great leader with pride and confi
dence. Pride in his achievements in the face of
tremendous odds? confidence in the judgment of the

lQproceedings, 1932, p. 19.
•Llsee, for example, Proceedings, 1928, p. 18? Proceed
ings, 1876, p. 8? Proceedings, 1880, p. 6; Proceedings, 1956,
p. 82; Proceedings, 1912, p. 100.
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people to keep at the helm the captain, who alone,
has demonstrated a capacity to steer our economic
ship to safe harbor.
Perhaps it was with prophetic vision that the
American people elected Herbert Hoover four years
ago with the greatest popular and electoral col
lege vote any President ever received.
(Applause.)
At any rate, he had scarcely taken the oath of
office before economic storm clouds had begun to
cast their sinister shadow over the nations of the
world.12
Although somewhat more impassioned, Morton McMichael's
defense of President Grant is also typical of this first
category of praising the man to be renominated.

McMichael

stated:
It does not need, nor, considering my temporary
occupation of this chair, would it be suitable that
I should_enter into any elaborate commentary as to
the merits of our candidate. But this I will say,
that not withstanding all the malignant venom that
has been spit at him; all the odious calumnies that
have been heaped upon him; all the disgraceful
slanders that have been circulated in regard to him,
General Grant at this moment enjoys more of the c o n - ‘
fidence of his countrymen, is believed by them to be
an honester, truer, and better man than any of his
detractors.
[Great applause and cries of assent.]
No one in our day has been more thoroughly vindicated.
The great heart of the American people beats respon
sively to truth and justice, and as they have tried
and tested and trust him; as they know that his
administration has been wise and faithful; as they
have seen the nation prosper under his rule as it
has never before prospered, they will stand by and
defend, and, when the ballot-box gives them a chance
to do so, avenge him.
[Cheers, and cries of 'They
will.']
Remembering the sore trials which, along
with his fellow-soldiers, he underwent during the
war, his sacrifices of ease and comfort, his perils
by day and by night, the exposure by means of which
those who now revile him were able to secure luxu
rious repose at a safe distance from danger, they

•^Proceedings, 1932, pp. 19-20.
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are quite willing that he should indulge in 'palace
cars and cigars and seaside loiterings,' [cheers
and laughter;] and they mean to furnish him with
the opportunity of enjoying these for at least four
years to come.13
A final example, taken from Elihu Root’s 1904 keynote address,
should suffice to indicate the nature of this category of
eulogies.

After lamenting the death of McKinley, Root stated

that Roosevelt
. . . [had] been equal to the burden cast upon him.
Widely different in temperament and methods, he has
approved himself of the same elemental virtues— the
same fundamental beliefs. With faithful and revering
memory, he has executed the purposes and continued
unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the
peace, prosperity, and honor of our beloved country.
And he has met all new occasions with strength and
resolution and far-sighted wisdom. . . .
Our President has taken the whole people into his
confidence.
Incapable of deception, he has put aside
concealment.
Frankly and without reserve, he has told
them what their government was doing, and the reasons.
It is no campaign of appearances upon which we enter,
for the people know the good and the bad, the success
and the failure, to be credited and charged to our
account.
It is no campaign of sounding words and
specious pretenses, for our President has told the
people with frankness what he believed and what he
intended.
He has meant every word he said, and the
people have believed every word he said, and with him
this convention agrees because every word has been
sound Republican doctrine. No people can maintain
free government who do not in their hearts value the
qualities which have made the present President of
the United States conspicuous among the men of his
time as a type of noble manhood. Come what may here—
come what may in November, God grant that those
qualities of brave true manhood shall have honor
throughout America, shall be held for an example in
every home, and that the youth of generations to come
may grow up to feel that it is better than wealth, or

13

Proceedings, 1872, p. 7.
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office, or power, to have the honesty, the purity,
and the courage of Theodore R o o s e v e l t . 14
Still another context for the praise of these heroes
was as a kind of political funeral eulogy— when the hero was
dead, or was unable or unwilling to seek the party's presi
dential nomination.

Theodore E. Burton's 1924 keynote speech

abounded with such eulogies:
Not far away are the resting places of Garfield,
McKinley, Hayes, and Harding.
There are inexpres
sible sadness in the death of three of these, and
I hope I may be pardoned when I utter words of
praise prompted by friendship.
The tomb of James A.
Garfield and a monument to his memory are within the
city limits. He was born on a barren farm in this
country, and in rising step by step from lowly station
to the highest executive position in the world none
displayed more clearly than he the wonderful possi
bilities of American life.
Leader in peace and war,
he was the victim of the revengeful frenzy of a dis
appointed office seeker. What a terrible deed!
If
his worst enemy had contemplated such a frightful
crime, he would have shrunk from it in horror and
might have exclaimed after Macbeth:
■***Besides this Garfield
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead, like angles [.sic] trumpet-tongued, against
The deep damnation of his taking o f f . '
McKinley, too, was stricken down in his splendid prime
by one whose brain was reeking with the monstrosities
of anarchy.
How sorrowful the death of one whose
name will be forever associated with that captivating
charm which compels admiration and lovei
Almost equally pathetic was the death of Warren G.
Harding, whose untiring labors made him a martyr to
service and brought an early death quite as sad as
that of the soldier who perishes with all his armor
on.
The exacting duties of his high office did not
slacken his constant striving, though ill health and
weakness hung threatening as a sword above his head.
A Nation bowed in grief mourned his death; the whole

14proCeedincrs, 1904, pp. 55-57.

world mourned him as a lover of peace and good will.
If ever he made those mistakes which mortals must
make, it was because of the kindness of his heart,
because of a noble mind which thought no ill of
friend or foe but reposed trust in everyone.
If I may imitate and enlarge upon the words of a
funeral eulogy uttered by a famous orator, it may be
said of Harding that if all who gained inspiration
by listening to his eloquent words, everyone who has
felt the warm grasp of his friendly hand, the many
who received his sympathy in days of sorrow, were to
plant a flower upon his grave, a tangled wilderness
of flowers would surround his tomb; the snowwhite
anemone, the blue violet, blossoms of golden hue or
brightest red, poppies like those from Flanders
Field would spread a garment of beauty all around.
Rest, Wearied Spirit, rest in peace, secure in that
lasting remembrance which belongs to the immortals.15
Another example of this type of eulogy occurred in John M
Thurston's 1888 keynote address.

In referring to James G

Blaine, the keynoter stated:
With the infinite magnanimity of his incomparable
greatness he has denied us the privilege of sup
porting him in this convention. Holding above all
other things party harmony and success, he has
stepped from the certain ladder of his laudable
ambition that some other man may climb to power.
As his true friends we must not, dare not, commit
the political crime of disobedience to his ex
pressed will. We cannot place him at the head of
the ticket, but we can make him commander-in-chief
of the forces in the field, where he will be in
vincible. And though James G. Blaine may not be
our President, yet he remains our uncrowned king,
wielding the baton of acknowledged leadership,
supreme in the allegiance of his devoted followers,
honored and respected by all honest and loyal men—
that greatest living American, and the worthy object
of our undying love.16
A third context for the praise of these secondary

•^Proceedingsf 1924, pp. 17-18.
•^Proceedings, 1888, p. 12.
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lumunaries was frequently an argumentative or stimulative
reference to boyhood heroes, the hero's patriotism, or quo
tations from the hero's writings or speeches.

In 1964, for

example, keynoter Mark Hatfield stated:
Herbert Hoover, a great Republican and one of the
world's greatest humanitarians— (Applause)— and
may I always say to any Republican in an American
audience, my boyhood hero 30 years ago made this
very eloquent statement of the Republican Party's
faith in the future when he said:
'Advancing
thought, science, discovery, and invention are
constantly imposing new surroundings upon us.
Constant reform is an essential part of the pro
tection of liberty, and society, to be successful,
must secure the effort and the initiative of its
citizens.'
These were Hoover's words 30 years ago
that are as appropriate today as they were when they
were stated.
(Applause.)
In 1956, keynoter Arthur B. Langlie used this technique by
quoting from Dwight Eisenhower's 1953 Inaugural Address.
Langlie said:
Four years ago next January, President Eisenhower,
immediately after he took the oath of office, asked
millions of Americans to join with him in prayer to
Almighty God, that he and those associated with him
might be guided in their decisions for the good of
all the people.
In describing the role of the Republican party to the 1960
convention, Walter Judd asked:
What then is our role to be? Listen again to Lincoln
in his message to the Congress in 1862, 'The dogmas
of the quiet past and inadequate to the stormy
present.
The occasion is piled high with difficulty,
and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is

■^Hatfield's text
H e a d q u a r t e r s , p p . 4-5.

supplied by Republican National

•^Proceedings, 1956, p. 83.
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new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We
must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall
save our country.119
Thus, the keynoters were able to incorporate references to
various party leaders into almost any political setting.
Occasionally, however, the keynoter was apparently unwilling
to rely on references to a single man, regardless of his fame
or importance.

In ten of the speeches studied, the keynoters

used combinations of party heroes, including most of the ones
cited earlier.

20

Combination of Heroes
One of the first keynoters to utilize the listing of
party heroes was J. Sloat Fasset.

In an obvious attempt to

secure an immediate and overt response from his audience,
Fasset asked the delegates to
. . . count me over our chosen heroes, the men whom
you and I are teaching our children to love, emulate
and revere, and they shall be Republicans, every
one. . . .21
Fasset then presented his list of heroes, which resembled
Webster's roll-call in the Bunker Monument speech:
Lincoln [applause], Seward [applause], Grant [great
applause]. When the spirit of Republicanism fills

■^Judd's text supplied by Republican National Head
quarters, p. 13.
^ A l t h o u g h several of the critics mentioned earlier
in the study cited the listing of heroes as characteristic
of the genre, two— thirds of the speeches do not exhibit this
feature.
21Proceedinqs, 1892, p. 13.
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a man, it seems to have the power of transfiguration.
These men are great.
These men will always remain
great, because of their growth in the line of devo
tion to Republican doctrine and Republican principles.
[Applause]
Sherman [applause], Garfield [great applause],
Logan [applause], Harrison and Baine [long continued
applause]. These are only a few of our jewels and
we may proudly turn upon our Democratic friends and
utter the defiant challenge, Match Them!I
[Applause.]22
Although Fasset1s list of heroes was lengthy, some of the
keynoters were more selective in their enumeration.

Julius

C. Burrows, for example, praised the "patriotism and sagacity
of a Lincoln, the tenacity of a Grant, the wisdom and modera
tion of a McKinley, and the courage of a Roosevelt."2^
Still other keynoters combined their lists of heroes with
several kinds of "purple passages" often associated with key
note speaking.

In 1888, for example, keynoter John M. Thurs

ton said:
We hoped and believed that 1888 would right the
great political wrong of 1884.
Right it, not only

2^Proceedings, 1892, p. 13.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1908, p. 45. The reference to President
Roosevelt was not particularly complimentary.
The selection
of Burrows as keynoter for this convention was primarily the
result of intraparty squabbling.
Roosevelt wanted to a!llow
Albert Beveridge the privilege of keynoting the convention,
but his wishes were ignored by Harry New, chairman of the
Republican national committee. Burrows employed few refer
ences to the p a rty1s heroes and only mentioned the incumbent
Roosevelt's name twice.
One writer reported that when "aged
Julius Caesar Burrows, the temporary chairman, tried to utter
Roosevelt's name, he stammered and choked as though he were
gagging on the syllables." Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illi
nois (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1951), p. 133.
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for the Republican party, but for the grand and
glorious candidates whose names were the inspira
tion of that wonderful campaign. The wisdom of
an all-wise Providence has otherwise decreed.
One of them— that citizen soldier, that warrior
statesman, the Black Eagle of Illinois, has been
summoned by the Silent Messenger to report to his
old commander beyond the river— But John A. Logan— ^4
dead in the body— lives in the illuminated pages of
his country's most splendid history— lives in the
grateful love of a free people, whose union he so
gallantly fought to preserve— lives in the bless
ings of a downtrodden race, whose freedom he so
manfully struggled to achieve— lives in the future
.song and story of a hero-worshipping world? and
along the highway of the nation's glory, side by
side with old John Brown,25 Abraham Lincoln and
Ulysses S. Grant, his soul goes marching on.
The
other— that gallant leader, that chevalier of
American politics, the glory of Republicanism and
the nightmare of Democracy, our Henry of Navarre— ^6
is seeking in foreign travel needed relaxation and
rest from the cares and responsibilities of long
public life and service.27
Elihu Root, the only man to keynote two Republican conven
tions, introduced his list of notable Republicans after
stating that his party was the party of ". . . Lincoln, and
Sumner, and Seward, and Andrew, and Morton, and Grant, and
Hayes, and Garfield, and Arthur, and Harrison, and Blaine,
and Hoar, and McKinley.

..."

28

A similar approach was used

24x,ogan had died in 1886.
^ T h i s seems to be the only time a keynoter included
Brown among the party's heroes.
(Lincoln, in his Cooper
Union speech, had claimed that "John Brown was no Republican!")
James G. Blaine.
Blaine was in Italy during the time
of the convention recuperating from a stroke,
^ Proceedings, 1888, p. 12.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1912, p. 90. As a result of the party
split, Root carefully eschewed mention of either-Taft or
Roosevelt.
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by Theodore E. Burton in 1924.

As a native of Ohio, Burton

stated:
Of the 11 of our party who have held the great
office of President, 7 have been natives of this
Buckeye Coimnonwealth and 5 were elected from our
state. . . . You will recall the names of Grant,
Hayes, Garfield, Harrison, McKinley, Taft, and
Harding. . . .29
Although keynoters still occasionally list the party's heroes,
they do not do so as extensively or grandiloquently as their
predecessors.
In addition to their discussion of Republican heroes—
individually as well as collectively— many keynoters attempted
to instill pride in their auditors by recalling Republican
history and principles.
Republican History and Principles
Fifteen of the keynoters specifically mentioned
Republican history or Republican principles in their ad
dresses.

As early as 1876, Theodore Pomeroy attempted to

capitalize on Republican history.

He stated that during the

party's twenty-year life span
. . . [it] kept pace with the progress of the times,
accepting each added responsibility of war, emanci
pation, taxation and reconstruction, till the
brightest pages of American history are but the life
story of the Republican party.30

^ Proceedings, 1924, p. 17.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1876, p. 8.
It seems reasonable to
speculate that at least part of the rationale for such an in
novation was due to the many important events that had
occurred between 1872 and 1876.
Numerous scandals had rocked
the Grant administration during both terms, carpetbaggers
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In the years following this speech, many conventions were to
hear Republican history told, retold, and occasionally re
written.

Elihu Root, for example, stated in his 1904 address:

When the course of the next administration is but
half done the Republican Party will have completed
the first half century of its national life. Of
the eleven administrations since the first election
of Abraham Lincoln, nine— covering a period of thirtysix years— have been under Republican Presidents.
For the greater part of that time, the majority in
each House of Congress has been Republican. History
affords no parallel in any age or country for the
growth in national greatness and power and honor, the
wide diffusion of the comforts of life, the uplifting
of the great mass of the people above hard conditions
of poverty, the common opportunity for education and
individual advancement, the universal possession of
civil and religious liberty . . . sympathy with
humanity and love of liberty and justice, which have
marked the life of the American people during this
long period of Republican control. . . .33Root continued his development of party history and principles
by arguing that a
. . . great political organization, competent to
g overn, is not a chance collection of individuals
brought together for the moment as the shifting
sands are piled up by wind and sea, to be swept
away, to be formed and re-formed again.
It is a

had lost much of their earlier control of the Southern elec
toral votes, the Democrats had made substantial gains in the
1874 elections, and the Republican party was split into three
groups of relatively equally strength.
The use of party
history, then, was perhaps designed to avoid alienating Radi
cals, "Half-Breeds," and Reformers, by focusing attention on
symbols common to all groups.
In contrast, Pomeroy carefully
placed both Lincoln and Grant in a safely neutral historical
context by noting that "events have chased . . . each other
rapidly, from the inauguration of President Lincoln to the
closing year of the administration of General Grant. . . . "
Proceedings, 1876, p. 8.
^^Proceedings, 1904, pp. 30-31.
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growth.
Traditions and sentiments reaching down
through struggles of years gone, and the stress
and heat of old conflicts, and the influence of
leaders passed away, and the ingrained habit of
applying fixed rules of interpretation and of
thought,— all give to a political party known
and inalienable qualities. . . ,32
Such examples of the recitation of party history are legion.
In his 1916 address, Warren G. Harding stated:
Recalling that the mightier forward strides have
been taken under a half century of Republican
control, after we led in fixing the indissoluble
ties of union, the retrospection, the contempla
tion and the anticipation combine to fill the
Republican breast with pride and hope, and trust
and faith, and magnify our obligations in this
crucial year of our national life. . . .33
Some of the speakers were more concerned with principles than
with history per se.

The 1964 keynoter, for example, stated:

"The Republican Party is committed to a set of principles.
This commitment is an act of unwavering faith in the American
people in the cause of freedom, in the eternal principles of
morality.

. . ."3^

Equally concerned with Republican princi

ples, Theodore E. Burton explained
. . . [that] the word "Republican" is not a mere

^Ibid., pp. 31-32.
Root's technique, similar to that
of Pomeroy in 1876, was a skillful attempt to avoid comparing
Hanna's "damn cowboy"— the progressive Roosevelt— to the con
servative McKinley.
•^Proceedings, 1916, p. 16. This entire speech, if
described in Harding's own style, would be labeled as "vague,
vapid, and venomous."
The most apt description is a phrase
used elsewhere— this is indeed "drenching rhetoric."
■^Mark 0. Hatfield, text supplied by Republican
National headquarters, p. 1.
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name; it is not a label which anyone can wear.
(Applause.)
It is not a cloak for individual
vagaries.
The strength and usefulness of the
Republican Party must depend on the maintenance
of enduring principles in the advocacy of which
triumph can only be secured by party solidarity
and an organization whose members unite in
closed formation to do battle to every foe.
(Applause.) 35
Two final examples should suffice to indicate how the key
noters used both Republican history and Republican principles
to direct the listeners' loyalties toward specific ideas and
events.

The first such example is taken from the speech of

the 1924 keynoter:
Just 70 years ago this was a small but gallant band,
actuated by the highest ideals; then, in 1856, a
multitude, defeated but alive and undaunted. Next,
a mighty conquering host, which through a long tract
of years shaped and guided the destinies of this
Republic, leading it always to new heights of great
ness and renown. What shining pages of history were
written when Abraham Lincoln grasped the helm of
state in 18611
(Applause.)
History has recorded no party organization whose
achievements can compare with ours.
In its triumphant
course it has stood unshaken for the Union and the
Constitution.
It removed the curse of slavery, resisted
repudiation and powerful currents of opinion which
threatened folly in our economic life, and has upheld
the rights of all, however humble.
In every emergency,
in days that were dark as well as those that were bright,
it has been a party of broad vision, full of hope and
of faith.
(Applause.)36
The final example in this category is taken from' Simeon Pess1s
1928 keynote speech.

Fess followed the precedents laid down

by his predecessors regarding the manner for handling history

35proceedings, 1924, p. 31.
•^ P r o c eedings, 1924, p. 36.

128
and principles.

Fess explained:

We are met in the Nineteenth National Convention
since the birth of our party.
Since that date
during a period of seventy-two years the choice
of the convention has been ratified at the ballot
box by the American people in every case save
Buchanan, Cleveland and Wilson.
Beginning with
the election of 1860, the management of our
national affairs has been under the control of
the Republican Party up to this hour, a period
of sixty-eight years, interrupted but twice. . . .^
Many keynoters, however, were not satisfied merely to
employ Republican symbols of great deeds, great men, and
great principles.

Most of the speakers began ransacking

American history to find other symbols for their purposes.
Supplementary Symbols from American History
Finding the symbols they sought in the broad spectrum
of American history and culture, the Republican keynoters
also employed (1) national heroes;
historic sites;

(3) the flag;

(2) national history or

(4) the Constitution;

(5) the

American war dead; and (6) the glories of the Union.
Almost two-thirds of the speeches contained references
to various national heroes.

Eight of the speakers referred

specifically to such revered men as "our founding fathers,"
"the framers of the Constitution,"

"our fathers," and the

"signers of the Declaration of Independence."

An example

from Warren G. Harding's keynote address is typical of these
kinds of references.

Harding stated

37proceedincrs, 1928, pp. 34-35.
(The speaker then
listed the accomplishments of every Republican administration
from Lincoln through Coolidge.)
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. . . [that] we ought to be as genuinely American
today as when the founding fathers flung their im
mortal defiance in the face of old-world oppressions
and dedicated a new republic to liberty and justice.
We ought to be as prepared for defense as Washington
urged amid the anxieties of our national beginning,
and Grant confirmed amid the calm reflections of
union restored.
(Applause.)
Another keynoter stated that the party's mission was to re
store the original policy of the government and to "place it
again in that rank upon which our fathers organized and
brought it into e x i s t e n c e . S t i l l another keynoter im
plored his listeners to "let loose in the world the dynamic
forces of freedom in our day as our forefathers did in
theirs. . . ."

40

In addition to the eight speeches that con

tained such general references to the nation's fighters,
founders, and signers, over half of the keynoters mentioned
specific American hero-figures of varying degrees of signifi
cance.

Included among those mentioned were Washington,

Jefferson, both Adamses, Madison, Jackson, Van Buren, Polk,
Monroe, Hamilton, Marshall, and Franklin.

One keynoter, for

example, presented a veritable presidential roll-call when he
stated:
The safety of our liberty, the security of all we

Proceedings, 1916, p. 15.
(Later in the speech,
Harding emerged from ambiguity long enough to express his
"deep conviction that the founding fathers were divinely
inspired. . . ." Ibid., p. 16.
•^Proceedings, 1860, p. 85.
4 ^Walter H. Judd, 1960, text provided by Republican
national headquarters, p. 8.
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hold valuable, demands that we should take possession
of this government and administer it upon those broad
Constitutional doctrines that were recognized for the
first sixty years of the existence of our government
— that were recognized by Madison, by Monroe, by Adams
the younger, by Jackson, by Van Buren, even down to
the time of Polk. . . .41
Another keynoter mentioned only two national heroes, but in
corporated several other techniques into his narrative.42
The keynoter stated:
At the close of the constitutional convention, George
Washington remarked to Benjamin Franklin that he
believed the constitution as finally evolved was a
great and noble charter of liberty upon which the
several states could rally, unite and prosper.
'Yes,
General,1 Franklin responded, 'if we can make it
work.'
We have made it work in the days of our great
past. And come November, we will make it work
again— so help us G o d ! 43
In addition to their mention of national heroes,
several keynoters included national history or historic sites
in their stockpile of symbols.

Included in this category

were references to Appomatox, Gettysburg, the nation's
capitol, specific geographical areas of the United States,
all of the wars in which the United States participated, the
Fourth of July, and other assorted and infrequent dates,
places, and events.

The amount of time and space given to

this category of national history and national sites in the

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1860, p. 86.
42ijtjie appeaj_ to patriotism and deistic references are
discussed later in this chapter.
^ Proceedings, 1952, p. 76.

keynote speeches is insignificant, and cannot be classified
as an inherent feature of the address.
A third such supplementary symbol to be considered is
the United States flag.

One-fourth of the speeches contain

references to this national symbol.
the "national banner,"

The keynoters spoke of

"old glory," "the old flag washed

clean of every stain by the blood of half a million heroes,"
and of a "flag floating everywhere, honored and respected,
over peaceful seas and welcomed everywhere in friendly ports.
Other speakers mentioned "the banner of this union," or our
"unconquered flag."44

Such references to the flag are seldom

used individually, but rather in conjunction with other
similar symbols.

An example from Charles W. Fairbanks's

1896 speech will illustrate this technique.

Fairbanks stated

that the "present high standard of our currency, our honor
and our flag will be sacredly protected and preserved by the
Republican party."45
Still another such supplementary symbol was the Con
stitution.

Eight of the keynoters mentioned this document,

and several of them spent a considerable amount of time
expounding its significance.

The 1860 keynoter referred to

the Constitution fourteen times during the course of his
address.

Another keynoter, Robert J. Breckinridge, commented

44see, for example. Proceedings, 1880, p. 85; Pro
ceedings , 1888, p. 12; Proceedings, 1860, p. 85.
4 5proceedings, 1896, p. 32.
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. . . it is a great error which is being propagated
in our land, to say that our national life depends
merely on the sustaining of that Constitution.
Our
fathers made it, and we love it. But if it suits us
to change it, we can do so.
[Applause.] And when it
suits us to change it, we will change it.
[Applause.]
If it were torn into ten thousand pieces, the nation
would be as much a nation as it was before the Con
stitution was made— a nation always, that declared
its independence as a united people, and lived as a
united people until now— a nation independent of all
particular institutions under which they lived, and
capable of modeling them precisely as their interests
require.^6
In this latter example, the speaker was able to utilize the
symbolic and connotative value of the Constitution as well
as use it as a vehicle for exposition.
1960 keynoter, asked:

Walter Judd, the

"Why did they [our forefathers] in

sist on having a bill of rights in that Constitution?"
Using the Constitution as his source, Judd explained that
"rights are not what our government must do for us; rights
are what our government cannot do to u s . " ^

Another speaker

claimed that the "Constitution will be the guiding star" of
AO

the Republican party. 0

Still other keynoters merely men

tioned the importance or value of the document without
elaboration.

The use of the Constitution as an American

symbol is not standardized— although most of the speakers
used the word to evoke emotional connotations of loyalty and
patriotism from their listeners, several of the keynoters

^ Proceedings t 1964, p. 179.
^ W a l t e r Judd, 1960, text provided by Republican
national headquarters, pp. 12-13.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1944, p. 55.
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used the Constitution as a vehicle for exposition or argu
ment .
A fifth supplementary national symbol used by the key
noters with some regularity was the American war dead.

The

keynoters were not consistent in their use of this symbol,
however.

Several of the seven speakers who employed this

device were quite specific— which battle, what war, what
cost; other speakers were more ambiguous when they stated that
"American shores were purchased with the priceless blood of
heroes and martyrs," or that adequate provisions must be made
for the "helplessness and old age of our surviving veterans
and the widows and orphans of their dead comrades. . . .
Several speakers were more direct in their handling of the
war dead.

Robert Emmet, for example, asked:

I ask you— you who represent the blood that was shed
at Lexington, at Dorechester Heights, and at Concord
— are you prepared to submit to such a taunt as that?
[Loud shouts of 'nol noi']. . . .50
In contrast to these somewhat pedestrian statements, one of
the keynoters was eloquent— even poetic— in his descriptions
of the turmoil created after the first World War.

After

describing the war's chaos and havoc, Henry Cabot Lodge
stated:
We find ourselves gazing upon the problems and trials
which the huge convulsion has left to us, and with
which we must cope and cope successfully if we are to

^ Proceedings , 1888, pp. 12-13.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1856, p. 19.
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rebuild and again move onward.
The ruined towns,
the broken industries, the desolated farms are
there before our eyes wherever the battles were
fought. Countless little mounds mark the resting
places of the dead in the fields and on the hill
sides torn and gashed by shot and shell.
Signals
of mourning throughout the world tell us of the
irreparable losses of all nations, which have swept
away such an appalling portion of the youth of
every land, those in whom were garnered up the
hopes and strength of the future.
The splendor of the achievement of our soldiers
and sailors, their dauntless courage and unshrink
ing service will always remain one of the proudest
memories in the history of the Republic. But the
dead return not and the shadow of the great sorrow
for those forever gone will never be lifted from
the hearts of the people who sent them forth to
battle. . .
Although several other Republican keynoters dwelt upon the
theme of war and death, these examples should serve to indi
cate the wide variety of application.
A final supplementary national symbol to be considered
concerns the Union.

Six of the Republican keynoters defended,

praised, or explained the federal system of the United States.
Most of the speakers used phrases such as "the holy bonds of
union," "this mighty union," or "our indivisible union."

The

other speakers that mentioned the Union were keynoters in the
conventions during and immediately following the Civil War.
The only speaker to develop fully this symbol was Robert
Breckinridge.

Breckinridge dealt with the nature of the

federal system in much the same manner as his discussion of
the Constitution.
51Proceedings, 1920, p. 15. Although the emotive
language is typical of keynoting, the literary and aesthetic
quality of Lodge's speech is highly unusual.
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Now among these principles . . . the first and most
distinct is that we do not intend to permit this
nation to be destroyed.
[Applause.] We are a
nation— no doubt a peculiar one— a nation formed of
states, and no nation except as these states form
it. And these states are not states except that
they are states in that nation. They had no more
right to repudiate the nation than the nation had to
repudiate them. None of them had even the shadow of
a right to do this, and God helping us, we will
vindicate that truth so that it shall never be dis
puted any more in this world.
{Applause.]52
This quotation seems to illustrate Breckinridge's ability to
merely not arouse an emptional response to a particular
symbol, but to channel that emotion by providing concrete,
if somewhat oversimplified, explanations of the immediate
significance of those symbols to his auditors.
Republican keynoters attempted to show that their
party was worthy of praise for its glorious history and out
standing leaders.

The speakers attempted to accomplish their

purposeis by eulogizing individual or collective heroes, by
explaining Republican history and Republican principles, and
by discussing symbols drawn from American history and culture.
It is important to point out, however, that no dichotomy
existed among these various categories— rather than being
mutually exclusive, these groupings of history and heroes
were frequently combined by the keynoters.

In fact, such

combined appeals were used over fifty times in the Republican
keynote speeches.

The following lengthy excerpts illustrate

the kinds of symbol groupings employed by the speakers:

^ Proceedings, 1854, p. 178.

When those founders of our nation met in this
historic city, a century and a half ago, the dark
shadow of despotic government covered most of the
earth.
The wealth, the traditions and the power
of the Old World were all arrayed against them.
Yet they succeeded.
The framework for a govern
ment of free men which they drafted here became a
beacon of liberty and progress for the entire world.
The people of thirteen struggling states adopted
their work, and made of it the living constitution
of these United States.
The people took from their
number a great leader and made of him, George
Washington, their first president.53
No, citizens!
This republic was established for
the purpose of securing the guarantees of liberty,
of justice and of righteousness to the people and
their posterity.
This was the great object with
which the revolution was fought; these were the
purposes for which the Union and the Constitution
was formed. . . .
Bear this well in mind throughout the campaign, for
it is the first condition of our ability to enter
upon the path which will carry us forward to true
progress and to wiser laws.
It is the path of
Washington, of Lincoln and of Roosevelt from which
Mr. Wilson has sought to drag us. We can only
regain it by once and for all condemning the man
and his associates who have thus endeavored to turn
us from the right road into the dark and devious
ways which with all nations lead to destruction.
We
therefore make our appeal for support to all who
love America, to all, whatever party name they
happen to bear, who are true to the faith of the
fathers, to join with us. . . .55 ■
The American people are neither poltroons nor pessi
mists, and they will not signalize the dawn of the
new century by the surrender of either convictions
or territory.
(Applause.)
Every soldier back from

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1944, pp. 44-45.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1860, p. 86.
^ Proceedings f 1920, p. 18.
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the islands and they are in almost every hamlet in
the land, returns an advocate of their retention.
[The Philippines]
Our dead are buried along the
sands of Luzon, and on its soil no foreign flag
shall ever salute the dawn. Whatever may be in
store for us in the new and unbeaten track upon
which we are entering, we shall not be found 'with
the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin.'
(Applause.)
Our way is new, but it is not dark.
In the read
justment of world-conditions, where we must take
our place with the other great nations of the
earth, we shall move with caution, but not with
fear. We seek only to lift up men to better
things, to bless and not to destroy.
(Applause.)
The fathers of the Republic accepted with courage
such responsibilities. . . .^6
Summary
The pervasiveness and frequency evidenced by the theme
dealing with heroes and history, tends to confirm the opin
ions held by delegates, newspaper writers, scholars, and
members of the Republican hierarchy that the keynote speech
should thrill, excite, stimulate, or key up the convention.
One method employed by the keynoters to achieve this purpose
has been the use of heroes and history that often are rich
in connotative value and elicit emotional responses from the
audience.

The early Republican keynoters probably used these

symbols to focus delegates1 loyalties on familiar men and
events; later keynoters added Republican heroes to the list
of national figures; in recent y e a r s , many keynoters rely on
such symbols to amplify ideas or support an argument rather
than to thrill the auditors.

56proceedings, 1900, pp. 47-48.
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Supporting Materials for History and Hero Theme
Republican keynoters relied on all three of the
Aristotelian modes of proof to support the theme that "our
party is worthy of praise for its glorious history and out
standing leaders."

If the three modes were classified

according to frequency and importance, their order would be
(1) pathos;

(2) logos? and (3) ethos.

Pathos.— Without exception, every keynoter discussing
this theme relied on emotional proofs more than logical or
ethical proofs.

Although many motive appeals were employed,

including relief of distress, love of family, security,
freedom from restraint, ownership or possession, and explora
tion, appeals to patriotism outnumbered all other appeals by
a ratio of over three to one.

Emotive language and patriotism

abound, for example, in Warren G. Harding's 1916 address:
In the travail of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness the American soul was born.
Set aglow at
Bunker Hill, it was reflected in the faces of the
patriots of a fearless republic, where men dedicated
themselves to the solemn and momentous task which was
traced by an infinite hand.
They were not all Ameri
cans by birth, but they were dedicated Americans in
the baptismal rites of a new republic and a new
patriotism.
They could not all sign the Declaration
of Independence, but they committed all Americans to
it for all succeeding time.
They could not all join
in making the constitution, but they pledged the
succeeding millions of Americans to its everlasting
defense.
(Applause.)
There were stalwart Americans then, Americans from
Great Britain with British ideals and their devotion
to orderly government.
There were Americans from the
land of Napoleon and Lafayette, to give of the enthus
iasm and heroism of France in establishing new freedom.
There were Americans from Germany to fight the battles
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of the republic and blend their sturdiness and
thoroughness in the progress of a new people, not
a new race. There were Americans from the green
fields of Ireland, with a passion for liberty.
Americans from Southern Europe to battle for
opportunity.
There were Americans who came from
oppression and stood erect in the freedom of the
republic. They all made common cause. There was
lack of homogenity of race, but there was kinship
of soul, and that soul- was American.
The gates of
our ports have swung inward ever since, there has
been a welcome to the foreign-born, whom we asked
to drink freely of the waters of our political
life and find their places in the sun of American
opportunity. They are an inseparable and important
and valued part of American citizenship, and the
few zealots of any origin who violate our neutrality
do not and can not impugn the loyalty or the American
patriotism of that great body which adds to the
swelling chorus of 'My country, 'tis of thee. Sweet
Land of Liberty.'
(Applause, loud and prolonged.)57
As is obvious from the quotations used throughout this chap
ter emotional appeals are frequently used with the heroes
and history theme.

Regardless of which motive appeals were

used, they were almost always couched in highly emotive
language.

Walter Judd, for example, stated in I960:

In 1860 in this city the Republican Party nominated
as its candidate for the Presidency of the United
States a man who had risen from the humblest begin
nings to become a leader in the effort to end human
slavery without destroying the Union.
He led the party to victory, the nation to salva
tion, and the people to a rededication to the sound
principles on which the country had been founded and
had grown great.
We want tonight, both to honor Abraham Lincoln
and to learn from him.
Please God, we may do as well with our divided
world as he did with his divided nation.^8

^ Proceedings, 1916, pp. 25-26.
58Text supplied by Republican national headquarters,
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In this example, Judd combined appeals to relief of distress,
patriotism, and religious belief, all phrased in emotive
language.

Such combinations of appeals were often employed

by Republican keynoters.

Earl Warren relied on such a com

bined appeal to patriotism, love of family, and religious
belief, when he stated that the Republican party
. . . will not be cocksure in good times or depressed
and cynical in bad times.
(Applause.)
It will direct
our combined material and spiritual resources against
the enemies of our country.
It will make any sacrifice
to achieve victory even one day sooner so our boys can
come home.
(Great applause.)
It will see to it that
they are cared for when they do come h o m e . (Applause.)
And we will honor them for the rest of their lives.
(Great applause.)
But we will start building right now that finer
America, which during the night vigils these men in
arms dream of as they look at the stars from their
foxholes on land and from their gun turrets at sea
and in the air; the America that to them spells
happy homes and freedom of opportunity for all; the
America that represents unity at home and peace with
the countries of the world.
It takes faith to build
faith, the same faith that
men; a faith that is truly
hoped for, the evidence of

such an America— a strong
now sustains our fighting
'the substance of things
things not s een.1

With such a faith— which is our faith— we shall
march under God toward victory, toward opportunity,
toward peace. . . .59
In addition to patriotic appeals, the keynoters used appeals
for relief of distress.

Most such motive appeals occurred

during the first fifty years of the party's history, and
dealt with the emancipation of Negro slaves.

Republican

keynoters praised their party for freeing "the downtrodden

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1944, p. 56.
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slave," "for eliminating the blight of slaveholding," or "for
rescuing the Negro slaves."

Other appeals for relief of

distress were most often concerned with the "white man's
burden" in the Philippines and West Indies.

One keynoter

said, for example, that no chapter
. . . i n the history of nation building has ever been
written that will show a more unselfish service and
greater humanitarian regard than that relating to what
we have done for people like the Philippino and the
peoples of the West India Islands.^0
Although other motive appeals were used in connection with
the history and hero theme, none were used as frequently as
were appeals to patriotism and relief of distress.

In addi

tion to these two appeals, the history and hero theme was
typified by emotive language.
The second mode of proof used by Republican keynoters
when discussing the history and hero theme was logical proof.
Although logical proofs are less characteristic of this theme
than are emotional proofs, logical forms of support appeared
with sufficient frequency to merit attention.
Logos.— Included among the many methods by which a
speaker can support an argument are explanation, description,
narration, authority (testimony), specific instances or
examples, statistics, analogy (comparison), causal reasoning,
and rhetorical q u e s t i o n s . I t

is of little significance to

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1928, p. 33.
61A1though explanation, description, narration, and
rhetorical questions do not constitute proof, per s e , these
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state that all of these devices were used in varying degrees
by the Republican keynoters when they discussed history and
heroes.

In fact, the forms of logical support used with

this first theme differ very little from the logical proofs
supporting the other nine major themes.

Rather than relying

on concrete supporting materials, most keynoters depended
upon assertion and generalization.

Following assertion and

generalization in terms of frequency, the speakers depended
upon specific instances, rhetorical questions, and quotations.
Dwight Green, for example, defended Republican foreign
policy by listing the specific examples of Republican leaders
who helped formulate American foreign policy:
It was a Republican President and Secretary of State
who made Hawaii a part of this nation and an outpost
of defense in the Pacific. It was Republican Secre
tary of State John Hay who opened the doors to China.
It was a Republican President and Republican Secretary
of State who tried to check Japanese aggression at its
outset.
. . . Seward, Blaine, Hay, Root, Hughes, and Kellogg
— these were the makers of real American foreign policy.
. . . Merely to recall them is to blast the New Deal
falsehood that the Republican Party is timid or pro
vincial in its foreign policy. . . .62
This example, when combined with the other excerpts through
out this chapter should amply illustrate the nature of logi
cal proofs by example and specific instances.

methods of amplification are considered in this study to be
more directly related to logos than to the other two modes
of proof.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1948, p. 47.
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Even though rhetorical questions have occasionally
been employed as a partitioning device or as a transition,
they most often appeared as a means of amplification.

The

1960 keynoter stated:
What the American people want to know as they watch
us here tonight is: what party has the greatest
capacity to keep this country safe and sound?
What party is the most alert to and best under
stands the powerful forces against us, abroad and at
home?
Which party best understands the forces for us,
abroad and at home?
Which party has the ablest, the most ejqperienced,
the best qualified and the finest men to lead our
country through the perilous months and years a h e a d ? 6 3
Another keynoter employed the same technique when he said:
This, briefly, is the record of the progress our
crusade has achieved in less than four short years.
How has it come about? What have- the Republican
Party and President Eisenhower brought to our Govern
ment that was so lacking during the twenty years that
had gone b e f o r e ? ^
Frequently, the audience responds to such questions with
shouted replies.

One such instance occurred when the keynoter

asked:
I ask you— you who represent the blood that was
shed at Lexington, at Dorechester Heights, and at
Concord— are you prepared to submit to such a taunt
as that?
[Loud shouts of 'no! n o ! '] To such an
insult? [Reiterated shouts of No! no!']
To such a
slur upon your political energy? [Continued cries of
'No 1']. . . .65

63proceedings, 1948, p. 47.
64walter Judd, 1960, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p . 1.
65proceedinqs, 1956, p. 80.
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Rhetorical questions were used frequently by the keynoters
to amplify their ideas.
Although employed more sparingly than assertion,
specific instances, and rhetorical questions, authority or
quotation appeared in the keynoters' discussions of the his
tory and hero theme.

In 1908, for example, the keynoter

stated that in "this free representative Government," all
final authority over
. . . officials, parties, and policies rests at all
times with the supreme electorate, confirming the
declaration of Abraham Lincoln that this is in fact
a 'government of the people, by the people, and for
the people. . . .'66
Another keynoter, when referring to Lincoln's faith in God,
stated:
He never would have succeeded except for the aid of
divine providence upon which he at all times relied.
'I feel,' said Lincoln, 'that I cannot succeed with
out the same divine aid that sustained him [George
Washington] and on that same Almighty Being I place
my reliance for support and I hope you, my friends,
will all pray that I may receive that divine assis
tance without which I cannot succeed, but with which
success is certain.
These two examples, when considered along with those cited
earlier in this chapter, are typical of the authoritative
support employed by Republican keynoters when discussing
heroes and history.

In summary, the three kinds of logical

proofs appearing most frequently with this theme were specific
instances, rhetorical questions, and authority (quotations).

^ Proceedings, 1908, p. 29.
^ Proceedings, 1956, p. 82.
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Ethos.— Republican keynote speakers utilize many more
emotional and logical proofs than ethical proofs.

Ethical

proof, designed to show the speaker's good will, high char
acter, and intelligence, was used in two ways by the key
noters:

(1) to enhance the status of the speaker, or (2) to

show the high motives and worthy goals of the party.

The

first category of speaker ethos (as opposed to party ethos)
is not inherently characteristic of this particular history
and hero theme.

The second category of ethical appeal, how

ever, is characteristic of the history and hero theme.

Many

keynoters employed appeals designed to enhance the admirability of the party.
taken two forms:

This party ethos has traditionally

(1) long lists of "beneficial legislation,"

and (2) appeals for honesty, morality, and integrity in
governmental affairs.

The first form needs no elaboration,

for the essence of this kind of ethos is more often the
quantity of the legislation rather than its quality.

In this

second form of party ethos, however, the keynoters frequently
associated their party with "crushing corruption," and re
storing "the honor of the Government," and'placing "the public
service of the country in the hands of honest, true and capa
ble men.

. . ."68

still other keynoters were more specific.

One such speaker, after asking what promises the party had
made, stated:

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1868, p. 10.
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We promised we would clean out the corruption that
was a scandal under the previous Administration and
led to more than twenty convictions of high officials.
I am proud of the fact that there has not been a
single conviction for malfeasance in office of any
high official of this Administration.
That does not
mean everything has been perfect.
It does mean that
whenever and wherever there was any slightest sus
picion of impropriety, this Republican Administration
has not tried to cover up; it has cleaned up.
That
is what you wanted it to do. . . .69
A final example of such party ethos is taken from the speech
of the 1964 keynoter:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, government is not in the
business of dispensing religion. However, government
by its example shares in the setting of the moral
stands of this nation. . . .70
Thus, Republican keynoters attempted to establish party
ethos by showing (1) lists of beneficial legislation, and
(2) the importance of honesty, integrity, and morality.
Summary
One of the themes most characteristic of Republican
keynoting was that "our party is worthy of praise for its
glorious history and outstanding leaders."

Over the years,

these keynoters praised such individual party heroes as
Abraham Lincoln, U. S. Grant, James G. Blaine, William Mc
Kinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge,
Herbert Hoover, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and others.

The

majority of references to these men occurred in one of three

69Walter Judd, 1960, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p . 9.
7(^Mark Hatfield, 1964, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, pp. 9-10.

147
kinds of contexts:

(1) when a man was serving as incumbent

President (or titular head of the out-of-power party) and was
to be nominated for a second term;

(2) when the hero was

dead, or was unable or unwilling to seek the party's presi
dential nomination; and (3) when quotations from the hero's
speeches and writings, or references to the hero's patriotism
could be included.
Still other techniques included the combination or
listing of many such individual heroes, the recitation of
Republican history and principles, and employing supplementary
symbols from American history and culture.
symbols included (1) national heroes;
historic sites;

(3) the flag;

Such supplementary

(2) national history or

(4) the Constitution;

(5) the

American war dead; and (6) the Union.
An examination of this first theme tends to confirm
the opinion held by delegates, newspaper writers, scholars,
and members of the Republican hierarchy that the keynote
speech should thrill, excite, stimulate, or key up the con
vention.

In order to achieve this purpose, the keynoters

relied on emotional proofs more frequently than logical or
ethical p roofs.

motive
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Even though the keynoters relied primarily on assertion
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and generalization, specific instances, rhetorical questions,
and authority for their logical proofs, none of these items
were peculiar to this history and hero theme, but were
employed with most of the other major themes as well.
Most of the ethical proofs used by the keynoters dis
cussing the history and hero theme were designed to establish
party ethos rather than speaker ethos.

This party ethos

traditionally appeared in one of two forms:

(1) long lists

of "beneficial legislation; 11 and (2) appeals for honesty,
morality, and integrity in governmental affairs.
One method employed by Republican keynoters to thrill
their auditors has been the use of heroes and history that
often are rich in connotative nuance and thereby elicit emo
tional responses from the audience.

The early keynoters

probably used these symbols to focus delegates' loyalties on
familiar men and events; later keynoters added Republican
heroes to the list of national figures; in recent years, many
keynoters rely on history and heroes to amplify ideas or sup
port arguments, rather than employ such symbols to thrill,
excite, stimulate or "key up" their listeners.
The Democratic Party (or a Specific Democratic Administra
tion) is Inferior in Many Wavs and Deserves Criticism
Over the years, a second common appeal used by the
Republican keynoters revolved around criticism of the Demo
crats.

Without exception, every keynote speech given since

1856 attacked not only Democratic policies, but Democratic
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motives, Democratic leaders, Democratic programs, or Demo
cratic history.
areas:

These attacks were centered in five general

(1) criticism of the President or titular head of the

Democratic party;

(2) criticism that the motives and philos

ophy of the Democrats are immoral, undesirable, dishonest,
harmful, socialistic, collectivistic, or un-American;

(3)

criticism that the Democratic party's history or membership
reflect disunity,

turmoil, dissension, or deterioration;

(4)

criticism of specific Democratic policies and programs re
garding defense, currency, agriculture, welfare, labor, manu
facturing, taxes, and similar related issues; and (5) gen
eralized criticism or attacks combining the four areas men
tioned above.
Criticism of the President or Titular Party Head
One of the most frequent targets of the Republican
keynoters was the Democratic President or titular head of the
Democratic party.

Such attacks were most frequent when the

Republicans were out of power.

As early as 1856, for example,

the keynoter stated that the Democrats
. . . nominated as-their candidate, James Buchanan.
Now, gentlemen, I have known Hon. James Buchanan for
forty years and upwards, intimately; and I say here,
that some of the dearest and most cherished recollec
tions of my life are connected with my associations
with him.
I would defend his personal character if
assailed. But his political character— if I were not
in deadly hostility to that, I would not be here.
[Loud cheers.]
I do not complain of Mr. Buchanan
because he has been a politician by profession from
the time he became a man.
There is nothing dis
honorable about a m a n 1s being a politician by
profession— I do not say "by trade." [Laughter and
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applause.]
And although he is already in the field,
I do not blame him for having been a Federalist once.
[Renewed cheering.] And for having said in the
enthusiasm of the moment (he was a young man at the
time) , that if he thought he had one drop of Demo
cratic blood in his veins, he would let it out.
[Laughter and cheers.]
That would do exceedingly
for a Fourth of July oration to an audience assem
bled like that, and at that time. But I do blame
him in that, after he had expressed his opinion in
regard to the Missouri Compromise, after he had
bowed in adhesion to it, as every patriot of the day
did, yet when he found certain men of his party break
ing down that fabric of liberty, he had not strength
to resist.
I blame the Hon. James Buchanan for having
shown a want of firmness, a want of self-reliance, a
want of adhesion to principle, and an over-zealous
devotion to party in several acts of his life. . . .
He acknowledges that he is no longer James Buchanan,
a free agent, with the right of expressing whatever
will or opinion he may have of his own; but that he
is bound to that platform, and to every plank of it,
and that he has no right or power to remove or alter
one plank of it— an admission that he has allowed him
self to be chained to the Juggernaut of Slavery, and
that he allows himself to be dragged headlong by it.
[Loud cheers.]71
Evidently, the passage of one hundred years has not altered
the keynoters' techniques, for the 1964 keynoter proclaimed:
Now, my friends, what we did not fully realize at
that time was that the candidate for Vice President
of the United States was standing with one foot on
the banks of the Rio Grande and the other foot on
the banks of the Potomac, and that in these two
postures we find that his national foot pointed
toward school integration. His state foot pointed
toward school segregation. His national foot
pointed and advocated the repeal of state rightto-work laws, whereas his state foot endorsed a
right-to-work law as 'necessary.' I say to you
that one can not dance for long on two platforms
without stubbing his toe.
(Cheers and applause.)72

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1856, pp. 17-18.
72jyiark Hatfield, text supplied by Republican national
headquarters, pp. 2-3.
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Such genial and gentlemenly humor, however, is not completely
typical of the Republican keynoter during his attacks on the
Democratic President or party leader.

In 1920, for example,

the keynoter's attack on President Wilson was vitriolic:
. . . Mr. Wilson and his dynasty, his heirs and
assigns, or anybody that is his, anybody who with
bent knee has served his purposes, must be driven
from all control, from all influence upon the
Government of the United States.
They must be
driven from office and power not because they are
Democrats but because Mr. Wilson stands for a
theory of administration and government which is
not American. His methods, his constant if in
direct assaults upon the Constitution and upon
all the traditions of free government, strike at
the very life of the American principles upon
which our Government has always r e s t e d . 73
The 1936 keynoter attacked Franklin Roosevelt's motives when
he stated:
We propose to show the forty million now in gainful
employment that economic freedom depends upon ad
herence to a system under which their pay envelopes
will not shrink and under which their life insurance
policies and savings bank deposits will be protected.
If this great group of Americans will assert their
heritage as Americans, they need never again fear a
debacle such as we had in March, 1933, when a Presi
dent-elect without a conscience refused for four
months to cooperate with a President who had a
conscience, resulting in a bank crisis and a panic
of fear and fright.
(Applause, loud and long con
tinued.)
This Nation deserves a government by con
science.
In order that its free institutions may
be maintained, we have a right to insist upon a
President who puts the interests of the people
above considerations of personal politics.74
In addition to focusing their attacks on the Democratic
leader, the Republican keynoters also claimed that the

73proceedings, 1920, p. 17.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1936, p. 32.
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motives and philosophy of the opposition party were immoral,
undesirable, dishonest, harmful, socialistic, collectivistic,
or un-American.
Criticism of Democratic Motives and Philosophy
A second characteristic attack on the Democrats used
by the keynoters charged that Democratic motives and philos
ophy were inherently undesirable.

Among the charges levied

by the Republican keynote speakers were immorality, dishonesty,
socialism, collectivism, and un-Americanism.
examples are typical of these attacks.

The following

In 1936, keynoter

Steiwer claimed that centralization
. . . of power is the Siamese twin of bureaucracy.
Expensive and arbitrary, its supreme evil is greed
for money and power. History shows that centralized
autocracy invariably seeks to build itself greater
and stronger on the ruins of the people's liberties.
It reaches for control of the education of children
and the formation of thought, and finally all human
rights, including religious freedom, must yield to
its tyranny. When a Chief Executive finds uncon
stitutional concentration of power in himself, he
should exercise his constitutional power to recom
mend that Congress take back its authority.
This
wholesome recommendation will be made in January,
by an oath-keeping Republican President.
(AP “
plause, delegates rising and waving flags.)75
A similar indictment was stated by the 1944 keynoter:
We believe the New Deal is leading us away from
representative government. We believe that its
centralization of power in the numerous bureaus at
Washington will eventually destroy freedom as
Americans have always understood it— freedom in the
home, freedom of individual opportunity in business

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1936, p. 35.
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and employment, freedom to govern ourselves
locally.
(Great a p p l a u s e . ) 76
Still another keynoter, after attacking the policies of a
Democratic administration, asked:
Have we been too harsh in our judgment? No, in
fact, we have not even referred to the strong self
indictment of the obvious effort to break down one
of our bulwarks of freedom by violating the third
term tradition.
(Applause.)
The saddest chapter
of the last four years has been that the National
Administration, instead of keeping its eyes, states
manlike, upon the welfare of the people of this
nation, has turned its political gaze upon a third
term. This un-American desire for a third term com
pletely undermines their forthrightness in meeting
all of our issues.
It has destroyed statesmanship.
Cleverly and surreptitiously they have strengthened
the ironhanded control of the President over the
Democratic Party. Building upon the corrupt polit
ical machines of Kelly and Nash and Hague and their
kind (applause), they have erected as a super
structure a political machine such as this country
has never before seen. Democracy within the Demo
cratic Party has been destroyed.
(Applause.) With
this background they move on towards their conven
tion, tossing aside the traditions of Washington and
of Jefferson.77
A final example should suffice to indicate the nature of the
keynoters' attacks upon the motives and philosophy of the
Democratic Party.

Henry Cabot Lodge, the 1920 keynoter,

charged:
Great reductions in expenditures have been effected
but we have been met with resistance in some of the
departments and also by habits of waste backed by
maladministration, by sacrifice of efficiency to
political purposes, never so recklessly indulged in
before, and in certain cases by an incompetency so
marvellous that it cannot be due to nature, but must

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1944, p. 53.
77proceedinqs, 1940, p. 59.
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be the result of art.
(Applause, accompanied by
cries of 'That's true.')78
In addition to their attache upon the Democratic leaders,
motives, and philosophy, the Republican keynoters also criti
cized the history and membership of the Democratic party.
Criticism of Democratic Party's History and Membership
A third indictment of the Republican keynoters stated
that the history and membership of the Democratic party
reflected disunity, turmoil, dissension, or deterioration.
During the early years of the Republican party's existence,
most of the keynoters charged that the Democratic party was
once great, but that it had deteriorated.

In 1856, for

example, the keynoter said:
The great Democratic party of this country— a name
which, independent of the late acts of the party,
I have always honored and have always looked up to
till I ceased to belong to it— that great party
calling itself the Democratic Party, has met and
adopted their platform.
And a worse platform for
a Democratic platform I never read.
[Loud cheers
and laughter.]7 9
The 1872 keynoter made a similar indictment when he stated:
The malcontents who recently met at Cincinnati were
without a constituency; the Democrats who are soon
to meet at Baltimore will be without a principle.
[Hearty applause.]
The former, having no motive in
common but personal disappointment, attempted a
fusion of repelling elements, which has resulted in
explosion; the latter, degraded from the high estate
they once occupied, propose an abandonment of their
identity, which means d e a t h . 80

78proceedings, 1920, p. 19.
7Proceedings, 1856, p. 17.
^Proceedings, 1872, p. 6.
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This same speaker concluded his speech by stating that the
Republican party would "have to encounter the decaying
remnants of a once powerful party, but now so feeble that it
is crying piteously to its enemy for succor.

. . ."81

Al

though such descriptions of the decay of the Democratic party
were more numerous in the period from 1856 to 1880, the Repub
lican keynoters of the 1900‘s also discussed the deteriora
tion of the opposition.

In 1944, for example, the keynoter

charged:
We believe the New Deal is destroying the two-party
system.
(Applause.)
The New Deal is no longer the
Democratic Party.
(Applause.)
It is an incongruous
clique within that Party.
(Applause.)82
In addition to such attacks on the Democratic party's
history and descriptions of its decline, the Republican key
noters delighted in elaborating upon the disunity and dis
parate elements within the Democratic ranks.

In 1956, for

example, the keynoter said:
The Democrat Party is a party of many divisions.
It is a party of sectionalism and factionalism.
It stands for one thing in the South, another in
the North.
Under the same roof, this party has
some of the leaders of organized labor and some
of the bitterest, most reactionary enemies of the
men and women who toil in our factories.
(Cheers
and applause.)
It has northern liberals who
militantly champion civil rights— up to a certain
point— and it has others who abhor civil rights
like a plague.
They have nationalistic hotheads
who rattle their sabers at every opportunity,
disturb friendly relations with other nations, and

81proceedings, 1872, p. 7.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1944, p. 53.
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they have timid souls who attack and criticize the
Administration and accuse us of risking war whenever
we act firmly and effectively to prevent war.
(Applause.
In a similar vein, the 1944 keynoter charged that the New
Deal retained
. . . its power by patronizing and holding together
incompatible groups.
It talks of idealism and seeks
its votes from the most corrupt political machines
in the country.
(Great applause.)
The leaders of
its inner circle are not representatives of the
people.
(Applause.)84
Still other keynoters labeled the Democratic party membership
as "sectional and aristocratic,
plaxners."00

or as "critics and com-

In addition to attacking Democratic leaders,

motives, history, and membership, the Republican keynoters
also criticized specific Democratic policies and programs.
Criticism of Specific Democratic Policies and Programs
A fourth target of the Republican convention keynoters
was specific Democratic policies and programs regarding
defense, spending, agriculture, welfare, labor, manufacturing,
taxation, and other specific policies and specific programs.
Since there is nothing inherently indicative of a genre in
this category of criticism, little more will be said of it.
Although these attacks upon specific issues did occur with a

^Proceedings

t 1956,

p.

81.

84proceedings, 1944, p. 54.
85Proceedings, 1860, p. 85.
^ p r o c e e d i n g s , 1932, p. 36.
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high degree of regularity in the period from 1856 to 1964,
the keynoters' criticisms showed little internal consistency
or continuity.

General Criticism of the Democratic Party
A fifth and final group of criticism was much less
specific than the previous four categories.

This fifth

classification was composed either of generalized attacks on
the Democrats or consisted of criticism combining several of
the four categories mentioned previously.

The 1896 keynoter,

for example, stated "that three years of Democratic adminis
tration have been three years of panic, of wasted energy, of
anxiety and loss to the American people, without a parallel
in our history."8^

An earlier keynoter had stated that the

nation could endure "anything except the imbecility of a
Democratic administration.

. . .

Warren G. Harding's 1916

keynote speech was equally general when he stated:
It is not inspiring to recite Democratic failures.
I shall not dwell on that party's insincerity or
incapacity.
The country indicts and the record
convicts.
It proclaimed the sacredness of its
pledges and then profaned them.
It professed economy
and is staggered by its own extravagance. . . .
In addition to such general criticism, the Republican key
noters employed a kind of combined attack on Democratic
motives, membership, history, and policies.

^ Proceedingsf 1896, p. 28.
88Proceedings, 1876, pp. 8-9.
88Proceedinqs, 1916, p. 23.
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example, the keynote speaker said:
This party is a coalition of antagonistic factions
who periodically get together just long enough to
try to get themselves elected.
(Cheers and ap
plause.)
They spent twenty years trying to imple
ment their inconsistent concepts and wound up with
an appalling record of mismanagement and corruption.
(Applause) And it was only natural there was a
complete loss of the public's respect for and con
fidence in the highest office, of the land.
The
Democrats left us a staggering national debt, a
greatly reduced value of the dollar, a colossal
bureaucracy, and vastly increased taxes. . . .
Today this party is as divided on foreign affairs
as on everything else.
They have leaders who are
devoted to the ideal of world cooperation and have
isolationists like those who drove a great American
patriot, Walter George, out of the Senate after a
lifetime of devoted public service.
(Cheers and
applause)
They are divided on education, taxation,
immigration, and also on almost everything else.
The only thing on which they can agree is that they
would like to get back into office.
(Laughter)90
A similar combined attack was employed by keynoter George
Hoar in the 1880 convention.

Hoar stated:

The single purpose of its being [the Democratic party]
was to give political supremecy to the oligarchs of
the South, and office, without influence, to their
subservient Northern allies.
In the pursuit of that end, every great public
interest was sacrificed or disregarded.
Expending
little for public improvements, either on the coast
or on inland river or lake, in 1860 the credit of
the Nation was poor, its treasury empty, its six
per cent, bonds below par.
Our unprotected manu
factures contended at fearful odds with the pauper
labor of Europe, on whose workshops we depended
for a large portion of the necessaries and comforts
of life. Our little navy was scattered over the
four quarters of the globe.
Four millions of our
countrymen were in hopeless bondage.- To them every
new State, as it took its place in the great family,
but added a new dungeon to their gloomy prisonhouse .
q n

Proceedings, 1956, p. 81.
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At last, as the Democratic party let go its hold
on power, the National flag itself seemed about to
be folded and laid aside, to be regarded thenceforth
as a miserable symbol of the futility and folly of
the last great experiment of self-government.
The
Democratic party confronts us today, as I said,
unchanged in purpose, in temper, and in character.
United in nothing else, proposing no other measure
of policy, it wages its warfare upon the sefegards
I-sic 1 which the Nation has thrown around the purity
of its elections. . . .91
Still another example of this combined criticism can be
observed in the keynoter speech given by Earl Warren in 1944.
Keynoter Warren stated that President Roosevelt's party
leaders were not representative of the people:
They are the personal agents of one man. (Applause.)
Their appointments to public office are not made on
the basis of efficiency or public approval, but on
the basis of loyalty to the clique only.
(Applause.)
Under their rule, the Constitution has been shortcircuited.
The Cabinet has ceased to be a voice and
has become an echo.
(Applause.) . . . these bureau
crats of the New Deal tell the farmer what to sow
and when to reap— sometimes without regard for either
the seeds or the season.
(Applause.)
They require
him to work in the fields all day and keep books for
the government all night.
(Applause.)
These same
bureaucrats tell the worker what union he shall join,
what dues he shall pay, and to whom he may pay
them. . . .92
Two final examples should suffice to indicate the nature of
such attacks upon the Democratic party.

In 1900, the key

noter stated that the election of a Democratic President,
. . . could paralyze the operation of the new cur
rency law as effectively as if it were wiped from
our statute books. A Democratic victory would
infuse new life into the Tagal insurrection, cost

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1880, p. 6.
q9
Proceedings, 1944, p. 54.
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us the lives of thousands of our gallant army in
the Philippines, impair or destroy our prestige,
if not our power, in the islands, make us a by
word among the other great nations of the world,
and obliterate our influence in the settlement of
the vital questions certain to arise when China
shall be opened to foreign commerce. . . .93
In his defense of President Hoover in the 1932 convention,
keynoter L. J. Dickinson said that Democratic opposition,
. . . hampered the President at every turn. Through
a highly subsidized press bureau, Democratic leaders.
Democratic Senators and Democratic Congressmen sought
to distort his every word; to belittle his every
effort at human and economic relief; to impugn his
every motive; to frustrate his every move.
Their
orders were to 'Smear Hoover.’
Upon his shoulders the anvil chorus of Democracy
placed the responsibility for every ill at home and
abroad. Dreadful pictures of ruin and horror were
painted. Public confidence was shaken. Pessimism
became rampant. All this our political enemy did
without thought of the consequence to the Nation. . .

.

Summary
The regularity with which these attacks on the Demo
cratic party occurred tends to support the opinions of dele
gates, newspaper writers, scholars, and members of the
Republican hierarchy who felt that one of the primary func
tions of the keynote speech was to attack the opposition.
Every keynote speech delivered from 1856 through 1964 attacks
various elements or facets of the opposition party.

Most of

these criticisms can be grouped into five major categories;
(1) criticism of a Democratic President or titular head of

^ Proceedings, 1900, p. 47.
^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1932, pp. 24-25.
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the Democratic party;

(2) criticism that the motives and

philosophy of the Democrats are immoral, undesirable, dis
honest, harmful,

socialistic, collectivistic, or un-American;

(3) criticism that the Democratic party's history or member
ship reflect disunity, turmoil, dissension, or deterioration;
(4) criticism of specific Democratic policies and programs
regarding defense, currency, agriculture, welfare, labor,
manufacturing, taxes, and similar related issues; and (5)
generalized criticism or attacks combining the four areas
mentioned above.
Attacks upon the Democratic party increased in fre
quency and vehemence when the Republicans were out of power.
Virtually all of the attacks on a Democratic leader occurred
when the Republicans were out of office.
Supporting Materials Used When Criticizing
the Democrats
Although the Republican keynoters relied on all three
of the Aristotelian modes of proof to support the theme that
"the Democratic party (or a specific Democratic administra
tion) is inferior in many ways and deserves criticism, " such
an observation is of little value when determining what kind
of supporting materials are characteristic of the keynote
genre.
Ethical pr o o f s.— The only kinds of ethical proofs that
are characteristic of this theme are those employing a nega
tive ethos— those proofs that associate the Democratic party

162
with corruption, dishonesty, immorality, and other equally
unsavory traits.
Logical proofs.— Among the many forms of support used
by the Republican keynoters when attacking the Democrats were
explanation, description, narration, authority (testimony),
examples, statistics, comparison, causal reasoning, and
rhetorical questions.

Of all of these forms of support, how

ever, only three can be labeled as characteristic:
assertion or generalization;

(1)

(2) rhetorical questions; and

(3) comparison (analogy).
Rather
to d o c u m e n t

than

relying

criticisms

on

concrete

supporting materials

of the Democrats,

depended on assertion and generalization.

the keynote

speakers

In 1936, for

example, the keynoter stated that the New Deal
. . . pretends it would protect American interests,
yet harbors aliens who are not entitled to remain
in America, but are permitted to remain and who
compete with the American working man, increase
the cost of our struggle against crime and add to
our relief burden.
It coddles agitators and
encourages the purveyors of unrest at a time when
the Nation needs a firm and dignified leadership.
Not content to employ professors and theorists as
economic advisers, the New Deal has placed the
affairs of government in their hands.
It depends
on bookworms for practical experience and on book
worms for energy. . . .95
The 1944 keynoter was also dependent on assertion when he
attacked the Democratic party.

The keynote speaker stated:

^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1936, p. 36.
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They have threatened our free press.
They have
intimidated our free radio. They are using every
device and excuse to insinuate themselves into
control over the public schools of our states.
(Applause.)
They have injected a low grade of
politics into the administration of relief and
social welfare.9®
A final example can be observed in the speech of the 1896
keynoter:
Three years of Democratic administration have been
three years of panic, of wasted energy, of anxiety
and loss to the American people, without a parallel
in our history.9^
These three examples of assertion are representative of
those employed to support attacks on the Democratic party.
In addition to assertion and generalization, the Republican
keynoters frequently asked rhetorical questions to amplify
their attacks on the opposition.
Even though rhetorical questions were occasionally
employed as a partitioning device or as a transition, they
most often appeared as a means of amplification.

In I960,

for example, the keynoter stated:
I would rather not go over the mistakes of the past;
there's more than enough to talk about regarding the
future. But if Republicans are to be charged with
inability to deal with the forces of aggression
which those who make the charges helped to build up,
then we owe it to the truth to set the record
straight. . . . Was it Republicans who recognized
the Soviet Union in 1933 and gave it acceptance
into our country and world society as if it were a
respectable and dependable member thereof? Was it
Republicans who, at Tehran, against the urgent

^ Proceedings, 1944, p. 54.
97proceedings, 1896, p. 28.
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advice of Mr. Churchill, agreed to give the
Russians a free hand in the Balkans? Was it
Republicans who secretly divided Poland and gave
half of it to the Soviet Union? Was it Repub
licans who agreed to the Communist takeover of
a hundred million people in Eastern Europe who
are not R u s s i a n ? "
The 1964 keynoter also employed the rhetorical question tech
nique by asking:
. . . was it a Republican Administration that pre
sided over the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs?
(Chorus
of 'no') Was it a Republican Administration that
neutralized Laos and so initiated the chain of
events that threatens freedom throughout all of
Southeast Asia?
(Chorus of 'no') And I ask you:
Was it a Republican Administration that ignored
the problem in Cuba until it erupted into rioting
and bloodshed?
(Chorus of 'no') Was it a Repub
lican administration in power when the Berlin Wall
was built?
(Chorus of 'no').^
Convention audiences have frequently responded to these
rhetorical questions by chanting the replies in unison.

In

1876, for example, Theodore Pomeroy asked:
I ask the freedmen of the South, if they are ready
to accept the Democratic party as the source of
power [Voices— 'No! No!'
Speaker— I know it.]
from which is to flow the appropriate legislation
as congress may d e v i s e ? ! "
A similar situation occurred in 1940, when keynoter Stassen
asked:
To whom shall we entrust the leadership on this
front? Shall it be to those who have added almost

" w a i t e r Judd, 1960, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, pp. 32-33.
" M a r k Hatfield, 1964, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p . 3.
^•" p r o c e e d i n g s , 1876, p. 9.
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400,000 men and women to the public payrolls of
their political army, but have have added only a
few thousand to the payrolls of our regular
army?
[Cries of 'No.']
Or to those who tried to
pack the Supreme Court of these United States?
[Cries of 'No.']. . . .101
Such responses to rhetorical questions have been frequent,
occurring in the conventions of 1868, 1896, 1904, 1916, and
1936, in addition to those just

m e n t i o n e d .

102

The third form of support that occurred with suffi
cient regularity to be labeled as "characteristic," was the
use of analogy— comparison.

The following examples are

typical of analogies employed to attack the Democratic party.
In 1936, the keynoter said:
This is the only administration, in our history which
has deliberately impaired private credit, destroyed
confidence and intimidated capital.
The prudent,
everywhere, abstain from risk which is aggravated by
policies that harass and destroy.
No one would
advocate reform ahead of recovery except the re
formers who can experiment and exploit only when the
people are in distress.
In the fear that if the
country recovers it will not take any more of their
reforms, they have manufactured turmoil and disorder.
The patient needs a competent physician, not these
quacks of confusion. Pointing the finger of promise
toward abundance, the New Deal has aimed its policies
of performance in exactly the opposite direction.
If
Noah, in anticipation of the flood, had installed an
irrigation system instead of building the Ark, his
mistake would have been no worse than have been the
New Deal economic blunders.
(Laughter.)103

lOlproceedings , 1940, p. 57.
102in the 1936 convention, many of keynoter Steiwer's
rhetorical questions were answered by the audience with the
phrase, "three long years."
This chant became a popular
slogan throughout the 1936 campaign.
lOlproceedings, 1936, pp. 38-39.
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Another keynoter , in his attack upon the Democrats, stated
that some "of the master minds of the Democratic party are
now chirruping away like incessant little birds.

. . ."104

A final illustration of the keynoters' use of comparison can
be taken from the speech of George Hoar:
It is twenty years since the Republican Convention
met in this city, and after a stormy but friendly
contest, put in nomination Abraham Lincoln and
Hannibal Hamlin.
Lincoln has gone to his rest. His
companion upon the ticket, in fresh and vigorous age,
is present with us to-day, to give us counsel from
the stores of an experience gathered from a life of
honorable public service.
Lincoln has gone to his
rest. Douglas and Breckinridge, his two competitors
for the great office of the Presidency, sleep by his
side. But, the parties which confronted each other
then, confront each other now, unchanged in purpose,
in temper, and in character. The Democratic party
was ruled then, as now, by the South.
The single pur
pose of its being was to give political supremecy to
the oligarchs of the South, and office, without
influence, to their subservient Northern a l l i e s . 105
Thus, the three logical proofs most often employed by the
Republican keynoters were (1) assertion and generalization;
(2) rhetorical questions; and (3) comparison.
Emotional proofs.— Although most of the Republican
keynoters employed numerous emotional appeals in their
attacks upon the Democratic party, only two items occurred
with sufficient regularity to merit attention.

The two

aspects of the speeches are (1) emotive language and (2)
sarcasm, ridicule, and humor.

These two elements of

lQ4proceed i nas, 1920, p. 20.
•^^Proceedings, 1880, p. 6.
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Republican keynoting are among the few truly inherent char
acteristics of this genre of speaking.
The 1952 keynote speech was notable for its use of
emotive language.

After attacking President Truman's foreign

policy as being "vacillating and negative," the keynoter
stated that Democratic leadership in the Korean War was

char

acterized by "irresponsibility, recklessness, weakness, and
indecision.

. . ."

The keynoter speaker added:

Korea stands today as the hallowed graveyard for
countless American dead. We must not let it become
as well a graveyard for American hope, American
faith and American h o n o r . 106
The 1948 keynoter also employed emotive language when he
said:
Human institutions have human faults.
The Republican
Party is a human institution.
But it has never
harbored anything like the motley collection of em
bittered failures, back-alley revolutionaries, and
parlor anarchists with which the New Deal has dis
graced the party of Jefferson and Jackson.107
This same speaker added that the "Cold War we face today is
the

lusty

child

of

the N e w Deal's

rendezvous with

destiny."^®®

A final example should suffice to indicate the nature of
emotive language in these speeches.
attacked Democratic

leaders

by

In 1944, the keynoter

stating:

They are the personal agents of one man. (Applause.)
Their appointments to public office are not made on

IQOproceedings, 1952, p. 73.
107proceedings, 1948, p. 44.
108proceedings, 1948, p. 46.
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the basis of efficiency or public approval, but on
the basis of loyalty to the clique only.
(Applause.)
Under their rule, the Constitution has been shortcircuited. . . . Both Congress and the judiciary have
been intimidated and bludgeoned to make them servile.
(Applause.)
Over all of this— and over all of us— is
the ominous, gargantuan figure of an arrogant, powerintoxicated bureaucracy.
(Applause.)109
In addition to emotive language, the keynote speakers
relied on sarcasm, ridicule, and humor when attacking the
opposition.

This category of humorous or sarcastic state

ments is one of the most obvious and significant character
istics of Republican keynote speaking.

In 1888, for example,

keynoter Thurston ridiculed his opposition by ironically
stating that the Democrats had now been in power
. . . nearly four years.
Its administration has been
most satisfactory to those who hold office under it.
Its loyalty has been so pronounced as to receive the
approval of every enemy of the Government.
The
courage of its foreign policy has amused the Great
Powers and pleased every coward. . . . Its justice
to the disabled soldiers has won golden opinions from
those who gave them their wounds. . . . H o
An example of more genial humor occurred in the speech of
the 1944 keynoter:
To perpetuate themselves in power the New Deal clique
has always capitalized upon some crisis.
It has always
had the indispensable man— the same man— for each suc
ceeding crisis.
[Great applause.]
The first time it
was the depression.
The second time it was the reces
sion.
Last time it was to keep us out of war.
[Applause.]
This time it will be to achieve peace.
[Applause.] The next time— who knows what crisis it
will be? That there will be one and that the indis
pensable man will still be indispensable, we can rely

I09proceedings, 1944, p. 54.
llOproceedincrs, 1888, p. 13.
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on the New Deal clique to assert.
[Applause.]
The
New Deal came to power with a song on its lips:
‘Happy Days Are Here Again.' That song is ended.
Even the melody does not longer on. Now we are
being conditioned to a new song:
'Don't Change
Horses in the Middle of the Stream.' That melody
isn't likely to linger either.
For eleven long years
we have been in the middle of the stream. We are not
amphibious. We want to get across. We want to feel
ground under our feet again.
[Great
Still another keynoter, employing reductio ad absurdum,
stated that the Democratic party had exhausted an entire con
gressional year,
. . . in vain assaults upon three items in a tariff
bill, containing over 2,500 items, and if their party
should be continued in power it will take them, to
complete their tariff reform . . . at their present
rate of progress, about eight hundred years. [Ap-.
plause .]112
Dwight Green, keynoter in the 1948 convention, quipped that
the Democrats had promised efficiency, but "its Grecian gift
was a Trojan donkey filled with swarming bureaucrats turned
loose within our citadel.

. . ."113

jn a similar vein, the

1964 keynoter said that the "current administration should
wage war on the poverty of its own ideas.

(Applause.)"114

Still other keynoters employed humor to defend Republican
actions against Democratic criticism.

In 1900, for example,

the keynoter defended the necessity for the Spanish-American

H lproceedinqs, 1944, p. 55.
ll^Proceedings, 1892, p. 13.
•^^Proceedings, 1948, p. 43.
H ^ M a r k O. Hatfield, 1964, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p. 4.
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war by stating:
There are parallels in our own history.
For five
millions of dollars and other valuable considera
tions we purchased Florida from Spain in 1821, when
it had four thousand white settlers. The Seminoles,
natives of the soil, brave, resolute, have far
greater intelligence and character than the Tagals,
disputed our possession. We sent Andrew Jackson
down to fight them, and it took us twenty-one years
to subdue them and send what was left of them west of
the Mississippi.
If the 1Anti-everythings' had lived
then, they would, I suppose, have urged us to turn
' over Florida to Osceola, the Aguinaldo of the
Seminoles! [Laughter.]
A final example of sarcasm, ridicule, and humor can be taken
from the speech of the 1940 keynoter.

The speaker stated

that after the outbreak of the Second World War,
. . . [and the] news swept across the country, the
President went on the radio and in an extremely
clever, but dangerously deceptive manner, lumped to
gether the equipment that was 1on h a n d ' and 1on order'
(applause and cries of 'He sure did!') in an effort to
smooth over the failure to fulfill the trust that the
American people placed in his administration.
The
cold facts are that in many instances the totals the
President gave 1on h a n d 1 and 'on order' were about
one-fifth 'on hand' and four-fifths 'on order' and
those orders sadly delayed in their fulfillment.
(Applause.)
Later in the speech, the same keynoter stated:
For too long a time we have wasted millions and millions
of dollars on 'Passamaquoddies 1 and 'Florida Canals'
while neglecting needed defenses. (Applause.)
For too long a time our leaders have strutted down
the avenues of the world jauntily knocking chips off
shoulders without even preparing to raise our arms in
self defense.
(Applause.)
For too long a time we
have talked boldly of quarantining aggressors in order

^■^P r o c e e d i n g s , 1900, p. 46.
116pr o c e e d i n g s , 1940, p. 49.
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to protect other nations and now find we are not even
prepared to protect ourselves. . . . For too long a
time our foreign policy has been one of a big noise
and a little stick, and even that little stick 'on
order.'
(Laughter and applause.) We need again a
calm, resolute voice and a big stick.
(Cries 'Oh,
man J ')
In the heat of partisan controversy, the humor, sarcasm, and
ridicule has occasionally degenerated into name-calling,
guilt-by-association, and ad hominem attacks.

President

Franklin Roosevelt, for example, was called a 'itfew Deal Caesar"
by the 1936 keynoter, and labeled as "un-American" by the 1940
keynote speaker.

One keynoter employed the fallacy of guilt

by association when he said that the federal training camps
suggested by Roosevelt was "the method of Hitler and
Mussolini and Stalin."-^®
The use of humor, sarcasm, and ridicule has been an
inherent characteristic of Republican keynote speaking since
the first convention in 1856.

The humor itself, however, is

less consistent— usually caustic, occasionally clever, and
frequently heavy-handed— but always partisan.
Summary
The second most characteristic theme of the Republican
keynoter was that "the Democratic party (or a specific Demo
cratic administration)
criticism."

is inferior in many ways and deserves

Such attacks upon the Democrats were centered

•^-^proceedings, 1940, p. 51.
118pr0cee d i n q s , 1940, p. 55.
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in five general areas:

(1) criticism of the President or

titular head of the Democratic party;

(2) criticism that the

motives and philosophy of the Democrats are immoral, unde
sirable, dishonest, harmful, socialistic, collectivistic, or
un-American;

(3) criticism that the Democratic party's his

tory or membership reflect disunity, turmoil, dissension, or
deterioration;

(4) criticism of specific Democratic policies

or programs regarding defense, currency, agriculture, welfare,
labor, manufacturing, taxes, and similar related issues; and
(5) generalized criticism or attacks combining the four areas
mentioned above.
Every speech given from 1856 through 1964 employed one
or more of these criticisms, with the attacks increasing in
frequency when the Republicans were out of power.

A detailed

examination of this second major theme seems to reinforce the
opinions expressed by delegates, newspaper writers, scholars,
and members of the Republican leadership that one of the main
purposes of the keynote address was to flail the opposition.
Characteristically, the Republican keynoters supported
this second theme in the following fashion:

(1 ) most of the

ethical proofs employed were negative— those that associated
the Democrats with corruption, dishonesty, and immorality;
(2 ) although the speakers relied on a variety of logical
proofs, only three were consistently associated with the
theme— assertion or generalization, rhetorical questions,
and comparison;

(3) most of the keynoters depended heavily
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on emotive language and sarcasm, ridicule, and humor.
As was mentioned earlier in this study, one of the
purposes of the national political convention is to prod the
delegates and general public to action.

One of the methods

employed to achieve this goal is the keynoter's attempt to
infuse harmony and a sense of unity into the convention
atmosphere.
We Need Unity and Harmony
Appeals for unity and harmony have been frequent in
Republican national conventions, occurring in over fourfifths of the conventions, and in every convention from 1920
to 1964.

The third major theme to be discussed, then, is

"We need unity and harmony."

As early as 1856, Republican

keynoters began stressing the importance of party unity.
Robert Emmet, keynoter for the first Republican convention,
stated:
Let us proceed to nominate a man as our candidate for
the office of President. . . . Each man cannot have
his favorite. We come here to make concessions. We
come here to act in harmony. We come here to act
unanimously in the cause, as I hope and trust we
will. . . . And although it is natural and it is
proper that there should be preference of particular
men, preference for a man is not the true principle
upon which we should act in this Convention. . . .
Although this particular theme ranks high in frequency among
the twenty-seven keynote speeches, there are few character
istics that can be labeled as significant or inherent.

^•^Proceedings, 1856, p. 20.
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though the speakers have urged unity when the party is badly
split, they have also used the same appeal when harmony pre
vails within the party ranks.

The only apparent differences

that occurred in this unity theme were that the appeals for
harmony were longer and more detailed when (1 ) the party was
leaderless or badly split; or (2 ) when a floor fight developed
over the selection of the keynoter.

One of the longest and

most detailed pleas for unity and harmony came in J. Sloat
Fassett's 1892 keynote

speech.

120

passett attempted to

achieve harmony by stating:
We are not here as warring factions, seeking supremecy
by strife, under favorite leaders, but we are here as
members of one great party seeking to elect from the
shining roll of our honored great men, the type of
statesman who shall be regarded as the soundest and
completest embodiment of the cardinal doctrines of
the Republican party. . . . If there is ever a time
when it is proper that Republicans should differ, that
time is now, and the occasion is here. We are here
for the express purpose of comparing divergent views
and divergent opinions, meaning out of the clash and
conflict of opinions to arrive at ultimate unity. . . .
In the delicate and wide-sweeping questions growing
out of the selection of standard-bearers for a great
party, there has always been, and always will be, a
wide opportunity for differences of opinion among
honest and independent men . . . and the more earnest
the men, the more honest the opinions, the more
vigorous and determined will be the conflict, and the

120p arty unity was lacking at the time of this conven
tion, for although James G. Blaine was aged and ill, he had
received substantial publicity as President Harrison's
Secretary of State, and had then resigned his office shortly
before the convention took place. Although Blaine still had
considerable support within the party, many new leaders were
emerging who wanted the nomination. Unity was further
hampered by the mass movement of many farmers toward the
third-party coalition.
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more complete the unification ultimately
reached. . . . The air is always sweeter and purer
after a storm, and indicates a brighter to
morrow. . . .121
Elihu Root's appeal for unity in the 1912 convention was
also somethat more detailed than the usual appeal for har
mony. -*-^2

Root began his thematic development by stating

that a p a r t y 's 'fitness to govern depended upon
. . . the willingness of the members of the party
to subordinate their varying individual opinions
and postpone the matters of difference between them
in order that they may act in unison upon the great
questions wherein they agree. . . .
Without these things there can be no party worthy
of the name.
Without them party association is a
rope of sand, party organization is an ineffective
form, party responsibility disappears, and with it
disappears the right to public c o n f i d e n c e . 1 2 3
Unlike the two examples just cited, most of the keynoters'
appeals for unity and harmony were brief and perfunctory.
In 1888, for example, the keynoter stated:
We enter upon the proceedings of this convention
prepared to submit individual judgment to the wisdom
of the majority, and to lay down personal preferences
on the altar of party success. When our candidates
are nominated we will all join, heart and soul, in
the grand chorus of rejoicing. . . .124
Another keynoter merely asked "that a spirit of patriotism

121proceedings, 1892, p. 12.

1 2 2 ^ ^ 3 Ei^hu Root was ,being escorted to the plat
form following a bitter seven-hour debate over his election,
several delegates rose and shouted:
"Receiver of stolen
goods
•^•^Proceedings, 1912, p. 89.
124 p r o c eedings , 1888, p. 12.
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and harmony will guide us.

. . ."125

still another speaker

said that he realized that some delegates "will at first
favor one man, some another, but we shall all strive to
obtain the best man; and when the choice is ultimately made
I trust we shall all feel that we have succeeded.

. . ."126

A final example can be taken from the 1916 speech of keynoter
Harding.

In referring to the vicious 1912 convention, the

speaker said:
We did not do very well in making for harmony the
last time w e met.
[Laughter and applause.]
The
country has regretted, let us forget— and make
amends to our country. . . . Let us forget the
differences, and find new inspiration and new com
pensation in an united endeavor to restore the
country. . . .127
Such appeals for harmony and unity have been frequent in
Republican national conventions.
Supporting Materials for Unity
and Harmony Theme
Unlike the two themes discussed earlier in this
chapter, the unity and harmony theme lacks any significant
repetitive characteristics of supporting materials.
Summary
Appeals for unity and harmony constitute the third
major theme of the Republican keynoters, occurring in over

^•^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1860, p. 86.
126pr0ceedings, 1872, p. 7.
l^^Proceedings, 1916, p. 14.
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four-fifths of the speeches and in every convention since
1920.

Most such appeals were brief and perfunctory except

(1 ) when the party is leaderless or badly split, and (2 )
when a floor fight developed over the selection of the key
note speaker.

This unity theme lacks any characteristic

forms of supporting material.

Apparently, the delegates,

outsiders, and Republican leaders were correct in their
observation that one of the purposes of the keynote speech
is to stimulate the delegates' desire for harmony and unity
within the party.
According to many texts on public speaking or per
suasion, appeals to patriotism or loyalty can often be of
value to the speaker, whether the speech be deliberative,
forensic, or ceremonial.

A fourth major theme of the

Republican keynoters focused on such motive appeals.
America is Wonderful!
A fourth theme that appeared frequently in the twentyeight keynote speeches stated that "America is wonderful!"
Although this idea did not appear as often as the three
themes discussed previously,

it was employed with enough

regularity to merit brief attention.

The keynoters stated a

variety of reasons why their listeners should believe that
America is wonderful, including:
motives;

(1) our humanitarian

(2 ) our manifest destiny— some said ordained by

God— others were less presumptuous?

(3) our "spiritual
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heritage";

(4) our concern for the dignity of the individual;

(5) our belief in the importance of education;
"perfect" form of government;
helped make it great;

(7) our party (Republican)

(8 ) our free enterprise system;

our desire for continual progress;
character";
vigor;

(13) our agricultural skills;

standard of

(9)

(10 ) our "fine basic

(11 ) our natural resources;

labor force;

(6 ) our

(12 ) our youth and

(14) our excellent

(15) our industrial capacity; and (16) our
l

i

v

i

n

g

.

^28

Only two of these reasons were pre

sented with sufficient regularity to merit discussion.
Appeals designed to show American prosperity outnumbered all
other appeals by a ratio of over four to one.

The second

most frequently stated reason for American greatness was
based on the desirability of our form of government.
(Although a third reason will be discussed in this portion
of the analysis, it consists of a combination of several of
the sixteen items stated earlier.)
Over half of the Republican keynote speakers contended
that one important reason why "America is Wonderful!" was due
to our prosperity.

The 1940 keynoter said that America "has

given to our people the highest standard of living in the

•*-^®This list is by no means exhaustive, but the nature
of the remaining reasons can be typified by Harding1s reason
ing: America is wonderful because our form of government is
wonderful; the founding fathers established our wonderful
form of government; therefore, the founding fathers were
divinely inspired.
(Proceedings, 1916, p. 16.)
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1954 keynoter reminded his listeners that

world. "129

"capitalism in the United States has brought us to the
highest standard of living in the history of the world.
. .

13 0

Although the 1956 keynoter said that our "idealism

and our faith in God" were more "meaningful than our material
wealth," the speaker also said that "America stands today as
the richest, freest, finest country in the world.

We live

in a land of abundance, a land rich in resources.

We are a

prosperous people.

. . ."131

still another keynoter pointed

out "that we are in the midst of an unparalleled material
development.

. . ."132

several speakers were more specific

in their development of this theme.

The 1960 keynoter, for

example, said that American workers,
. . . have better food and clothing for themselves
and their families, more homes, more automobiles,
more refrigerators, more T V 1s , more free time for
study, for recreation, for sports, for travel, for
whatever.133
Still other speakers spoke of "high wages," "control over
inflationary pressures," or listed the luxuries available to
Americans.

1 2 9 p r o c e e d i n a s , 1940, p.
1 3 0 n a tfield, 1964,
n a t i o n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , p.

55.

tex t s u p p l i e d b y R e p u b l i c a n
8.

1 3 1 p r o c e ed i n q S , 1956, p.

82.

1 3 2 p r o c e e d i n q s , 1924, p.

28.

133Walter Judd, 1960, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p. 10.
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In addition to prosperity, several of the keynoters
thought that our form of government was a major factor in
American greatness.

In 1916, for example, the keynoter

expressed this point of view:
It is not alone the miracle of accomplishment which
deepens our reverence? it is not alone the con
viction that we have builded the first, seemingly
dependable, popular government on the earth and
exalted all its citizenship, which adds to our faith;
but we are the oldest of existing civilized nations,
with one passing exception, continued under one form
of government, and under that form we have developed
the highest standard of living in all the world.
Surely we must be right.
( A p p l a u s e . ) 134
This idyllic view of our governmental system was also ex
pressed by the 1912 keynote speaker, when he said that
"nowhere on earth" were the "true ends of government more
fully secured . . . than in the life of America
today.

. . .1,135
Still a third group of speakers preferred to support

their claim that "America is wonderfuli" by combining a
number of the reasons mentioned earlier in the discussion.
The 1964 keynoter, for.example, stated:
We have faith that the American nation and system will
prevail against the Communist menace that stalks and
threats to"bury us and against the Fascist that lurks
and threatens to capture u s . . . . A n d , we have the
energy, the knowledge of the enemy, and the faith in
freedom that will maintain our liberty against either
danger.
We have faith in our educational system, as
the foundation of self-government, as the mainspring
of economic progress, at [.sic] source of brain power

■^^Proceedings, 1916, p. 16.
135Proceedings, 1912, p. 98.
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for the defense of the state. We have faith in the
free enterprise system in the Republican Party.
(Applause.)1^6
A final example of this combined support for the "America is
wonderful!" theme can be taken from Root's 1912 speech:
That nowhere on earth is there such unfettered scope
for the independence of individual manhood; nowhere
greater security and competency for the family home;
nowhere more universal advantages of education for
rich and poor alike; nowhere such universal response
for all demands of charity and noble plans for re
lieving the distress and improving the condition of
mankind; nowhere a more ready quickening of public
spirit under the influence of high ideals . . . than
in the life of America today. . . .137
Although Republican keynoters listed a variety of reasons
for American greatness, only several can be labeled as
characteristic:
prosperity;

(1) America is wonderful because of her

(2) America is great because of her form of

government; or (3) America is wonderful because of a combina
tion of these reasons.
Supporting Materials Used with the

"America

is wonderful 11 Theme
Since the keynoters could assume a partisan attitude
toward their expressions of American greatness, it is little
wonder that the supporting materials for this theme primarily
consist of assertions and appeals to patriotism.

1 3 6 ^ ^ Hatfield, 1964, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, pp. 7- 8 .
137prOCeedinqs, 1912, p. 98.
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Logical proofs.— Although several keynoters supported
their ideas on this theme with specific instances, compari
sons, statistics, and causal reasoning, assertion outnumbered
all other forms of support by a ratio of over ten to o n e .
(The examples cited earlier should suffice to indicate the
exact nature of these assertions.)
Emotional proofs.— As might be expected by the nature
of the arguments, those keynoters who thought that American
greatness was characterized by her prosperity primarily
relied on appeals to ownership or possession; on the other
hand, the speakers who stated that American greatness
resulted from the form of government depended on appeals to
loyalty and patriotism.

When advocating the prosperity

point of view, only one out of every five speakers would
include any emotional appeals whatever with his assertions.
Even in these instances, the appeals were indirect or implied
— the listener was left to draw the obvious conclusion that
higher wages, lack of inflation, and more leisure time would
be of personal benefit to him.
For those speakers who advocated that American great
ness resulted from our governmental structure, the opposite
ratio of assertion to emotional appeal resulted.

Appeals to

patriotism and loyalty outnumbered all other forms of support
by about five to one.

In contrast to the appeals used with

the prosperity position, the emotional proofs used with the
governmental position were neither indirect nor implied.

In
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stressing the impact of our system of government, the 1916
keynoter said:
In building the surpassing temple of the Republic,
which we have been doing to the astonishment, some
times the envy, sometimes the admiration of the
world, and oftentimes inspiring others by our
example, there will ever be modifications. . . to
meet the public need and conform to popular ideals.
. . . The wisdom of representative popular govern
ment is proven in the surpassing achievement. . . .138
The 1912 keynoter was even more explicit in his appeal to
patriotism:
We shall not apologize for American institutions.
We cherish with gratitude and reverence the memory
of the great men who devised the American constitu
tional system— their unselfish patriotism, their
love of liberty and justice, their lofty conception
of human rights, their deep insight into the strength
and the weakness of human nature, their wise avoidance
of the dangers which had wrecked all preceding attempts
at popular government, their breadth of view which
adapted the system they devised to the progress and
development of a great people.
We will be loyal to
the principles they declared and to the spirit of
liberty and progress, of justice and security, which
they breathed into that immortal instrument.139
These two examples of emotional proof are representative of
those employed to support the theme that "America is wonder
ful" due to her form of government.
Ethical proofs.— Ethical proofs are not characteris
tically employed with the theme that "America is wonderful!"
(Although some ethos is evident in the quotations used
throughout this section of the analysis, these instances of

^-38procee<^£nCTS^ 1916, p. 16.
139proceedings, 1912, p. 97.
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ethical proof are incidental to the other two inodes of
proof.)
Summary
A fourth theme that is characteristic of Republican
keynoting states that "American is wonderfulI"

Although the

speakers offered numerous reasons for America's greatness,
two reasons were listed more often than any others:

(1 )

America is wonderful because of our prosperity, high standard
of living, and general material wealth;

(2) America is wonder

ful because of our form of government.

Several keynoters

supported this theme by presenting a combined list of
reasons for American greatness.
Speakers who supported the prosperity idea relied on
four-fifths assertion and one-fifth implied emotional appeals
to ownership and possession.

Speakers who preferred the

governmental importance position supported their stand by
employing four-fifths appeals to patriotism and loyalty, and
one-fifth assertion.

The emotional proofs supporting the

latter position (importance of government) were much more
forceful and direct than those used with the prosperity idea.
The purpose of such a theme in Republican keynoting
is probably multiple.

The most obvious reason for the

speakers to state that "America is wonderful!" is to instill
pride in the auditors.
its merits,

Pride alone, however, regardless of

is inadequate as a purposive political tool.

Consequently, the Republican keynoters attempted to
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associate American greatness with the G.O.P., implying some
degree of causality in the association of the two.
Our Fiscal Policies Are Excellent
One of the alleged characteristics of the Republican
party is their concern for fiscal "responsibility."

The

fifth dominant theme that appeared in the speeches of the
keynoters centered around various aspects of fiscal policy.
Arguments based on financial policy usually were expressed
by three frequently occurring propositions:

(1 ) the federal

government must be run efficiently on a "business-like"
basis;

(2 ) that the national debt must be paid (or at least

reduced);

(3) that a sound currency was vital to the nation's

economic stability.

The twenty-eight keynote speeches reveal

that Republican fiscal policies have changed since they were
first expounded in Theodore Pomeroy's 1876 keynote address.
Although the Republican speakers have consistently stressed
the need for efficiency and freedom from controls, certain
variations have occurred:
1.

Unmitigated praise for Republican economic poli

cies was modified soon after the turn of the century.

At

this time several keynoters admitted the need for certain
reforms.

In 1908, for example, what keynoter Burrows called

"our recent financial disturbance," prompted a closer exami
nation of fiscal policies.

Burrows stated that there "is

something inherently defective in the system itself, which
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can only be reached by a thorough overhauling."

Burrows was

quick to defend Republican monetary policy, however, for he
stated that such a fiscal policy,
. . . [while] confessedly defective in its inability
to respond at all times to the varying and exacting
demands of trade, yet, during the forty-five years
of its existence, has served a wise and beneficient
purpose.140
A later keynoter echoed the same phrases, stating that "the
national currency . . .
conditions.
2.

is no longer adapted to our changed

It is inelastic."141
Certain controls and regulations upon the national

economic structure were first abhorred; in later years they
were labeled as artificial, socialistic, or temporary.
Actually, it was not until the Second World War that keynote
speakers began to admit the necessity for certain kinds of
economic regulative policy.

Senator Steiwer's 1936 keynote

speech typified Republican hostility to the economic
"experimentation of the New Dealers."

The speaker said that

140proceedincTS, 1908, p. 40. The period of transi
tion was obviously incomplete at this point, for Senator
Burrows promptly itemized the beneficial results of the "con
fessedly defective" policy which had restored public credit,
established the gold standard, standardized the currency,
and lowered the national debt by $103,996,420.
(Ibid.)
141proceedings, 1912, p. 90. Senator Root explained
that the Republican administration had established a Monetary
Commission to study the problem and that the commission's
findings were being considered by the Congress.
(At this
point in his discussion, Root stated that it is for the
"interest of every business man in the United States that the
party controlling the government [the Republicans] should not
be changed until this policy has been carried into execu
tion.")
(Proceedings, 1912, p. 93.)
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the New Deal, politicians
. . . [tell] us that prosperity has been returned
through their efforts.
The improvement that has
come has been largely purchased at the expense of
the public treasury, and we have paid for more
prosperity than we have received.
Improvement
purchased on credit is a dear luxury, uncertain
to this generation— unjust to the next. When
national resources and credit are exhausted, the
Nation will find itself face to face with these
unpleasant facts:
that purchased business
activity is not enduring; that our duty to the 10
million unemployed has not been met; and, further
more, that the power of the Federal Government to
provide for those who are destitute has been
frittered away until the Nation itself has become
destitute.142
Apparently unwilling to accept the principle of direct
governmental spending as a spur to the economy, Steiwer
argued " . . .

[that] no one would advocate reform ahead of

recovery except the reformers who can experiment and exploit
only when the people are in distress."143
The first inroads upon the stubborn theme of "natural"
Republican economic policies as opposed to "artificial"
Democratic experimentation were not fully expressed until
the 1940 convention.

Keynoter Stassen began his argument

with the same old Republican economic theme song that "the
great productive processes of a free people under a system
of individual enterprise have made this nation the great
power that it is."
It has given to our people the highest standard of

142p roceed i n g s , 1936, p. 37.
143p roceedinq S , 1936, p. 38.
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living in the world.
This system has been and will
be subject to depressions and its recessions, its
maladjustments and readjustments as the years roll
by. We must recognize that government should furnish
a cushion against the sharper fluctuations of this
economic system, but that it cannot successfully
furnish a bed upon which society can go to sleep. . . .144
The latter part of Stassen's argument is the first admission
by a Republican Keynoter that governmental control of
economic fluctuations is not necessarily undesirable, arti
ficial, or un-American.

Although several later keynoters

implied that there was something less than "real Americanism"
in certain Democratic economic policies, it was not until
1956 that a Republican keynoter labeled them as "social
istic."

The keynoter stated:

After World War II was over, the Democrats fought to
keep socialistic war controls over every phase of a
free American life, and when a Republican Congress
restored freedom to the people the Democrats pre
dicted wild and wanton inflation and economic
disaster, but it did not happen. . . . The Demo
crats claimed that we could not relax controls and
maintain economic stability; yet, we did it.145
By 1960, the Republican keynoters had moved from "artifici
ality" to "socialistic" and back to "artificiality" again.
Although the 1960 keynoter did not label Democratic controls
as "artificial," he referred to them as "temporary":
It is the obligation of the Republican Party and
its members to show that loose fiscal policies,
while temporarily gratifying, in the end inhibit
growth rather than expand it. . . .

•^^Proceedings, 1940, p. 55.
•*-45procee<^jnq S , 1 9 5 6 , pp. 81-82.
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. . . the first requirement was to stabilize our
economy and slow down the inflation . . . how
could inflation best be checked? The Democrats
clamored for more controls. President Eisenhower
announced he would take off the controls. . . .
we achieved stability not by changing our free
system, but by using it.
It works better than
those of little faith in the American people give
it credit for.^46
The chronological development of these two aspects of Repub
lican fiscal policy is designed to point out that although
financial matters are a major theme of the keynoters, the
attitudes on fiscal policies are far from static.

Further

more, even though virtually every keynoter discussed some
aspect of Republican fiscal policy, the preceding discussion
indicates the improbability that their positions were
identical.

Consequently, about the only true characteristic

of Republican fiscal policy at this point is that Republican
keynoters do not favor "temporary" or "artificial" controls
over the "American system of free enterprise."
3.

Democratic spending has usually been labeled as

excessive, although this criticism occurred most frequently
during the period from 1932 to 1944.

This third area of

financial policy is much more consistent and repetitive than
the two items just mentioned.

As early as 1876, a Republican

keynoter said that the Democratic party
. . . claims to accept the situation respecting the
sacredness of the national debt and the inviolability
of the national credit, and yet $20 ,000,000 of

14€>Judd, text supplied by Republican national head
quarters, p. 9.
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taxation will not make good the annual loss to the
American people, from the undefined and undefinable
attitude and intentions of that party in regard to
the payment of the principal of the public debt.147
A similar concern for Democratic spending was expressed by
the 1916 keynoter.

After enumerating the economic changes

that had occurred since the party last convened, the speaker
quipped:
There are new wonders and new hindrances in commerce,
changed balances of trade, new marvels in finance and
utterly changed economic conditions. . . . Everything
is abnormal except the depleted condition of the
federal treasury, which is characteristic of Democratic
control, and the facility of the administration for
writing varied notes without effective notice. . . .148
For the next sixteen years, even in the midst of the depres
sion , the Republican keynoters continued to stress the same
three financial propositions, especially excessive Democratic
spending and the need for a balanced budget.

In 1932, the

keynoter said that 11a balanced budget was the first essen
tial to economic recovery." 149

i<he speaker said that the

Democrats in the House and Senate "proposed billions in bond
issues for unnecessary and unproductive public works, pre
sumably on the theory that when your budget is unbalanced—
when your outgo exceeds your income— you can squander your
self into prosperity.

. . ."150

Continuing to overlook the

147p roC;eedincrs, 1876, p. 9.
148proceedinqs, 1916, p. 17.
149proceedinqs, 1932, p. 23.
1^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1932, pp. 25-26
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present economic condition of the country, Dickinson said
that "the Republican Party is still the party of sound money,
and of wise and conservative fiscal policies . . . the Hoover
Administration has rigidly adhered to this fundamental
Republican doctrine."

Dickinson concluded this portion of

his argument by cautioning against any form of "fiscal
experiments" that would endanger the national financial
s t r u c t u r e 1^1

As late as 1964, Republican keynoters were

still critical of Democratic spending, for the 1964 conven
tion keynoter stated:

"...

the complexities of the present

can not be met . . . by spending large sums of money on illconsidered programs that deal only with symptoms and not the
causes.

. . ."152

-j-t seems evident that one of the most ■

pervasive elements of Republican fiscal policy is concern
for a balanced budget (or reducing the national debt and
avoiding further deficit spending).

Although such criticism

of Democratic spending has been occurring with a high degree
of regularity since 1876, the criticism was most vitriolic
during the lengthy administration of President Franklin
Roosevelt.

l^lproceedings, 1932, p. 26.

(Underlining is my own.)

l ^ M a r k Hatfield, 1964, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p. 4.
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Supporting Materials Employed With the "Our
Fiscal Policies Are Excellent" Theme
Unlike the first four major themes discussed in this
chapter, the fifth theme is characterized by a preponderance
of logical proof over emotional and ethical proofs.

In

order to prove that their fiscal policies were sound and
superior to those of the Democrats, the Republican keynote
speakers used a variety of logical, ethical, and emotional
p roofs.
Logical proofs.— Republican keynoters employed
numerous types of logical proofs to show that their fiscal
policies were excellent.

In addition to assertion and gen

eralization, the most predominant kinds of proof were
examples, causal reasoning, comparison, and statistics.
To illustrate the keynoters 1 use of examples and
specific instances, we can examine the statement of the 1936
keynoter:
Let us consider the accumulation of the last three
long years.
For the fiscal year ending June 30,
1934, the deficit was approximately four billion
dollars.
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935,
it was in excess of three and a half billion dollars.
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, and elimi
nating any requirement for the payment of the soldiers'
bonus, the deficit is between three and a half and
four billion dollars.153
The 1896 keynoter praised Republican financial policy by
listing specific examples of Democratic fiscal failures.

3-53proceeaings, 1936, pp. 43-44.

193
The speaker stated:
Look at its ante-bellum currency record I Consider
its hostility to the currency rendered necessary by
the exigency of war; and, later, its efforts to in
flate the currency in a time of peace by the issue
of greenbacks.154
Without exception, every keynoter who discussed the excel
lence of Republican fiscal policy employed at least one
example or specific instance to support his argument.

In

addition to the use of example, however, a second favorite
logical proof was causal reasoning.
Many of the keynoters employed cause-to-effeet,
effect-to-effeet, and effect-to-cause reasoning to support
Republican financial policy.

In 1896, for example, the

speaker stated:
A change from the present standard to the low silver
standard would cut down the recompense of labor,
reduce the value of the savings in savings banks and
building and loan associations, salaries and incomes
would shrink, pensions would be cut in two, the bene
ficiaries of life insurance would suffer, in short,
the injury would be so universal and far reaching that
a radical change can be contemplated only with the
gravest apprehension.155
The 1936 keynoter also employed causal reasoning when he
said:
By July 1 the present administration will have in
creased the national debt more than 14 billion
dollars, and has announced that before a balanced
budget can be obtained there will be a further in
crease of several additional billions.
I warn you
that if America is to survive, debt expansion must

-^^Proceedings, 1896, p. 30.

155proceefl^nqS # 1896, p. 31.
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be ended.
A resolute and uncompromising purpose
to secure a balanced budget and honest assurances
of reduction in debt are essential to restoration
of public confidence.
Then the business world
will know there will be no further devaluation of
the dollar; that we will no longer stand at the
brink of inflation; that there will be no further
repudiation of public obligations; and that there
will be no additional exactions by the tax col
lector.
These essential assurances will start in
motion the wheels of industry.
(Applause.)156
Still another typical example of argument from causality can
be observed in the speech of the 1924 keynoter:
Among the pending issues of the day economy in
public expenditures and reduction of taxation must
assume the utmost importance.
The Federal Govern
ment, States, and communities have been engaging
in a riot of lavish expenditures, attended by
mounting indebtedness.
The burden of increased
taxation must shackle enterprise and diminish
employment.
It adds almost crushing weight to
the cost of living and closes the doors of oppor
tunity.
Excessive public expenditures create a
fatal example, stimulating prodigality and waste
among all the people in every form of activity.
Public economy promotes individual initiative and
prevents that reliance upon paternalistic govern
ment which weakens the morale of any people and
brings with it the depressing rule of bureaucracy.
(Applause.)157
These examples are typical of the causal reasoning employed
by Republican keynoters to glorify their financial policies.
In addition to examples and causal reasoning, many of
the keynote speakers relied on analogy and comparison to
demonstrate the worth of Republican fiscal policy.

In 1936,

for example, the keynoter said:
The administration has demonstrated that it is unable

156proceedinqs , 1936, p. 42.
157proceedinqs , 1924, p. 24.
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to obtain even a semblance of prosperity except by
buying it, and its purchases are on a basis so vast
and so impractical that they ultimately would destroy
America.
By midsummer the amount of their spending
will equal the value of all the farm land and all the
farm buildings in the United States, and the New Deal
harvest is yet to come. . . .158
The 1916 keynote speaker employed comparison when he said:
The Democratic party is always concerned about the
American consumer.
Our Republican achievement is
the making of a nation of prospering producers.
. . . Far better a high cost of living and ability
to buy than a lowering of cost attended by destruc
tion of purchasing capacity.
(Applause.)159
Still another keynoter compared per capita expenses during
several different years:
As an illustration of present conditions, the per
capita expenses of the United States Government in
the fiscal year of 1910 were $7.74; in 1919, the
year of the peak of expenses, they were $173.54; and
for the last year they were $33.44, more than four
fold those of 1910.150
The final type of characteristic supporting material to be
discussed in connection with the financial policy theme is
statistics.
The Republican keynoters frequently employed statis
tics to show that the G.O.P. fiscal policies were admirable.
In some cases the speakers used statistical data that were
virtually impossible to present orally with any degree of
intelligibility.

In 1904, for example, the keynoter pre

sented a mass of statistical data when he stated:

158p r o c e e d i n q s , 1936, pp. 41-42.

-^-^Proceedingst 1 9 1 6 , p. 21.
^^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1924, p. 24.
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On the 1st of March 1897, when the first adminis
tration of McKinley began, we had in the country,
including bullion in the Treasury, $1, 806, 272, 076.
This was $23.14 per capita for our population, and
of this 38.893 was gold.
On the 1st of March, 1901,
when the second administration of McKinley began,
the money in the country was $2,467,295,228.
This
was $28.34 per capita, and of this 45.273 per cent
was gold. On the 1st of May last the money in the
country was $2,814,985,446, which was $31.02 per
capita, and of it 48.028 per cent was g o l d . l ^ T
The statistical supports employed by the 1924 keynoter were
equally difficult to comprehend:
As a proof of the futility of these high taxes, it
is to be noted that in 1916 when the total surtaxes
were $121,900,000 and the highest rate 13 per cent,
$81,400,000 of these taxes were collected from
incomes in excess of $300,000,* but in 1921, when
surtax collections were $411,300,000, over three
times as great, under a maximum rate of 65 per
cent, the collections from incomes of $300,000
and over were only about $3,000,000 more than in
1916, or $84,700,000. . . .162
Other speakers, however, were clearer in their presentation
of the statistical information regarding fiscal matters.

In

1936, for example, the speaker stated that under "this
administration average wages have increased about 8 percent
while the cost of living has increased approximately 20 per
cent ."-^3

Still another speaker stated that prices "which

had been rising alarmingly— 48% in the seven Truman years—
promptly leveled off and stayed practically stable for four

161proceedingS , 1904, p. 35.
162proceedlnqs. 1924, p. 25.
l^3Proceedings, 1936, p. 42.
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years.

The total rise in prices . . .

is less than 10%."164

Although several speakers relied on explanation, description,
authority, definition, or narration to support their argu
ments on fiscal policy, only the four types of supporting
materials just mentioned can be labeled as characteristic—
examples, causal reasoning, comparison, and statistics.
Emotional and ethical proofs.— In discussing Republi
can fiscal policies, virtually all of the keynoters relied
on logical proofs more heavily than on ethical or emotional
appeals.

Although the keynoters employed a wide variety of

both ethos and pat h o s, neither mode of proof tended to show
consistent or regular lines of development.
Summary
A fifth major theme that characterized the twentyeight Republican keynote speeches stated that 11our fiscal
policies are excellent."

This financial theme was most

often expressed by three frequently occurring and often
interrelated propositions:

(1 ) the federal government must

be run efficiently on a "business-like basis";
national debt must be paid

(2 ) that the

(or at least reduced); and (3)

that a sound currency was vital to the nation1s economic
stability.

Although the keynoters consistently stressed the

need for efficiency and freedom from controls, several

^64Walter Judd, 1960, text supplied by Republican
national headquarters, p. 9.
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variations occurred in the development of the three finan
cial propositions:

(1) unmitigated praise for Republican

economic policies was modified soon after the turn of the
century.

At this time, several keynoters admitted the need

for certain reforms;

(2 ) certain controls and regulations

upon the national economic structure were first abhorred; in
later years they were labeled as artificial, socialistic, or
temporary.

It was not until the Second World War that key

noters began to admit the necessity for certain kinds of
economic regulative policy;

(3) although the keynoters have

consistently labeled Democratic spending as excessive, these
charges seemed to increase in frequency and vehemence during
the period from 1932 to 1944.

Supporting materials for this

financial theme were primarily logical, with examples, causal
reasoning, comparison, and statistics being more character
istic.
The Centralization of Power is Dangerous; We Are
Concerned About the Individual
American Citizen
A sixth major theme expounded by the Republican key
note speakers linked two propositions related to the power
of the government versus the freedom of the individual.
Over three-fourths of the keynoters argued that the central- .
ization of power was dangerous and that the Republican party
was concerned about the individual American citizen.

Although

both of these propositions occurred regularly, they received
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particular emphasis following wars and during the New Deal
era.
In 1924, for example, the keynoter warned against the
dangers of control by a central government agency, and urged
freedom for the individual citizen:
Let us secure for every individual the greatest
possible equality of opportunity and leave to the
States and minor political divisions a broad field
of activity in their proper sphere. . . . Thus we
shall avoid an unwieldy central government in con
stant danger of toppling over. . . .165
In I960, the keynoter developed both propositions simul
taneously:
We Republicans deeply believe that the first function
of a good government is to protect the liberty of the
individual citizen, not to take it away. . . . There
have never been but two basic philosophies of govern
ment— government from the bottom up, and government
from the- top down. . . . One group begins with the
assumption that the more complex and complicated a
society becomes, the more its control and management
must be centralized in an increasingly powerful
government. . . .
We are not against adequate Federal Government.
There must be such government to prevent abuses of
power. We merely want to keep it limited to its
proper fields, so that the liberty of individuals
will be protected. . . .166
Still other keynoters, including Warren (1944), Green (1948),
and MacArthur (1952), warned of the federal government's
usurpation of the rights of individuals, states, and com
munities.

This same theme was expressed somewhat more

1 6 5 p r o c e e d i n g s , 1924, p.

27.

•^^Judd, text supplied by Republican national head
quarters, p. 12.
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emotionally by the 1880 keynoter:
National wealth may exist, manufactures may flourish,
commerce may increase, in a nation whose people are
degraded and enslaved.
The keynote of every Republi
can union, is found in its respect for the dignity of
the individual man.
Until that becomes the pervading
principle of the Republic, from Canada to the Gulf,
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, our mission is not
ended.167
These examples are representative of the keynoters' attempts
to show that the centralization of power is dangerous and
that the G.O.P. was concerned for the individual liberties
of the citizen.
Supporting Materials for "Centralized Power
Versus Individual" Theme
Republican keynoters employed a variety of methods to
show that the centralization of power was dangerous and that
Republicans were concerned about the individual American
citizen.

Only one of these modes of support, however, can

properly be labeled as characteristic of the theme.1®®

The

emotional appeal to freedom from restraint appeared far more
often than any other form of support, including both ethical
and logical appeals.

In 1936, for example, the keynoter said

that centralization of power
. . . i s the Siamese twin of bureaucracy.

1 6 7 p r o C e e d i n g s , 1880, p.

Expensive

7.

Although many of the speakers implied that the
centralization of power was dangerous, threatening, ominous,
evil, or foreboding, the motive appeal to sheer fear was
seldom stated explicitly.
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and arbitrary, its supreme evil is greed for
money and power. History shows that centralized
autocracy invariably seeks to build itself greater
and stronger on the ruins of the people's liber
ties.
It reaches for control of the education of
children and the formation of thought, and finally
all human rights, including religious freedom, must
yield to its tyranny.169
Although the 1912 keynoter utilized the same appeal to free
dom from restraint, his approach was much less emotionally
phrased:
Ihe Republican party will maintain the power and
honor of the nation, but we still observe those
limitations which the constitution sets up for
the preservation of local self-government. This
country is so large and the conditions of life are
so varied that it would be intolerable to have the
local and domestic affairs of our home communities,
which involve no national rights, controlled by
majorities made up in other states thousands of
miles away or by the officials of a central govern
ment.
A final example of this kind of appeal can be taken from the
speech of the 1944 keynoter.

In his attacks on the central

ized power of the New Deal, the speaker stated:
These bureaucrats of the New Deal tell the farmer
what to sow and when to reap— sometimes without
regard for either the seeds or the season. . . .
They require him to work in the field all day and
keep books for the government all night. . . .
They tell the worker what union he shall join, what
dues he shall pay, and to whom he may pay them.
They soon will tell the worker where he can work and
where he cannot work. . . .
These bureaucrats encumber the small businessman
with a multitude of rules, regulations, orders and
decrees which entangle him, stifle his business, and

169proceedings, 1936, p. 35.
17Oproceedings, 1912, p. 98.
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darken his future.
They move in, like political
commissars, to watch over the shoulders of our
industrialists, to say what, where and how indus
try can produce.l^l

Summary
A sixth major theme of the Republican keynoters stated
that the centralization of power was dangerous and that the
Republican party was concerned about the individual American
citizen.

Even though three-fourths of the keynote speakers

dealt with this theme, it received particular emphasis
following wars and during the administration of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Although a wide variety of supporting

materials were employed in connection with the theme, the
only characteristic appeal was to freedom from restraint.
Although the seventh, eighth, and ninth major themes
were frequently discussed separately in the various keynote
speeches, they were often linked together by the keynoters.
These themes stated that Republican policies benefited all
segments of the American economy.
Our Policies Provide an Impetus for Business and Manufactur
ing; Our Policies Are of Benefit to Agriculture;
Our Policies Aid the Labor Force
As early as 1872, Republican keynoters attempted to
show that their p a r t y ’s policies were beneficial to all people,

171

Proceedings, 1944, p. 54.
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including the "laboring masses, wherever and however
employed, in town or country.

. . ."172

still another key

noter said that the Republican party wanted to protect "our
farmers and manufacturers, and to insure the steady and
remunerative employment to those who labor."173

The 1908

keynoter attempted to be more specific by listing the
economic growth of the nation in terms of flocks, herds,
coal, gold, savings accounts, cotton, silk, shipping, and
exports.

The speaker summarized by stating:

This record of material activity in field and forest,
factory and farm, mines and mills during the last
four years might be indefinitely extended, but this
will suffice to show the development and robust con
dition of our industrial life.174
These examples will illustrate the attempts of the Republican
keynoters to appear impartial toward any particular segment
of the economy.

A more detailed examination of these three

themes, however, reveals that labor, agriculture, and busi
ness were not given equal consideration by the Republican
keynote speakers.

In order to examine these differences in

treatment, each of these three themes will be discussed
briefly.

•^^Proceedings, 1872, p. 7.
17^Proceedings. 1900, pp. 35-36.
174proceedings. 1908, p. 31.
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Our Policies Provide an Impetus
for Business and Manufacturing
Many Republican keynoters stated that "our policies
provide an impetus for business and manufacturing."

Many of

these same speakers, however, were exceedingly vague in rela
tion to the G.O.P. position on trusts and large monolithic
corporations.

In. 1888, for example, the keynoter said that

the Republican party was strongly opposed to ". . . all
unlawful combination and unjust exaction of aggregated
capital and corporate power.

. . ."175

other keynoters

skirted the trust issue and were more general:

"It is the

purpose of_the Republican party not only to develop our
domestic trade, but to extend our commerce into the utter
most parts of the earth."176

still other keynoters were a

bit sensitive about the trust'issue.

In 1900, for example,

the keynoter stated:
Whenever a Republican administration is in power
there is constant talk of trusts.
The reason is
not far to seek. Aggregations and combinations of
capital find their only encouragement in pros
perous days and widening commerce. Democratic
administration in this country has universally
meant industrial stagnation and cgmmercial depres
sion, when capital seeks a hiding place instead of
investment.177
After Theodore Roosevelt's much publicized "trust-busting,"
1904 keynoter Root was careful to explain that, "no

175p roceedincrs, 1888, p. 13.
176pr0ceedincrs, 1896, p. 31.
177p roceedings, 1900, p. 38.
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investment in lawful business has been jeopardized, no fair
and honest enterprise has been injured.

. . ,"178

The 1916

keynoter, unlike several of his predecessors, did not mention
the elimination of trusts; rather, after arguing that the
Democrats were hostile to American industry and business
success, the speaker stated:
No honest business in this country is too big to be
good and useful, or too little to be protected and
encouraged and both big and little deserve the
American shield against destruction. . . . Business
and its agencies of transportation are so insepara
ble from each other and from the common weal that
the political party which does not pledge them a
square d e a l , no more and no less, does not deserve
the confidence of the people.
The strength of the
business heart shows in every countenance in all
the land, and the weakness of that heart holds a
nation ill. We must strengthen the heart of
American business in government co-operation rather
than official opposition.
The final stage in the keynoters 1 development of the business
theme did not appear until 1936, when the keynoter attacked
governmental controls on industry as well as direct govern
ment spending:
Government regimentation of business works to destroy
business.
Business half-slave, half-free, cannot
pay adequate wages and cannot adequately serve the
consumer.
The direct competition of government

1 7 8 p r o c e e d i n c r s , 1904, p.

39.

179proceedincrs, 1916, p. 23. The extent to which
"business" considerations dominated the Republican party's
value system is readily apparent in the speech of the 1924
keynoter:
"The adoption of policies for the exclusion of
Japanese immigrants by no means implies any claim of their
inferiority, but . . . in standards of living, which render
them uncongenial to our industrial way of life. . . ."
(Proceedings, 1924, p. 22.)

206
in business uses the money of all of the people to
destroy the property of a part of the people. 180
Thus, although Republican policies regarding business and
manufacturing were not always concise or well articulated,
these policies were much more consistent and more fundamental
to the party's philosophy than were arguments concerned with
labor or agriculture.

In order to examine these differences,

it would be well to scrutinize precisely why the Republican
keynoters felt that their "policies were of benefit to
agriculture."
Our Policies Are of Benefit to Agriculture
An examination of the keynoters' claims that "our
policies are of benefit to agriculture," reveals several
major shifts in Republican agricultural policy.

During the

period prior to 1900, no keynoter discussed Republican agri
cultural policies in depth.
stated that the G.O.P.
American agriculture.

"stands for the protection . . .

flagrant wrong to the farmers of the

. . ."182 orj that the Republican party

wanted to "protect our farmers."183

180proceedings, 1936, p. 34.
181proceedings, 1888, p. 13.
182p roceedings, 1896, p. 29.
^-^ P r o c eedings

of

. . -"181 or( that certain Democratic

policies were ". . . a
United States.

Rather, the speakers typically

t 1872,

p. 7.
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The keynote speeches given after the turn of the
century expressed considerably more concern for the farmer.
In 1904, for example, the keynoter said,

"that the Department

of Agriculture has been brought to a point of efficiency and
. practical benefit never before known."

The speaker concluded:

To increase the profit of the farmer's toil, to
protect the farmer's product and extend his market,
and to improve the conditions of the farmer's life;
to advance the time when America shall raise with
in. her own limits every product of the soil consumed
by her people . . . — these have been cardinal
objectives of Republican administration. . . .184
Another keynoter was even more specific in his praise of the
Department of Agriculture:
The Agricultural Department has continued its work
in promoting the interest of the farmers by
diversifying their products; supplying new and
valuable seeds and plants especially adapted to
our climate and soil; eradicating diseases which
. infest and destroy animal and vegetable
life. . . .185
1920 marks still another transition in the keynoters'
statements regarding agricultural policy.

The 1920 keynoter

said:
. . . the most essential remedy for high costs is
to keep up and increase production, and particularly
should every effort be made to advance the produc
tivity of the farms. . . . Just how much the Govern
ment can do in this direction is uncertain. . . .186
This transitional period was completed when the 1924 keynoter
admitted "that the condition of agriculture is today one of

184proceedings, 1904, pp. 40-42.
185proc;ee^j[nq S f 1908, p. 31.
186pr0ceedings, 1920, p. 22.
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our most perplexing problems . . .

we deplore the depression

which rests upon various branches of production."187

This

same speech reflected the pervasiveness of Republican dis
trust for artificial controls upon any segment of the economy.
Republican reliance upon natural processes and their hos
tility toward certain types of economic supports are clearly
indicated in the following statement from Burton's speech:
The Republican Party has shown its willingness to
extend liberality to the last degree in the enact
ment of legislation which will aid the farmer, but
it can not respond to impracticable theories or
accept measures which will only aggravate the situa
tion. Any artificial stimulus to prices which are
depressed by irresistible causes can only postpone
the evil day and add to the distress.
Inexorable
laws demand decreased acreage in certain staple
products and a wider diversification.
Numerous
remedies proposed for relief fail utterly- when
subjected to careful analysis. . . . Nothing which
promises a solution has been proposed, but I trust
some remedy may yet be found. . . .
A later keynoter was equally unable to cope with the farm
problem, and stated:
Sound relief will avoid artificial stimulus such
as government price fixing or government buying
and selling.
Such remedies will but defer the
day of reckoning.
All relief measures to be of
permanent value must be constructive and grounded
in economic principles underlying production and
consumption.
The solution is primarily economic,
not political.
It is more individual and collec
tive thaji governmental.
Whatever aid the govern
ment may give, the remedy lies largely with the
farmer himself. . . .189

187proCeedincrs, 1924, p. 22.
^^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1924, p. 23.
^ ^Proceedings, 1928, p. 49.
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Still a third period of transition occurred about the
time of the New Deal programs.

After discussing the "plight

of agriculture" and the "make-shift" remedies of the New
Deal, the keynoter said:
The farm problem must and will be met, without
violation of the Constitution, without regimen
tation, without burdensome taxes, and without
any program of curtailment or ruthless destruc
tion of food needed in a hungry world. . . .190
Still another keynoter admitted that farmers should be
assisted, but said:
These aids again must not be looked upon as a
solution to the agricultural problem, but only
as a temporary expedient to ease the maladjust
ment that exists. We must seek real solutions
in keeping with the natural economic forces that
are involved in our system. . . .191
The final phase in the evolution of Republican agri
cultural policy revealed in the keynote speeches came in
'1956.

Arthur B. Langlie, keynoter for the 1956 convention,

completely reversed the party's position on agriculture.
Stating that he "wanted to keep history straight," Langlie
said:
The decline in farm prices began right after World
War II. . . . B y the time this Republican Adminis
tration took office the bottom was falling out.
Quickly we shored up the falling prices.
Flexible

P r o c e e d i n g s . 1936, p. 39.
Senator Steiwer failed
to explain, however, precisely how this solution was to be
implemented.
Virtually all of his remarks about farming (as
well as business and labor) stressed the importance of
avoiding "artificial" controls and allowing the normal cycles
of economic law to assert themselves again.
191proceedings, 1940, p. 55.
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price supports took hold with the 1955
harvest. . . .192
Governor Langlie apparently disagreed with several of his
fellow keynoters who had bemoaned the fate of the farmer in
the 1920's and 1 9 3 0 'si

More importantly, however, it is

interesting to observe that "flexible price supports" are no
longer "artificial," but have become an important element of
Republican agricultural policy.

With this speech, the full

cycle of Republican attitudes toward farming was completed—
from slight interest, to involvement, to concern, to
avoidance of artificial measures, to the adoption of artifi
cial measures on a temporary basis, and, finally, to the
acceptance of flexible price supports.
In addition to claims that Republican policies pro
vided an impetus for business and manufacturing, and in
addition to assertions that Republican policies benefited
agriculture, the Republican keynoters said that their
policies aided the labor force.
Our Policies Aid the Labor Force
The claims of Republican keynoters that "our policies
aid the labor force" have been characterized by superficial
ity and ambiguity.

Unlike the discussions of agriculture or

manufacturing, the labor policies advanced by the keynote
speakers were brief and lacking in any discernable evolution

l92proceedings, 1956, p. 79.
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- or development.

Many of the keynoters, for example, merely

stated that under Republican administrations,
received higher wages than ever.

"...

labor

. . ;"193 another keynoter

listed advances for seamen, working women and children, and
the exclusion of Asiatic workers;

still another speaker

said that his party wanted "social justice" for the
laborer;

inc

one speaker explained that his party wanted to

improve the status of the working man.

He stated:

To the safety and inviting environment of the
laborer we must add his growing merits of com
pensation.
There can be no permanent material
good fortune that is not righteously shared,
there can be no real moral achievement that
does not lift the great rank and file to an
ever higher plane. . . .196
These few examples are typical of the comments made by
Republican keynoters regarding their party's policies toward
labor.
Supporting Materials Used With the Three Themes
That Republican Policies Benefit Business and
Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Labor
Although the keynote speakers used virtually every
kind of logical support for these three themes, no form of
support was employed with sufficient regularity to be

3-93prQCeedings, 1896, p. 28.
194proceedings, 1908, p. 31.
195proceedings, 1912, p. 94.
196proceedings, 1916, p. 25.
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regarded as characteristic.

Additionally, no ethical or

emotional proofs were consistently used to support the themes.
Summary
Over the years, Republican keynoters have claimed
that their party's policies were beneficial to all segments
of the economy.

The seventh, eighth, and ninth major themes

expressed this idea.

The seventh theme stated that "our

policies provide an impetus for business and manufacturing."
Although the keynoters spoke consistently in support of
business, their attitude toward trusts and large corporations
was less clearly articulated.

The eighth theme said that

"our policies are of benefit to agriculture."

The Republican

position on this theme gradually evolved from distrust of any
governmental controls to acceptance of flexible price supports.
The ninth theme asserted that "our policies aid the labor
force."

This theme was characterized by vagueness and

superficiality.

Although a variety of supporting materials

were employed with these three themes dealing with business,
labor, and agriculture, no form of support was inherently
characteristic.
Our Policies on Tariff and Trade Are Sound
The final major theme to be discussed, and one that
permeated most of the keynote speeches during the middle
period of Republican history, claimed that "our policies on
tariff and trade are sound."

Republican attitudes toward
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(1 )

tariff and trade can be grouped into three categories:
unmitigated praise;

(2 ) admission for need to reform or

revise; and (3) abandonment.
The first point of view toward Republican tariff and
trade policies, that of unadulterated praise, was frequently
expressed by the keynoters of the 1880's and 1890's.

The

1888 keynoter, after stating that the Republican party was
the party of protection, said:
. . . it stands for the protection of American
commerce, American manufacture and American
agriculture from disastrous foreign competition;
stands for the protection of home invention, home
skill and home labor from the free trade heresies
which would degrade and pauperize them all. . . .197
Other keynoters in this period explained that Republican
tariff policies "were fitted to meet the requirements of our
necessary expenditures, to furnish the needed protection to
our farmers and manufacturers, and to insure the steady and
remunerative employment to those who labor.

. . .

i go

This

unmitigated praise for the protective tariff policy continued
until 1912, at which time the keynoter realized a need for
reform.

This speech marks the beginning of the second cate

gory of attitudes toward tariff and trade.
Recognizing that the policy of protection had been
abused, the 1912 keynoter stated:
We stand not for the abuses of the tariff but for

•'•^Proceedings, 1888, p. 13.
198proceedinqs, 1900, p. 36.
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the beneficent u s e s . . . . The chief cause of
abuse has been that we have outgrown our old
method of tariff making.
Our productive indus
tries have become too vast and complicated, our
commercial relations too extensive, for any
committee of Congress of itself to get at the
facts to which the principle of protection may
be properly applied.
The Republican party pro
poses to remedy this defective method. . . .199
Although the protective tariff was mentioned in the conven
tions from 1916 to 1928, it was not until the 1932 convention
that a Republican keynoter returned to hearty praise for a
protective tariff .200

The 1932 speaker said:

Since the beginning of the depression, the Demo
cratic Party has shown an utter lack of cohesion
on every important issue, and on none has it been
more divided than on the tariff. . . .
In contrast to the wabbling of the Democrats,
the Republican Party has followed a straight
course on this as on every great issue. . . .
Coming into existence as the party of protection
— protection to the American farmer, to the
American working man and to the American industry
— our party has remained true to this principle.
And the soundness of its position was never more
abundantly demonstrated than in this period of
world crisis. . . .201
The speech of the 1936 keynoter marks the end of this second
category of ideas regarding the protective tariff.

The 1936

speaker observed that one of the "fundamentals of established
national policy is tariff protection of efficient American

199proceedings, 1912, pp. 91-92.
200By 1932, the depression had apparently enhanced the
appeal of protective tariff policies.
L. J. Dickinson re
turned to the same refrain that had been repeated by Republi
can keynoters since 1888, and sang the praise of protection.
20^Proceedings, 1932, p. 30.
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production.

America, does not propose to destroy the oppor

tunity of our citizens by giving up this protection."20^
No keynoter since 1936 has returned to the protective
tariff theme.

Thus, Republican keynoters have praised the

protective tariff and trade policies without reservation,
later admitted the need for certain reforms, and, finally,
abandoned the theme that "our policies on tariff and trade
are sound."
Supporting Materials Employed With
the Tariff and Trade Theme
While most of the keynoters employed varied support
ing material for the idea that Republican tariff and trade
policies are sound, only one type of logical proof can be
labeled as a characteristic form of support for this theme.
Logical proofs.— Among the keynote speakers who dis
cussed the tariff and trade theme, virtually all of them
relied on supporting evidence by causal reasoning.

In 1932,

for example, the keynoter said that the "Republican tariff
has preserved the American market for the American
producer ."203

The 1896 keynoter also employed causal reason

ing when he stated:
The Democratic party had at Chicago condemned the
protective tariff principle as unconstitutional;

202proceedings, 1936, p. 40.
203proceedings, 1932, p. 30.
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and solemnly pledged itself to the overthrow
and destruction of the McKinley law and to the
adoption of free trade as the policy of the
United States.
This bold, aggressive attack
upon the long settled principles of the Repub
lican party brought its natural fruit in shaken
confidence, unsettled business; and we were
seen drifting against the rock of destruction.204
Still another keynoter said that under Republican leadership
. . . the policy of protection to American industry
and American labor was established, developed, and
vindicated; and the markets of the world opened by
the bright, persuasive logic of reciprocity, to the
products of the American farm, as well as to the
American workshop, until to-day the nations of the
earth are paying tribute to the sagacity of our
legislation and diplomacy, in millions of dollars
increased annual p u r c h a s e s . 205
These examples are representative of the keynoters' attempts
to show through causal reasoning that "our tariff and trade
policies are sound."
Ethical and emotional proofs.— Other than a few vague
and amorphous appeals to security, no ethical or emotional
appeals characteristically appeared with the tariff and trade
theme.
Summary
The tenth and final major theme advocated by the
Republican keynoters stated that "our policies on tariff and
trade are sound."

Prior to the turn of the century, most

keynoters had abundant and unqualified praise for protective

^^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1896, p. 28.
205proceedings, 1892, p. 13.
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tariffs.

Later, several of the speakers admitted the need

for slight revision and reform.

During the depression era,

two keynoters returned to unmitigated praise for protection.
By 1936, the theme that "our policies on tariff and trade
are sound" had been abandoned.

The only characteristic form

of support consistently accompanying this theme was causal
reasoning.
These ten themes were the major arguments advanced
for over one hundred years by twenty-eight Republican key
note speakers.

In addition to these ten themes, however,

numerous minor themes emerged during the years studied.
II.

MINOR THEMES

Over the years, numerous minor themes appeared in the
twenty-eight keynote speeches, each receiving varying degrees
of emphasis.

Included among these minor themes were:

(1)

our party has been instrumental in gaining civil rights for
all citizens;

(2) Democratic administrations consistently

misconduct wars;

(3) the United States is a more effective

world power when under Republican control;
are effective anti-Communists.

(4) Republicans

The minor theme that

appeared in the speeches from 1856 through Grant's adminis
tration was that the Republican party had abolished slavery
and had saved the union.
All these minor themes occurred with so little con
sistency and such irregularity that they are not discussed

further in this study.
In addition to the foregoing analysis of major themes
and supporting materials, this study will attempt to describe
characteristic organizational techniques employed by the key
noters .
Organization
It is exceedingly difficult to formulate meaningful
generalizations regarding inherent organizational techniques
of Republican keynote speeches.

One reason for this diffi

culty is the multipurposive nature of the speeches themselves.
Seldom does a keynote speech have a clearly stated central
throught or proposition.

It is of little value to argue that

each speech has an implied proposition that "our candidates
are splendid and will win the election," for such a propo
sition is inherent in the nature of the convention system—
each party in each convention pays at least lip service to
this argument.
An examination of the themes and supporting materials
seems to indicate that most of the speeches are designed to
stimulate rather than to inform, convince, or persuade.

When

the party is in power, the major arguments and themes tend
to be phrased defensively, e.g., Burton's argument that the
"entire government is not corrupt."206

vJhen the party is

out of power, the keynoters' themes and arguments are often

^ ^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1924, pp. 29-30.
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stated as a need to change the status qu o f e.g.,

"Democrats

are hostile to business and cause depression (or inflation)."
Other than this rather obvious conclusion, little can be
said regarding inherent features of the emergence of central
themes in the speeches.
With the exception of Root's two speeches in 1904 and
1912, and Stassen's 1940 speech, none of the keynote speeches
are notable for their clear and effective organization.
These three speeches make extensive use of previews, transi
tions, and summaries, while most of the other keynote
addresses lack such organizational devices.

This deficiency

probably creates no real difficulty, however, for almost all
of the speeches are partitioned topically, and the shift
from one ,area of discussion to another is usually apparent.
In addition to emergence of the central thoughts and the
choices of organizational devices, certain aspects of the
introductions are worthy of brief discussion.
Introductions
The introductions of the keynote speeches fall into
two distinct groupings:

(1) the speeches from 1856 to 1896,

and (2) the speeches from 1900 to the present.
For a period of forty years— from 1856 to 1896, every
Republican keynoter began his address with an attempt to gain
the good will of his audience by expressions of appreciation,
humility, or unworthiness.

Several examples should suffice

to indicate the nature of these ethical proofs.

In 1856,
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for example, the keynoter began his speech by stating:
Gentlemen, Delegates to the Republican Convention:
I feel deeply the honor which you have just conferred
upon me, and I return you my sincere thanks for it.
Certainly it is owing to no merit of mine that I have
been singled out for this compliment. Nothing beyond
the zeal which I feel in the common cause that has
brought us here together could possibly entitle me to
it. And in that respect I claim_not to be behind any
one of you. . . .207
The introduction of the 1860 keynoter is also typical of
this early period.

The keynoter began:

X have no words in which properly to express my sense
of the honor— and the undeserved honor, I think it is
— of being called upon to preside temporally [sic]
over the deliberations of this Convention.
I shall not attempt a task which I feel inadequate
to perform. Be sure, gentlemen, that I am not in
sensible to this high and undeserved honor.
I shall
carry the recollection of it, and of your manifesta
tion of partiality with me until the day of my
death. 2OS
These examples are characteristic of the introductions to
the keynote speeches delivered from 1856 to 1896.
None of the speeches given after 1896 begin with such
expressions of humility or unworthiness.
Although most of the Republican keynote speeches are
lengthy, the introductions are consistently short— ^seldom
longer than three paragraphs.
reasons for this brevity:

There seem to be several

(1 ) since the speaker is often

prestigious and the audience's attention should be voluntary,
material designed to gain involuntary attention is often

207proceedings, 1856, pp. 15-16.
2OSproceedings, 1860, p. 85.
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omitted;

(2 ) since the speaker is chosen partly because of

his political prowess, ethical appeals to show his qualifi
cations are omitted;^09 an<j (3 ) since the role of the key
noter is steeped in tradition and custom, there is little
need for the speaker to secure an intelligent hearing by
explaining or defining his role in the convention program.
Conclusions
Insofar as characteristics of the keynote genre are
concerned, the conclusions of the speeches are particularly
significant.

The conclusions of the keynote addresses are

somewhat more revealing than the introductions.

Seldom do

Republican keynoters summarize or re-state arguments;
rather, the conclusions are consistently centered around an
appeal— patriotic, religious, or a combination of both.

In

1940, for example, the keynoter concluded:
Let us remember the words George Washington spoke
in this very city:
'If to please the people we
offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we
afterwards defend our work.
Let us raise a stand
ard to which the wise and honest can repair. The
event is in the hands of G o d . '210
A similar combination of patriotic and religious appeal
occurred in the conclusion of the 1936 keynote speech:
And now I ask the simple questions— will America
live or die? And I answer that America will live

20^Except for isolated references in the speeches
since 1932, the introduction of radio and television seems
to have had little or no influence on the speakers' use of
ethical appeals.
210proceedinqs, 1940, p. 60.
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because the people are firmly resolved that our
Nation shall not die. When have we ever tested
the full measure of the people's strength? . . .
The full measure and depth of a great people's
will is unknown, even to themselves.
The secret
lies hidden in the omnipotent mind of the Creator
of all courage and all resolution.
To Him let our
prayers be offered that an aroused America, cast
ing out all doubt, will vindicate the faith of the
fathers. We shall not falter, but in new found
strength will hold high, in the splendor of a
bright dawn, the banner of a Nation's liberties. 11
Still another such example can be taken from the conclusion
of the 1944 speech:
It takes faith to build such an America— a strong
faith, the same faith that now sustains our fight
ing men; a faith that is truly 'the substance of
things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen .1
With such a faith— which is our faith— we shall
march under God toward victory, toward opportunity,
toward p e a c e . 212
These several examples of appeals should suffice to illus
trate the kinds of conclusions present in over four-fifths
of the keynote speeches.
In only two instances did keynoters restate what they
considered to be the most important part of their speech.
In 1896, for example, the keynoter stated:
My friends, the campaign of 1896 is upon us.
The
great questions for debate in the august forum of
the United States are Free Trade and Free Silver
against a Protective Tariff and Sound Money. . . .213
The only other instance of restatement came in the conclusion
of the 1920 keynote address of Senator Lodge.

2H p r o c e e d i n g s , 1936, p. 46.
212proCeedinqs, 1944, p. 56.
213Proceedings, 1896, p. 32.

The speaker

223
instructed his auditors that the League of Nations was the
most important of the campaign issues.

Lodge stated:

We of the Senate believe that we have performed a
high and patriotic duty and we ask you, representa
tives of the Republican party, to approve our course
and stand by what we have done. . . . The next act
will fill a larger stage and the people will decide
between us and the President.
The League must be
discussed in every district and in every State and
we desire to have the verdict so clearly given that
no man who seeks to represent the people in the
Senate, in the House or in any place or any degree,
can have the slightest doubt as to his duty. . . .
We make the issue; we ask approbation for what we
have done.
The people will now tell us what they
think of Mr. Wilson's League and its sacrifices of
America. . . .214
In these two examples, the keynoters isolated the issue or
issues for the forthcoming campaign.

With the exception of

the earliest Republican keynoters, who wanted to rid the
nation of the blight of human slavery, no other Republican
keynote speakers used such techniques.

These latter exam

ples are important, for they partially substantiate the
opinions held by delegates, outsiders, and Republican
leaders that one of the functions of the keynote speech is
to focus attention on the issues to be raised in the Novem
ber election.

These two speakers evidently felt that their

primary purpose was to urge the convention delegates to
isolate the important issues and to wage the campaign on
them; otherwise,

it seems dubious that a speaker would talk

for over an hour about many issues, and not single out the
one that he regarded as most vital.

2-^Proceedings, 1920, p. 31.

On the strength of
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these few examples, however, it could not be said that a
primary purpose of the keynote genre is the isolation of
issues for the forthcoming campaign.
Extrinsic Means of Persuasion
Most of the factors discussed thus far in this chapter
have concerned intrinsic elements of persuasion— the result
of the speaker's inventive process.

This portion of the

analysis suggests several forms of extrinsic persuasion that
lie beyond the speaker1s invention and that are often present
in the convention situation.
1.

The common response:

As was mentioned earlier in

the study, one of the characteristics of the keynote speech
is the frequent oral response by the audience to the speaker's
rhetorical questions.

Other such mass responses include

singing, chanting, parading, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,
and clapping.

All of these activities form an important seg

ment of the campaign-rally function of the convention.

All

of these mass responses contribute to the delegates' feelings
of belonging to a united movement rather than a collection of
individuals from various states.

The very fact that the

delegates are usually crowded together with little space to
move around, increases the probability of common responses
to a given stimuli.
2.

Other events on the agenda:

Additional events

have been added to the convention agenda since the original
convention of 1856.

The prayers given in Republican national
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conventions, for example, merit brief attention for their
incorporation of the history and hero theme!

In 1872, the

minister's prayer incorporated references and quotations
from Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address.
Alexander Reed prayed:
freedom."215

The Rev. Dr.

"We thank thee for our new birth of

iqq^ p rayer was even more prolific in its

thanks for "our glorious National heritage," Plymouth Rock,
Yorktown, Appomattox, the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution of the United States, land, laws, institutions,
Q *1 C .

and the Emancipation Proclamation.

Frequently, such

patriotic symbols are also presented by the national chair
man, the permanent chairman, the mayor, the governor, and
finally are sung by various choirs, quartets, or soloists.
It is probably little wonder that keynoters in recent years
have tended to lessen their reliance on such heroes and
history.
It is difficult to exaggerate regarding such items on
the program, for at some time or another even the most far
fetched events have occurred.

In 1900, for example, the New

York Times reported that following the singing of the Star
Spangled Banner,
. . . a remarkable tribute to the flag and the pioneers
of the Republican Party then occurred. Mr. Wolcott
stepped forward and stated that fifteen survivors of
the first Republican Convention called at Pittsburg

^-^Proceedings, 1872, p. 5.
^^ P r o c e e d i n g s , 1884, p. 17.
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forty-four years ago, were present with the same
old flag used in that convention. At that moment
a file of white-haired patriarchs appeared from
the rear, bearing at their head a faded American
flag, tattered and barely held together by a cross
staff.
As the flag appeared the audience rose, delegates,
spectators, and guests, and a deafening salute went
up for the faded standard and its venerable up
holders. . . .217
In the 1936 convention, Alfred M. Landon1s favorite song—
"Oh Susanna"— became the convention's theme song.

Delegates,

alternates, guests, and musicians sang and played the song
over eight hundred times before the convention

a d j o u r n e d . 218

To reinforce the idea that U. S. Grant was a man of peace,
white doves were released in the convention hall when Grant
was nominated in 1868.219
3.

Physical effects:

In the 1924 convention held in

Cleveland, each time a patriotic event took place in the hall
(the Pledge of Allegiance, the "Star Spangled Banner," and
the singing of "America"),

"...

the enthusiasm of the

multitude was heightened by a flooding of the convention with
red, white, and blue lights from the ceiling ."220

As £ar

back as the 1860 convention, large portraits of the party
leaders have been displayed in prominent places in the con
vention

h a l l .
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217uew York Times, June 21, 1900, p. 2.
218Merkin, op. cit., p. 133.

(Underlining is my own.)

^■^Mayer, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
2 2 0 p roc;eed i n q S f

1 9 2 4 ,

p p .

22lMayer, pp. cit., p. 67.

7 - 9 .
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4.

Prestige personalities:

In addition to the

appearances of famous entertainers such as Ethel Merman,
such operatic figures as James Melton and William Warfield,
and such conductors as John Philip Sousa, the keynoter's
ethos is enhanced by the band of party leaders who tradi
tionally escort him to the speaker's platform.
Although the specific effects of these extrinsic
means of persuasion are difficult to determine,
obvious that they:

it seems

(1 ) provide physical aids to focus the

attention of the delegates;
responses from the audience;

(2 ) help achieve unity by common
(3) supplement (or perhaps

detract from) standard emotional themes of the keynoter;

(4)

supply a large quantity of the ritualism necessary for the
campaign-rally function of the convention; and (5) provide
some common ground of emotion between the laity and the
party professionals.
Summary
An analysis of the Republican keynote speeches de
livered between 1856 and 1964 revealed ten major themes that
occurred regularly.

These major themes are listed below

according to their importance:
1. Our party is worthy of praise for its glorious
history and outstanding leaders.
2. The Democratic party (or a specific Democratic
administration) is inferior in many ways and deserves
criticism.
3.

We need unity and harmony.

228
4.

America is wonderful.

5.

Our fiscal policies are excellent.

6 . The centralization of power is dangerous; we
are concerned about the individual American citizen.
7. Our policies provide an impetus for business
and manufacturing.

8 . Our

policies are of benefit to agriculture.

9.

Our

policies aid the labor force.

10.

Our

policies on tariff and trade are sound.

One of the themes most characteristic of Republican
"keynoting was that "our party is worthy of praise for its
glorious history and outstanding leaders."

Over the years,

keynoters praised party heroes, national heroes, national
history or historic sites, the flag, the Constitution, the
American war dead, and the Union.

Although a variety of

supporting materials were used with this theme, appeals to
patriotism, emotive language, assertion, specific instances,
rhetorical questions, authority, beneficial legislation, and
appeals for morality were most common.
The second most characteristic theme of the Republican
keynoter was that the "Democratic party (or a specific Demo
cratic administration)
criticism."

is inferior in many ways and deserves

Such attacks usually were centered on party

leaders, party motives, party history, or specific party
policies.

Every speech given from 1856 to 1965 contained at

least one example of this second theme.

The Republicans sup

ported this theme with negative ethos against the Democrats,
and by the use of assertion, rhetorical questions, comparison,

sarcasm, ridicule and humor.
Appeals for unity and harmony constituted the third
major theme of the Republican keynoters, occurring in over
four-fifths of the speeches.

Such appeals were usually

brief except when the party was split or leaderless.

This

third theme lacks any characteristic forms of supporting
material.
A fourth theme that is characteristic of Republican
keynoting states that "America is wonderfulI"

Although a

variety of reasons were given to support this theme, the two
reasons that were most common were

(1 ) our material wealth,

and (2) our admirable form of government.

This theme was

supported by appeals to ownership and possession, appeals
to patriotism, and assertion.
A fifth major theme that characterized the Republican
keynote genre stated that "our fiscal policies are excel
lent."

Many of the speakers argued for efficiency,

spending, sound currency, and freedom from controls.

less
Repub

lican positions on each of these matters varied throughout
the period studied.

Supporting materials for this financial

theme were primarily logical, with examples, causal reason
ing, comparison, and statistics being most characteristic.
A sixth major theme of the Republican keynoters stated
that the centralization of power was dangerous and that the
Republican party was concerned about the individual American
citizen.

This theme was most frequent during the New Deal

era and was most often supported by appeals to freedom from
restraint.
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The seventh major theme advocated by Republican key
note speakers stated that "our policies provide an impetus
for business and manufacturing."

Although many of the

speakers were vague in the matter of trusts, the keynoters
consistently supported the importance of business in the
American economy.
An eighth major theme claimed that "our policies are
of benefit to agriculture."

The keynoters' ideas reflected

a change in Republican policies regarding farming, moving
from distrust to artificial controls to acceptance of flex
ible price supports.
The ninth major theme enunciated by Republican key
noters was that "our policies aid the labor force."

This

theme was characterized by vagueness, superficiality, and
lack of logical progression.
The final major theme advocated by Republican key
noters urged that "our policies on tariff and trade are
sound."

The party's position on the matter of protection

shifted from unqualified support to the need for reform, and
finally, to abandonment.

This theme was most often supported

by causal reasoning.
Although several minor themes emerged from the key
note speeches, they lacked consistency and regularity.
With only a few exceptions, the speeches were not
particularly notable for their organization.

All but three

were organized topically; introductions were brief, omitting
appeals for interest, attention, and intelligence, and
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relying on good will; all of the early keynoters began their
speeches with expressions of humility or unworthiness— this
practice was discontinued by 1900.

In all but two instances,

conclusions utilized appeal rather than summary or restate
ment.

The majority of such appeals combined patriotism and

religious feeling.
Although their specific influence cannot be determined,
extrinsic means of persuasion exerted an effect upon the
campaign-rally function of the convention, and consequently
upon the keynote speech.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the speaking
of the keynoter in Republican national conventions from 1856
to 1964.

The study sought to determine the purposes and

characteristics of the keynote speech and to analyze the
methods and significance of the Republican keynote speaker.
Specifically, the question posed by this study was:

When

viewed as a genre— as a type or kind of speech— what are the
inherently unique features of the Republican keynote address?
KEYNOTING DEFINED
Traditionally, the speech of the temporary chairman
of the convention has been labeled as the keynote speech.
The only three exceptions to this procedure occurred in the
Republican national conventions of 1952, 1956, and 1960.

In

these years, the Republican national committee created two
separate positions— a temporary chairman to preside while
the permanent organization was being formed and a keynote
speaker whose sole responsibility was to give a speech.

As

it appears in this study, the keynote speech is a long, often
vitriolic, usually ill-supported, carefully prepared, well
232
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publicized speech, that historically has been designed to
stimulate, convince, or persuade both the delegates and the
public of the desirability or

undesirability of a course of

action, an administration, a party, a party faction, or an
individual.

In recent years, the speech has been increas

ingly directed to radio, television, and the press rather
than to the assembled delegates and guests.

Additionally,

the speech usually reflects the position of the party rather
than merely voicing the opinions of the speaker.

The keynote

speech has long been a part of convention activity.
WHY STUDY KEYNOTING IN REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS?
This study of Republican keynoting seemed justified
for the following reasons:
1.
over

The fact that the keynote address has existed for

ahundred years appears .to indicate that it has at

least minor importance in the affairs of the convention.
2.

Many outstanding speakers have keynoted Republican

national conventions between 1856 and 1964.
3.
political

The importance ofthe convention system in American
life is undisputed.

All aspects, however tan

gential, of such an important institution, merit analysis and
evaluation.
4.

The keynote speech of a national political conven

tion usually receives widespread attention and publicity.
5.

This study, when paralleled with E. Neal Claussen's
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analysis of Democratic keynoting, will offer a complete and
thorough treatment of keynoting in both major political
<—

tr

parties.

6.

This study of Republican keynoting provides an

opportunity to examine the evolution of this kind of speaking
over a period spanning a century of American political life.
METHOD OF DEVELOPMENT
In order to examine the highly complex relationship
that exists among keynoter, party, occasion, and delegate,
this study attempted to focus attention on keynote speaking
as a genre— as a type or kind of speaking.

Consequently,

the direction of the study was to ferret out recurring ideas,
themes, methods of argument, and forms of support, rather
than to discuss techniques or ideas that occurred only
occasionally.
Among the numerous questions posed by this study were:
1.

Who were the keynoters and what qualities or

qualifications did they possess?
2.

What common characteristics or qualities can be

observed among all twenty-eight keynoters?
3.

What rationale does the national committee use

when they select a keynoter?
4.

What is the role of the arrangements committee and

the national chairman in the selection of the keynoter?
5.

What are the attitudes of the delegates regarding

the selection of the keynoter?
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6.

What is the place of the speech in the convention

organization?
7.

What are the views of newspaper writers, casual

observers, delegates, members of the Republican leadership,
and of the keynoters themselves regarding the purpose of the
speech?

8.

Do the specific purposes of the keynote speeches

9.

What common themes and arguments occur repeatedly

vary?

in all of the Republican keynote speeches?
10.

How did the keynote speakers support their ideas?

11.

What motive appeals, if any, were most often

employed?
12.

Do the speeches reveal the use of popular symbols

and heroes?
13.

Is the style of the keynote speeches highly

emotive?
14.

Do the ethical proofs establish the credibility

of the speaker, of the speaker's party, or both?
15.

Do the speeches reveal common organization tech

niques in partitioning or development?
16.

What are the inherently unique features of the

Republican keynote address?
17.

What is the significance of Republican keynoting?

18.

What major changes have occurred during the evolu

tion of the Republican keynote speech?
In order to fully understand the social and political
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setting in which the twenty-eight keynote speeches were
delivered, Chapter II attempted to analyze the nature of
conventions and convention audiences.
THE SETTING:

THE CONVENTION

During the early history of the United States, three
methods of selection and election were employed in the choice
of a President.

The first method allowed the members of the

electoral college to exercise their independent judgment.
The second method provided that a caucus of party members
determine the choice of candidates.

The third method of

selecting candidates was the national nominating convention.
The practice of having the temporary chairman of the
convention address the delegates after assuming the chair
was adopted by the Republicans in 1856.

Although the origin

of this practice is open to question, the tradition probably
began in the 1832 Democratic convention.
In order to better understand the setting in which
the keynote speeches were delivered, it .seems important to
examine briefly the purpose of the convention itself.
The Function of the Convention
At the outset, it is vital to distinguish between the
"observable" convention that is seen by the delegates, guests,
and television viewers, as contrasted to the "real" convention
that controls the decision-making apparatus of the party.
This distinction between the dual nature of the convention
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is essential, for to misunderstand the convention purposes
is to misinterpret the function and significance of the key
note speech.

It is of little value to criticize the keynote

speech for having slight effect upon the decision-making
apparatus of the "real" convention.

Indeed, the keynote

speech is an integral part of the observable convention, and
often, _is not designed to function as ja kind of deliberative
rhetoric.

As this study points out, a national political

convention usually has, in addition to its deliberative
function, a campaign-rally function, a cohesive function, a
compromising function, a propaganda function, and a ratify
ing function.

In order to ascertain the relationship of the

keynoter to these various functions, several categories of
convention criticisms were examined in the earlier part of
the study.

(Since this study was concerned with the

"observable" convention rather than the "real" convention,
the term "convention" refers to the former of the two pur
poses .)
Most convention criticism falls into rather distinct
categories:
1.

The "carnival" atmosphere of the convention with

its noise, confusion, and chaos, has been deplored by news
paper writers, casual observers, scholars, delegates, and
members of the party leadership.
Since the keynote speech is often a part of this
"carnival" atmosphere, it is important to establish a
rationale for the seeming chaos and confusion.

One of the
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primary explanations for this atmosphere is the nature of
the "campaign-rally" function of the convention— to rein
force party loyalty prior to the campaign; to stimulate the
party and the public; and to provide a seemingly dynamic
setting in which the grass-roots laity supporters can mingle
with the party professionals.
Much of the excitement and turmoil is admittedly
excessive.

Yet, the needed sense of unity and belonging

could probably not be achieved by cold calculated ration
ality; hence, the atmosphere of the convention itself is
designed to serve specific and premeditated ends.
2.

Many critics felt that national political conven

tions were too large— too unwieldy to function efficiently.
This criticism is significant, for increased size indirectly
brought about increased rigidity, formality, ritualism, and
lack of spontaneity to the convention activities.
3.
entirety.

Many critics condemned the convention in its
Such critics overlooked (a) the flexibility of the

system to meet changing social or political conditions;

(b)

the advantage of allowing new personalities to rise quickly
to positions of party leadership;

(c) the necessity of pro

viding time and opportunity for compromise; and (d) the
important fact that the convention system is accepted as
legitimate by the populace.
4.

Still other critics of the convention system felt

that the proceedings were drawn out over too long a period.
The campaign-rally function and the compromise function of
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the convention, however, could probably not be achieved if
the convention were shortened to one or even two days.
5.

Another frequently occurring criticism of conven

tions argued that concern for precedent and tradition was
excessive.

Although such criticism has validity, this con

cern for precedent seems to add to the aura of legitimacy,
as well as being well known to the general public and the
participants.

6.

Finally, many critics were distressed by the

length, the quality, and the number of speeches delivered in
national political conventions.

An institution which has

varied purposes produces a variety of speeches.

Some of the

speeches are designed to (a) impress the general public;
maintain the enthusiasm of the delegates;

(b)

(c) provide a means

of publicity for the professional politicians;

(d) stimulate

party spirit; and (e) serve as "fillers" when there is no
other important convention business.
These areas of convention criticism indicate that con
ventions and convention speaking are multi-purposive.

As a

facet of this activity, the keynote speech cannot be con
sidered apart from this premise of multi-purposiveness.
THE CONVENTION SETTING:

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Information regarding delegates to Republican national
conventions from 1856 to 1964 is sparse.

On the basis of a

limited sample, however, the average delegate was between
fifty and sixty years old, male, Caucasian, Protestant,
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reasonably well educated, and having above average income.
Half of the Republican national conventions have been
held in Chicago.

Regardless of the site of the convention,

delegates have frequently been uncomfortable and unable to
hear what was being said on the platform due to the physical
surroundings of the convention hall.
The growing significance of the television audience
has resulted in the impediment of private deliberations, the
shortening of speeches, and the streamlining of the conven
tion program.
The setting for the keynoters 1 speeches have often
been characterized by noise, drinking, hilarity, apathy,
hostility, and masses of humanity.
The third chapter of the study discussed the positions
of the keynoters, their residences, their qualifications,
and the rationale for their selection.
THE KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
There was no single rationale for selecting a keynote
speaker in Republican national conventions.
writers,

Newspaper

scholars, and casual observers, as well as dele

gates and members of the Republican hierarchy agreed that
the speaker should have some degree of oratorical ability.
Another frequently mentioned characteristic of the person
selected as keynoter was his political prowess.

Most of the

keynoters seemed to fall into two distinct categories:

(1 )

men who already possessed considerable power and prestige,
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and (2 ) men who were being groomed by the party for possible
future leadership.

Most of the delegates with whom the

writer discussed the matter of political power tended to sup
port the first of the two categories— that the keynoter
should have an established reputation.

Although "outsiders"

had little to say about the keynoter's geographical location,
many delegates and members of the Republican leadership
indicated that the keynoter's place of residence was important.
Occasionally, these three characteristics have been out
weighed by additional considerations such as appearance or
intraparty power struggles.
The largest single age group represented by the twentyeight keynoters was between fifty and fifty-five.

As a

group, the men selected to keynote Republican national con
ventions have been exceptionally well educated, most of them
having studied law.

In recent years, all keynoters have

been veterans and the majority of the speakers since 1940
have been governors.
Chapter IV of the study presented general information
regarding the keynote speeches.
THE KEYNOTE SPEECHES:

GENERAL INFORMATION

Since the convention itself is multi-purposive and
the keynote speech is an important part of the observable
convention, this portion of the analysis examined the keynote
speech from four points of view:

(1 ) views of newspaper

writers, casual observers, and scholarly writers;

(2 ) views
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of the delegates to various Republican national conventions;
(3) views of the national committee members and other leaders
in the Republican party; and (4) views of the keynoters them
selves .
Many of the "outsiders"

(newspaper writers, casual

observers, and scholars) agreed on four functions for the
keynote speech:
campaign ahead;

(a) set forth important issues for the
(b) stimulate the delegates;

(c) point with

pride to party accomplishments (if in office); and (d) attack
the opposition for any unpopular occurrence.
A large number of delegates to the national conven
tions felt that the primary purpose of the keynote speech
was to stimulate the delegates by setting the mood or tone
of the convention.

Other delegates felt that the speech was

primarily designed for radio and television listeners.
Still other delegates suggested that the speech should
isolate issues for the forthcoming campaign, stimulate the
nation, attack the opposition, or fill a combination of all
these requirements.

Some of the delegates felt that the

speech was unimportant.
Members of the Republican leadership were equally
divided as to the purpose and function of the keynote speech.
The largest number of respondents in this category regarded
the speech as primarily stimulating or inspirational.

Other

party leaders suggested (2 ) that the importance of the speech
lay in radio and television viewers;

(3) that the purpose of

the speeches vary, depending on whether or not the nominations
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would be hotly contested;

(4) that the speech has a number

of different purposes; and (5) that the keynote speeches
were insignificant.
Many of the keynote speakers evidenced an awareness
of the complexity of the keynote situation.

Although most

of the speakers agreed with the purposes and functions
expressed by the other three groups of commentators, the
keynoters were cognizant of the importance of current social,
political, and economic conditions.
In summary, newspaper writers, scholars, casual
observers, delegates, and members of the Republican hier
archy felt that the keynote speech should:
the delegates;
delegates;
on issues

(3) inform the

(4) inform the nation regarding party positions
(or convince them to accept the positions);

promote unity;
leader;

(2) stimulate the nation;

(1 ) stimulate

(5)

(6 ) provide a forum for a present or potential

(7) present philosophy rather than issues;

(8 ) pre

sent party views rather than the personal views of the key
noter;

(9) point with pride (if in office) and view with

alarm (if out of office); and (10 ) attract the attention of
radio and television auditors.
The keynoters themselves were in substantial agree
ment with these purposes, yet in all instances allowed for
some flexibility of purpose to meet the immediate demands of
audience and occasion.
The purpose of the keynote speech extends far beyond
the demands of the immediate audience.

Even in those

244
instances where a keynoter felt the need for argument, he
also was aware of the need to stimulate and excite; in the
cases where a keynoter desired to ridicule his opposition to
the delight of his immediate audience, he was aware of the
possible reactions of the reading or listening audience.
On the basis of the preceeding discussion, it appears
that the keynote speech cannot be consistently classified
under one of the five "general ends" of speech.

As a

political document, the speech of the keynoter must be
flexible enough to meet the changing political climate.
The fifth and final section of the study dealt with
the rhetorical characteristics of the keynote speeches.
THE SPEECHES:

A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

By analyzing various repetitive rhetorical patterns,
Chapter V sought to determine the characteristics of the
keynote genre.

This analysis revealed ten dominant themes

that occurred with a high degree of regularity and repeti
tion.

Additionally, many of these themes were characterized

by a specific type of supporting material.
The theme most characteristic of Republican keynoting
was that "our party is worthy of praise for its glorious
history and outstanding leaders."

This theme was most often

supported by appeals to patriotism, emotive language,
assertion, specific instances, rhetorical questions,
authority, lists of beneficial legislation, and appeals for
morality.
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A second characteristic theme charged that the "Demo
cratic party (or a specific Democratic administration) is
inferior in many ways and deserves criticism."

This idea

was most often supported by negative ethos, and by assertion,
rhetorical questions, comparison, sarcasm, ridicule, and
h umor.
A third major theme called for "unity and harmony"
within the party.

This theme lacked a consistent form of

supporting material.
The fourth theme that is typical of Republican key
noting claimed that "America is wonderful."

This theme was

supported by appeals to ownership and possession, appeals to
patriotism, and by assertion.
The fifth major idea advocated by the keynoters
claimed that "our fiscal policies are excellent."

Supporting

materials for this theme were most often examples, causal
reasoning, comparison, and statistics.
A sixth major theme of the Republican keynoter
speakers stated that the "centralization of power is danger
ous; we are concerned about the individual American citizen."
This particular theme was characterized by appeals to free
dom from restraint.
The seventh theme of the Republican keynoters was
that "our policies provide an impetus for business and manu
facturing ."

This theme lacked any characteristic supporting

materials.
An eighth major argument claimed that "our policies
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are of benefit to agriculture."

This theme also lacked

characteristic forms of support.
The ninth major theme presented by the Republican key
note speakers said that "our policies aid the labor force."
Like the themes regarding business and agriculture, this
theme lacked any characteristic type of supporting details.
The final major theme advocated by the keynote speak
ers urged that "our policies on tariff and trade are sound."
This argument was most often supported by causal reasoning.
With only a few exceptions,

the speeches of the

Republican keynoters were not particularly notable for their
organization.

All but three of the speeches employed

topical organization;

introductions were usually brief,

omitting appeals for attention and interest, but relying on
appeals for good will.

All of the early keynoters included

expressions of humility or unworthiness in the speech intro
ductions— this practice was discontinued by 1900.

In all but

two speeches, the conclusions employed appeal rather than
summary or restatement.
Although their specific influence is difficult to
determine, extrinsic means of persuasion exert an influence
upon the campaign-rally function of the convention, and con
sequently upon the keynote speech and the keynote speaker.
In view of the stated purposes of this study, and in
view of the foregoing summary, several conclusions can be
drawn regarding Republican keynote speaking as a rehetoical
genre.
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Conclusions
The first and most obvious question to be posed at
this point in the study is:

do these individual keynote

speeches actually constitute a kind of rhetorical genre?

If

so, what are the inherent characteristics of this genre?
Although drastic changes have occurred to modify, if
not to eliminate many of the factors that were influential
in the origin and growth of the Republican keynote speech,
the speech has not become a purposeless vestige of the
convention.

In fact, one of the probable reasons for its

continued existence has been the flexible nature of the
speech in relation to the speaker, the convention, the
multiple audience, the party, and the immediate social or
political issues of the day.

Regardless of these variables,

however, certain facets of the keynote speeches tend to
occur with sufficient consistency and regularity to merit
the term "characteristic."

It is these "inherent" or

"characteristic" qualities of the keynote speeches that
justifies calling the twenty-eight speeches a genre.
INHERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
REPUBLICAN KEYNOTE SPEECHES
Before discussing the specifically inherent character
istics of the Republican keynote speech, it would be bene
ficial to bear in mind that any conception of keynoting must
take into account its dimension of time.

It may be even

more useful to think of the keynote speeches as an historical
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process rather than a patterned institutional behavior.

If

the keynote genre is viewed through time, additional aspects
of its multiplicity may be identified .1
One of the important qualities of the keynote genre
is the nature of the keynoter's role.

The speaker is

expected to present party views rather than personal views;
in the event of a contested nomination, tradition demands
that the keynoter remain neutral.

The keynoter should avoid

usurping the function of the platform committee as—well as
acknowledging any suggestions about his speech from the known
or probable nominees.

In effect, the keynoter should be an

image-maker rather than a policy-maker.

In many ways, the

role of the keynote parallels Cotter and Hennessey's descrip
tion of the national chairman:
. . . [He] is expected to deal primarily with what
might be called public attitudes, loosely defined
feelings or mental habits of goodness or badness,
rather than public opinions. His job as party imagemaker has its parallel in the 'institutional adver
tising' of industrial public relations, where
generalized goodwill, rather than specific sales, is
sought. His hope is to make the audience identify
or empathize with his cause by appealing to symbols
with emotional content .2
Furthermore, the role of keynoter is becoming progressively
more clearly defined by the dictates of tradition and prece
dent.

Whereas the earliest keynoters were relatively free

^These phrases borrowed from V. 0. Key, Politics,
especially pages 218-249.
^Cotter and Hennessey, op. ci t ., p. 69.
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to discuss anything from platform issues to pansies, the
modern keynoter must deliver a keynote speech that approxi
mates that anticipated by the immediate and greater audience.
A keynote speech that does not coincide with a "traditional"
preconception held by the auditors may be poorly received.-^
As was pointed out in Chapter IV, many people, including
delegates, scholars, representatives of the press, and
Republican party leaders, are in virtual agreement that the
speech of the keynoter should attack the Democrats, discuss
some of the major campaign issues, thrill the delegates,
excite the public, and appeal for unity.

There appears to

be little doubt that one of the characteristics of the
Republican keynote genre is the somewhat stereotyped role
of the keynote speaker.

Although the speaker may vary the

specific content of his speech, the keynote format is p ri
marily dictated by precedent and tradition.
A second important quality of the keynote genre con
cerns the attempts of the keynoters to fulfill the purposes
of the "observable" convention.

An analysis of the themes

and supporting materials utilized by the Republican keynoters
tends to support the observation of Harold Lasswell and
Murray Edelman that "key signs provide an unifying experi
ence" exciting sentiments that often transcend limitations

3a good example of such an event occurred in the 1964
Republican convention, when Governor Hatfield broke precedent
by expressing his personal views on the John Birch Society.
Although such action was certainly not unethical or in poor
taste, it introduced an idea contrary to the dominant mood
of the convention.

of culture, race, religion, class, and personality .4

Edelraan

explains that one sense "in which key signs unify is through
so shaping the perception of experience as to still or mini
mize discontent ."5

As will be pointed out later, these

"key signs" are simply the major themes and arguments of the
Republican keynoters.

In order to stir the emotions of the

audience the keynoters engage in an endless search for a few
clever variations on the same basic themes.

These basic

themes that characterize the speeches of the Republican key
noters have been discussed in Chapter V.

Five of the ten

major themes are related directly to the purpose and function
of the observable convention.

Furthermore, each of these

five themes seems designed to stimulate or excite, rather
than to persuade or convince.

These five themes are:

(1)

our party is worthy of praise for its glorious history and
outstanding leaders;

(2) the Democratic party (or a specific

Democratic administration) is inferior in many ways and
deserves criticism;

(3) we need unity and harmony;

(4) America

is wonderful? and (5) the centralization of power is dangerous;
we are concerned about the individual American citizen.
The first of these five stimulative themes is the
"most characteristic" aspect of Republican keynote speaking.
Almost without exception, Republican keynoters claimed that

4Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 128.

5Ibid., p . 129.
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"our party is worthy of praise for its glorious history and
outstanding leaders."

Among the many techniques employed by

the keynoters to establish this theme were references to the
p a r t y ’s history and heroes.

In addition to their praise of

specific leaders such as Lincoln, Grant, Blaine, McKinley,
and others, the speakers often employed a "roll-call" type
of enumeration, in which they listed a series of party
heroes.

Still other keynoters recited the glorious history

of the Republican party from its origins to the present, or
mentioned national heroes, national history, the flag, the
Constitution, the American war dead, or the glories of the
.Union.

The emotional impact of these key symbols is due to

the fact that "they evoke the emotions associated with the
situation.

They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or

act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories
or humiliations, promises of future greatness.

. . .

Through this major appeal to history and heroes, the keynoters
were able to focus the listeners’ loyalties on specific ideas
and events.

6 Ibid., p. 6 . After commenting that such signs are
extremely powerful, Edelman states:
"While the content of
sign structures differ, they are alike in requiring man to
identify himself with something perceived as guiding his
course:
the right, the true, the inevitable. Thereby his
dubious acts are sanctified and his responsibility as an
individual entity minimized. The constitution, the laws of
nature, reason, or other potent symbols justify man's lot and
his acts; and they are invoked not only explicitly but also
implicitly through the structure of language."
(Ibid., p.
129.)
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This appeal is significant in its relationship to the
audience and the nature of the observable convention.

The

keynoters' appeal to history and heroes could easily serve
to establish common ground between the laity and the party
professionals.

Also, such an emotionally charged appeal

would undoubtedly contribute to the "atmosphere" of the
convention by attempting to stimulate and excite the
listeners.

Still another factor to be considered is that

such a history and hero theme could contribute a sense of
unity to a collection of "New England Republicans, prairie
Republicans, and lily-white Republicans.

The varied natures

of their Republicanism result from their local traditions,
loyalties, and economic and social conditions ."7
This major theme that "our party is worthy of praise
for its glorious history and outstanding leaders," was made
even more typical of the observable convention by the nature
of the supporting materials used to substantiate the key
noters ' claim.

In addition to reliance on highly emotive

language, appeals to patriotism, and relief of distress, the
keynoters virtually assured a common response from the audi
ence by asking numerous rhetorical questions and inviting the
audience to respond in unison.
The pervasiveness and frequency evidenced by this
first major theme dealing with heroes and history, tends to
confirm the opinions held by delegates, newspaper writers,

7Herring, The Politics of Democracy, p. 217.
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scholars, and members of the Republican hierarchy that the
keynote speech should thrill, excite, stimulate, or "key up"
the convention.

One method employed by the keynoters to

achieve this purpose has been the use of national and party
symbols that often were rich in connotative value and
elicited emotional responses from the audience.

The early

Republican keynoters probably used these symbols to focus
delegates' loyalties on familiar men and events; later key
noters added Republican heroes to the list of national
figures; in recent years, many keynoters rely on such
symbols to amplify ideas or support an argument rather than
to thrill the auditors.
A second major theme that was highly characteristic
of Republican keynoting was that "the Democratic party (or a
specific Democratic administration) is inferior in many ways
and deserves criticism." Although this criticism tended to
be most frequent when the Republicans were out of power, the
difference in quantity of criticism was slight.

The regu

larity with which these attacks on the Democrats occurred
seemed to support the opinions of delegates, outsiders, and
members of the Republican hierarchy who felt that one of the
primary functions of the keynote speech was to attack the
opposition.

Two of the forms of support employed with this

theme were particularly significant.

The first was a kind of

negative ethos— those proofs that attempted to associate the
Democratic party with corruption, dishonesty, immorality,
and other equally unsavory traits.

The second type of proof
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was emotional— (1 ) emotive language and (2 ) sarcasm, ridicule,
and humor.

These pathetic proofs for the attacks on the

Democratic party were among the few truly inherent character
istics of Republican keynote speaking.
The use of humor, sarcasm, and ridicule has been an
inherent characteristic of the Republican keynote speech
since the first convention in 1856..

The humor itself, how

ever, is less consistent— usually caustic, occasionally
clever, and frequently heavy-handed— but always partisan.
A third stimulative appeal coincided with the stated
purposes of the convention itself— "we need unity and
harmony."

Apparently, the delegates, outsiders, and Repub

lican leaders were correct in their observation that one of
the purposes of the keynote speech was to stimulate the
delegates' desire for unity within the party.
A fourth theme that appeared frequently in the twentyeight keynote speeches stated that "America is wonderful."
Although a variety of supporting materials were employed to
support this stimulative theme, the most interesting proofs
in relation to the relatively high income audience were the
appeals to ownership and possession.

The only forms of

support that characterized this theme were assertion and
appeals to patriotism.

The Republican keynoters evidently

hoped that their auditors would causally relate American
greatness to G.O.P. programs.
The final stimulative theme expounded by the speakers
linked two propositions related to the power of the government
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to the freedom of the individual.

Over three-fourths of the

keynoters argued that "the centralization of power is danger
ous; we are concerned about the individual citizen."

This

theme is often significant, primarily because of the sup
porting materials associated with it.

This theme abounded

with appeals to freedom from restraint, bemoaning Democratic
bureaucracy that stifled "individual initiative." and
encroached upon the individual liberties of the American
citizen.
These five "stimulative" themes and forms of support
associated with them tend to confirm the opinion of many
observers, both "insiders" and "outsiders," that the pur
pose of the keynote speech is to stimulate or excite rather
than persuade or convince.

Even though emotional proofs

outnumber logical or ethical proofs, these emotional appeals
seem designed to heighten the emotional involvement of the
partisan rather than to persuade the neutral or convince the
skeptic.

The emotive language and connotative symbols "serve

chiefly to provide motive force for incipient gestures rather
than to change the gestures."^
The five remaining major themes differ considerably
from those just discussed.

These five themes are:

fiscal policies are excellent;

(2 ) our policies provide an

impetus for business and manufacturing;
of benefit to agriculture;

(1) our

(3) our policies are

(4) our policies aid the labor

^Edelson, op_. c it., pp. 122-123.
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force; and (5) our policies on tariff and trade are sound.
\

Although these five themes occurred repeatedly in the
Republican keynote speeches, they are of less significance
than the five "stimulative" themes.

With several notable

/

exceptions, the Republican position on these latter five
themes has not been characterized by consistency nor
clarity.

In fact, their significance lies in the following

considerations:

(1 ) whereas the first five themes were

stimulative in purpose, the latter five are primarily con
vincing or persuasive;

(2 ) unlike the themes discussed pre

viously, two of the latter themes are characterized by a
predominance of logical proofs over ethical or logical
supports;

(3) the five final major themes generally lack

consistency, depth of analysis, or clarity of argument, but
must be considered as major themes because of their frequency;
(4)

these five themes provided a conveniently flexible

vehicle for traditional Republican appeals to the sanctity
of private enterprise, the marvelous works of the American
businessman, the need for a balanced budget, for the
abolition of artificial controls on the economy, and for
efficiency and economy in government.
These ten themes were the major arguments advanced
for over one hundred years by twenty-eight keynote speakers.
Although five themes were stimulative and five themes were
persuasive or convincing, the stimulative themes were more
significant and characteristic of the genre than were the
convincing or persuasive themes.
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Although all three modes of proof were used to support
these major arguments, only four logical forms of support
could be labeled as characteristic of the crenre;

(1 ) asser

tion and generalization;

(2 ) rhetorical questions and subse

quent audience response;

(3) emotive language; and (4)

sarcasm, ridicule, and humor.

Although causal reasoning was

frequently employed, this mode of proof was used much less
often than the four characteristic supports.
Most of the ethical proofs employed by the keynoters
S

were designed to enhance the reputation of the party.

These

forms of ethos were most often lists of beneficial legisla
tion, or the association of Republican leaders with traits
of honesty, morality, and integrity.

In addition to these

characteristics of the keynote genre, organizational tech
niques utilized by the keynoters reveal several inherent
qualities.
The multipurposive nature of the observable convention
seems to dictate the multiple functions of the keynote
speeches.

Seldom does a keynote speech have a clearly stated

central thought or proposition.

It is of little value to

suggest that each speech does indeed have an implied proposi
tion that "our candidates are splendid and will win the
election."

Such implied propositions are inherent in the

nature of the convention system— each party in each conven
tion employs this type argument.

Admittedly, some of the

keynote speeches did have concise, clearly stated themes. As
a characteristic of the entire genre, however, clearly stated

central thoughts must be omitted.
The earlier examination of themes and supporting
materials seems to indicate that most of the speeches were
designed to stimulate rather than to inform, convince or
persuade.
The Republican keynote speeches have been character
ized by brief introductions,

few transitions or previews,

topical organization, and rather lengthy emotionalized con
clusions.
Introductions to the keynote speeches fall into two
categories:

(1) the speeches delivered prior to 1900, and

(2) the speeches given from 1900 to the present.

Every

introduction from 1856 to 1900 was characterized by the
keynoters' attempts to gain good will through expressions of
appreciation, humility, or unworthiness.

All of the later

speeches lack this particular characteristic.

In contempo

rary keynote speeches, therefore, the introductions lack
significant inherent qualities.
One of the most notable characteristics of the Repub
lican keynote speeches are the conclusions.

Seldom do

Republican keynoters summarize or restate arguments; rather,
the conclusions are consistently centered around an appeal.
These appeals are usually a combination of patriotism and
religion, with the speakers attempting to associate their
party with Moses and Lincoln, God and Grant, and the Con
stitution and the Bible.

Daniel J. Boorstin labels this

mingling of politics and religion as the search for the
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"common denominator."

Boorstin states:

Whether all this talk is capable of producing agree
ment is really not too important, if, as I have
suggested, the agreement is there all the time. Much
of what passes for public debate in the United States
is, then, less an attempt to tell people what to think
than to state what everybody already thinks. One of
the reasons why we are willing— or even eager— to com
mit our social philosophy to a search for the lowest
common denominator is simply that we are so sure that
the agreement is already there, that the common
denominator really exists.
. . . in a curious and altogether characteristic
way the currents of our religious and our political
feelings mix. . . . Here each of the two areas of
thought, the political and the religious, seeks to
compensate for the vagueness and inadequacy of the
other by being still more explicit, without neces
sarily becoming more precise.
Thus we expect . . .
that a political speech should have 'uplift' or some
personally inspiring drift to it. . . .9
These combinations of religious and patriotic appeals were
consistently employed in the conclusions of the Republican
keynote spee che s .
In addition to the role of the speaker and the nature
of the speeches, the keynoter's function in the observable
convention is supplemented by a number of extrinsic means of
persuasion,

including (1) the common audience responses;

other events on the agenda;
prestige personalities.

(2)

(3) physical effects; and (4)

All these devices contribute to the

convention's campaign-rally function, unity function, and
common ground function.
The keynote speech is significant for a number of

^Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157-159.
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reasons, primarily (1) for its attempts to heighten the
enthusiasm of the delegates;

(2) for its role in attracting

public attention to the proceedings of the convention;

(3)

for its contribution to the ritualistic function of the con
vention; and (4) for its attempts to provide common ground
among the laity and party professionals.
MAJOR CHANGES IN THE KEYNOTE SPEECH DURING
THE PERIOD FROM 1856 TO 1964
Several changes in the genre occurred in the period
covered in this study.
1.

These major changes are:

Criticism of the Democrats was most frequent and.

vitriolic following w a r s , and during the administration of
Franklin Roosevelt.
2.

Republican attitudes toward regulation of the

economy have evolved from hostility to toleration.
3.

Although all of the keynote speeches contain

assertion, this form of support began increasing in frequency
when Franklin Roosevelt came to power in 1932.

The employ

ment of assertion has increased to the extent that in Mark
Hatfield's 1964 keynote speech, assertion outnumbered any
other form of support by a ratio of over ten to one.

(The

single exception to this trend was Judd's 1960 keynote
address.)
4.

Contemporary keynoters use fewer statistics than

did their predecessors, but the recent speakers have presented
these statistics more clearly and effectively.
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5.

Although Republican keynoters frequently stressed

the importance of individual freedom and a fear of central
ized power, these two ideas received particular emphasis
following wars and during the New Deal era.
6.

Even though many keynoters after 1928 relied on

history and heroes, later speakers used fewer such symbols
and used them with more restraint than their predecessors.
Although keynoters in recent years occasionally refer to the
Constitution, the great party leaders, or the American
heritage, seldom do they delve into such matters with the
gusto of the early keynoters.

In recent years, references

to history or heroes usually occur in stimulative rather
than argumentative contexts.
7. Since 1900, the Republican keynoters have not
begun their speeches with expressions of unworthiness,
humility, or appreciation.
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